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When it comes to the African continent extempers are used to talking about topics such as South Africa’s economy, the continent’s amazing economic potential in the twenty-first century, Chinese interests in the region, Robert Mugabe’s continued misrule of Zimbabwe, and conflict zones such as the Democratic Republic of Congo. What they have been less used to is talking about smaller African nations such as Burundi, but in light of significant political unrest extempers will probably be talking more about this country in the weeks and months ahead. Last April, President Pierre Nkurunziza announced that he would seek a third term. This would be normal under some democratic systems, but Burundi’s constitution, agreed to in 2006 after the end of a thirteen-year civil war, prohibits a president being elected to more than two terms. In light of Nkurunziza’s decision, opposition groups mounted several public protests and elements of the Burundian military sought to depose him in a coup in May. That attempt failed and since that time international observers have worried that Burundi is becoming a cauldron of political unrest, which could break down along ethnic lines and produce another mass genocide on the African continent reminiscent of what took place in Rwanda in 1994. Observers also worry about the radicalization of Burundian refugees and that the nation’s unrest could ignite a multi-national struggle between Burundi, Uganda, and Rwanda and their allies in East Africa. Additionally, Burundi’s unrest provides a test of the African Union’s (AU) ability to protect civilians populations in its member states and its willingness to prevent future crimes against humanity.
This topic brief will provide some background on the ongoing political conflict in Burundi, explain how the international community has responded to the issue, and breakdown some implications of the unrest for Burundi and its neighbors.
Readers are also encouraged to use the links below and in the related R&D to bolster their files about this topic.
Background of the Conflict
As noted in the introduction, extempers were probably unaware of Burundi’s situation prior to the end of last season due to the fact that it rarely came up in rounds. The nation is located in East Africa and it shares a border with more notable African states such as Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It also shares a border with Tanzania. The country is home to more than eleven million people and it was colonized by the Germans and Belgians during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Burundi received its independence from Belgium in July 1962 and it has struggled to establish a stable political system, with the nation transitioning from a monarchy to a republic within its first four years of statehood and enduring two civil wars during the late twentieth century.
Like many African nations, Burundi is divided along ethnic lines with Hutus composing 85% of the population, Tutsis 14%, and Twa 1%. The Washington Post reports on December 15 that expressing one’s ethnic solidarity and identity is encouraged in Burundi, with people openly discussing stereotypes such as Hutus being better at soccer, while Tutsis allegedly do better at math. However, these ethnic ties are nothing to laugh about when it comes to their implications for political, social, and economic stability. During colonization, the Germans and Belgians pitted Tutsis and Hutus against each other, mirroring policies used by the French in Rwanda where these two groups are also present. The minority Tutsis were given a greater political and economic role, taking on bureaucratic jobs and composing a large part of the Burundian army. The Washington Post notes that this legacy of discrimination is still felt in Burundi today as Tutsis have higher paying jobs and their children enjoy better educational benefits. Due to the nation’s demographic makeup, a democratic system would favor the Hutus, but between 1965-2001 the Burundian government was controlled by the Tutsis, owed largely due to the loyalty the Tutsi-dominated military had for Tutsi-led governments. In 1972 a genocide was directed by Tutsis against prominent Hutu leaders, military commanders, and the educated. Military-oriented rule gradually ended and democratic elections were held in 1993, with Hutu candidates winning a majority. However, Hutu leader Melchior Ndadaye was assassinated by Tutsi soldiers and his successor, Cyprien Ntaryamira, was killed when the plane he was flying in with Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana was shot down. That incident, according to Newsweek on December 21, threw Rwanda into a genocide where Hutus massacred Tutsis (and moderate Hutus) and threw Burundi into a civil war during which Hutu extremists targeted minority Tutsis, thereby producing the second genocide in Burundian history.
The ensuing civil war lasted until 2006 and claimed more than 300,000 lives. The conflict ended with the 2006 Arusha peace agreement that took steps to pacify lingering ethnic and political divisions in the country. The Toronto Star reports on December 26 that the agreement mandated that former Hutu rebels be integrated into the Tutsi-dominated army and power-sharing quotas were established to reduce Tutsi fears that a Hutu government would abuse their rights. For example, Tutsis are disproportionately allocated seats in the national legislature and they have significant influence in the civil service, thereby checking the Hutu majority. It is true that the military remains largely Tutsi, but its more heterogeneous makeup reduces the chance that the army will overthrow an existing government to recreate a Tutsi government, which is what took place in the 1960s and throughout the 1970s. Another provision of that agreement was that the Burundian president would only serve two elected terms. This was meant to prevent the consolidation of power by one individual, a problem in Burundi’s history.
It is the term limit provision that is driving the current unrest in Burundi. Last April, President Pierre Nkurunziza announced that he would be running for a third term. Extempers may wonder how Nkurunziza could justify doing this when the constitution prohibited the practice and the answer to this query is that it is all about semantics and interpretation. According to Newsweek on December 25, Nkurunziza was elected to his first term in 2005 by the Burundian parliament, not in a direct election by Burundi’s population. In the eyes of Nkurunziza, the constitution only applies to when a direct presidential election takes place, so his first term should not count against the number of times that he can serve. Needless to say opponents of Nkurunziza and his National Center for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CDNN-FDD) coalition saw his move as an undemocratic step that was in violation of the spirit of the Arusha agreement. Protests took place across the country, which some observers claim led to the suppression and arrest of dissident journalists and activists (Nkurunziza denies these claims). The stakes were raised in May when elements of the army attempted to overthrow Nkurunziza, who is a Hutu. However, this was not a coup driven by ethnicity as the BBC reports on December 17 that its leader, General Godfroid Niyombare, was also a Hutu. The coup collapsed after several days when the military sided with Nkurunziza and Niyombare is still at large. Nkurunziza did win a third term in office when Burundian voters cast ballots in July, but the BBC explains that opposition forces say that the election was unfair, with opposition leader Agathon Rwasa saying that they were “a joke.” In recent months there are signs that the nation may be headed toward civil war as Burundian security personnel have been attacked by rebel groups and Edouard Nshimirimana, a former lieutenant colonel in the Burundian army, who defected from the government in September, announced the creation of Les Forces Republicaine du Burundi (FOREBU) last week. It is still unclear how much strength FOREBU has, but if it becomes sizable or someone manages to rally rebel factions under a collective umbrella, Burundi’s government could become engaged in a destructive civil conflict.
International Responses to the Situation in Burundi
Obviously, one of the concerns of the international community is that Burundi’s political dispute will lead to a renewed civil war, thereby undermining the work of the Arusha peace agreement and potentially triggering a new genocide. The New York Times writes on December 17 that human rights activists warn that police and security forces are active in opposition strongholds throughout the country, conducting house-to-house searches and carrying out extrajudicial killings. The United Nations Human Rights Council has unanimously recommended that a monitoring team be sent to Burundi (such a team needs the permission of the Burundian government to carry out its work) and that the government needs to halt the use of torture, engage in talks with opposition groups, and disarm militias are that loyal to the government. UN High Commissioner of Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad al-Hussein has also said that the UN should take steps to impose travel and financial sanctions on individuals that are encouraging violence. The Washington Post explains that both sides in the conflict are using ethnic appeals, but thus far such language appears coded. For example, the government has told the population that uprisings against Nkurunziza are an “urban phenomenon,” which elements of the international community have taken to mean that the opposition is primarily Tutsi. It is also thought that police and intelligence services are behind many of the ongoing atrocities. This is significant because these branches of the government do not have to follow ethnic quotas in the Arusha agreement and are predominately Hutu. Nevertheless, it should be noted that ethnic attitudes have not yet hardened. The Tutsi-dominated military still backs Nkurunziza and opposition groups include both Hutus and Tutsis.
The possibility of a new civil war scares the African Union (AU), a group that has preached “African solutions for African problems” for years. To stick by that moniker, the AU is trying to show that it can prevent human rights abuses and genocide among its member states. International institutions such as the International Criminal Court have been criticized in recent years because of their prosecutions have been carried out largely against African heads of state, so to avoid this the AU would like to take a preventative role. The Daily Nation explains on December 27 that the African Union’s Peace and Security Council has approved the deployment of a 5,500 member peacekeeping force to Burundi. This force would be tasked with protecting civilians and preventing crimes against humanity. Burundi’s government has objected to the AU’s decision, using social media to call the AU step “an invasion” and The Washington Post notes on December 26 that Vice President Gaston Sindimwo led protests in the capital of Bujumbura against the AU last Saturday. Interestingly enough, it does not matter if Burundi likes the AU’s decision because a clause in the AU’s Constitutive Act, which established the organization, allows the AU to deploy peacekeepers over the objections of a member state if war crimes, genocide, or crimes against humanity are thought to be taking place. The AU has never deployed a peacekeeping force against a member state’s wishes, though, and the move still requires ratification by the UN Security Council. It is still uncertain whether the UN will take this step, with The Africa Review of December 26 writing that Russia has criticized calls for foreign intervention in Burundi and China may also use its veto on the Security Council to thwart the move. Therefore, the ongoing unrest in Burundi is becoming a test of the AU’s ability to police its members and is quickly becoming a test of its own credibility.
Burundi’s neighbors are monitoring the conflict carefully. This is due to the fact that an estimated 220,000 people have fled their homes due to violence since April. Newsweek explains on December 24 that many of these refugees are congregating in nearby Rwanda, with some going to the Mahama camp, the biggest refugee camp in the country. Refugees International, a U.S.-based advocacy group, warned earlier this month that refugees could be persuaded to join extremist militias or even be recruited by the Rwandan government to launch attacks against Nkurunziza’s government. Fighting those who forced you to leave your own country can be a powerful argument and reports are surfacing that rebels are trying to recruit a 5,000-strong army among displaced persons. This threat is compounded by the fact that Burundi’s borders are porous, which is one of the reasons that the United Nations has suggested the use of drones to police Burundi’s borders to stop the shipment of weapons into the country. Nkurunziza has suggested that Rwanda, a government that some hardline Hutus in Burundi see as sympathetic to Tutsis (despite the fact that Rwanda is also a Hutu-majority nation), is seeking to overthrow him and he is calling upon Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni for help.
Implications of Burundi’s Unrest
Thus far, East African heads of state appear to be talking a cautious position on the situation in Burundi. Museveni has offered to host talks this week between Nkurunziza and opposition groups at the Ugandan presidential palace in Entebbe. The Agence France Presse reports on December 27 that the talks might produce a breakthrough as the government has yet to meet with CNARED, an opposition coalition that has claimed that it is upholding the 2006 Arusha peace agreement by opposing Nkurunziza’s continued stay in office. The government claims that CNARED is a “terrorist organization,” but Museveni has welcomed it to attend talks along with other scattered elements of the opposition. If Museveni can pull off a peace deal, it would be a victory for African statesmanship, but one of the lingering problems is how the government should appease the demands of the opposition. It is hard to imagine that Nkurunziza will allow himself to be forced from office, so what could occur is a new election that is supervised by the international community while keeping Nkurunziza as a candidate. The Guardian writes on December 21 that Burundi’s July elections had problems as the UN mission stationed there was only allowed to follow and report on the poll and not given any real power. In fact, the UN mission changed in Burundi between a more robust political reform mission to a poll watcher between December and last March and its mission had multiple problems. For example, the head of the mission did not live in Burundi, the group had a poorly defined bureaucracy, and it suffered from internal divisions. Also, its one achievement – getting Burundi’s major political actors to sign a pledge of nonviolence – lacked sufficient sanctions or monitoring, thereby making the deal not worth the paper it was printed on. If Burundi continues to slide into violence, not only will Africa’s reputation for competence take another hit, but so might the United Nations, whose missions to Africa have met with mixed success in the past (one only has to look at the failures of peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo during its civil war to get an ugly picture of the ineffectiveness of UN operations).
A regional war cannot be taken off the table either if negotiations breakdown. As noted in the previous section, Rwanda is looked upon with suspicion by the Nkurunziza government as he claims that Rwanda is training refugees and at the very least providing them with a safe haven. Rwandan President Paul Kagame has dismissed these allegations as unfounded and ridiculous, but Al Jazeera notes on December 23 that Kagame has said that no Rwandan troops will take part in an AU peacekeeping force if it is deployed to Burundi. This is an intelligent move that may calm tensions if such a force is sent over Burundi’s objections (it can also hurt the Burundian government’s claims that the AU force constitutes a hostile invasion), but if Rwanda is helping to train insurgents or decides to it could create a regional conflagration. The Washington Post explains that Rwandan arms could not only destabilize Burundi but the eastern half of the Democratic Republic of Congo, where elements of old Hutu militias still linger. Furthermore, Rwanda and Uganda both have groups that have expressed a willingness to interfere in Burundi if the conflict produces a genocide and both countries could be on opposite sides, with Uganda trying to prop up Nkurunziza while Rwanda would try to overthrow him. Thus, Burundi could become the site of a proxy war, resembling what took place in the Democratic Republic of Congo for more than a decade in the late 1990s.
Nkurunziza’s decision to run for a third term speaks volumes for how democracy might be under siege across the African continent. Recently, Rwandan voters approved Kagame’s right to seek another term in office beyond constitutional term limits and Democratic Republic of the Congo President Joseph Kabila is also taking steps to run for another term beyond what his nation’s constitution would allow. Ugandan President Museveni violated a campaign pledge in 2006 to step down after the 2001 elections (he has governed the country since 1986) and African strongmen such as Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe continue to hold onto power through intimidation and force. Although international polls show that Africans tend to favor term limits, there is a disconcerting trend that its political class does not. If Nkurunziza is allowed to stay as president, it would weaken the term limit provisions of the Burundian constitution, even if one buys Nkurunziza’s argument that he was indirectly elected in 2005 and should be allowed to be elected by the people to concurrent terms.
And finally, if massive unrest breaks out and the AU does nothing it would work to destroy that group’s credibility as well. The AU desperately wants to avoid another African genocide, especially in Burundi, which has seen two genocides in the last fifty years. The international community, and especially the AU, have claimed that there would never be another genocide after Rwanda in 1994, but very little has been done to Sudan and its president Omar al-Bashir over the killing of black Africans in Darfur in the early twenty-first century at the hands of pro-government militias. The AU’s resolve to send peacekeepers over the objections of Burundi’s leaders hold out hope that human rights abusers will be held to account. However, the move is fraught with risk if it goes ahead (and assuming that it gets UN Security Council approval). First, what would the AU do if Burundian troops fired upon it for violating the nation’s sovereignty? Reuters explains on December 26 that the AU is telling Burundi that its mission is only seeking to promote “mutual understand and cooperation,” but Burundi is hostile to the mission and the mission has no historical precedent. And second, Al Jazeera notes on December 21 that there are significant logistical challenges. The AU’s mission in Somalia is largely paid for with outside sources, with 90% of its funding coming from the European Union (EU) and the UN. With that in mind, it is very doubtful whether the AU could afford a sustained mission in Burundi to do the monitoring job that it wants. Additionally, if the AU decided to deploy such a force it would not arrive until the end of next month so by that time conditions may get significantly worse, more killing may take place, and more refugees might be created. As a result, the AU mission may be “all bark and no bite” due to the sizable hurdles that could impede its effectiveness.
Overall, Burundi’s unrest has sizable international and regional implications, not to mention what the unrest might mean the people of Burundi. Hopefully, political negotiations in Uganda can achieve a satisfactory outcome, but the chances of that are slim due to Nkurunziza’s determined stance of staying on for an additional term. By doing so, though, he endangers his country and the East African region and due to this extempers should continue to actively monitor Burundi’s situation for the time being.