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Since 1979, when Egypt was a signatory to the Camp David Accords with Israel, whereby Egypt normalized its relations with Israel in exchange for the Sinai Peninsula, the United States has maintained strong military and diplomatic ties with the Egypt. Today, the United States government provides an estimated $1.5 billion in aid to the Egyptian military. American foreign policy views Egypt as a bulwark against unrest in the Middle East and a constructive player in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. However, that foreign policy view left the United States backing Egyptian strongmen like former President Hosni Mubarak, who ruled the country under a state of emergency for nearly thirty years. The Arab Spring in Egypt in 2011 ousted Mubarak and brought to power the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist political organization and religious social organization, which had been declared an illegal organization after it was accused of trying to assassinate Egyptian Prime Minister Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1954. After being unable to stabilize the country politically or economically, protests against the Brotherhood’s rule were launched in June, which culminated in a military coup on July 3rd that installed a provisional government headed by Supreme Constitutional Court Chief Justice Adly Mansour. In light of the military government’s recent crackdown on sit-ins launched by the Brotherhood six weeks ago to pressure the provisional government to step down, which caused the deaths of at least 600 people, the United States and the Egyptian governments are in a tricky situation. Should the U.S. end its military aid to Egypt and risk alienating its governing authorities? How would that affect the geopolitical situation in the Middle East? Also, what is the effect of this unrest on Egyptian society and is there a way for the Egyptian provisional government to put the country on the path towards peace, prosperity, and political reconciliation?
This brief will summarize some of the major political and economic issues confronting Egypt, American foreign policy towards the Egyptian government, and what the future may hold for U.S.-Egyptian relations.
Readers are also encouraged to use the links below and in the related R&D to bolster their files about this topic.
Political & Economic Unrest
A helpful timeline of the unrest in Egypt can be found via this link (courtesy of Haaretz).
Hosni Mubarak’s rule over the Egyptian people was highly contentious and gave American foreign policy a black eye in the Islamic world. Mubarak ruled as a dictator and national referendums that supported his rule in 1987, 1993, and 1999 were questioned by international observers and a presidential election in 2005 saw Mubarak re-elected in the midst of massive government fraud. The Atlantic points out on July 8th that one of the worst parts of the Mubarak regime was that the state police did not obey the civil rights of Egyptians and was known for torture, coercing confessions out of innocent and guilty suspects, detaining people without just cause, colluding with criminals, and taking bribes. The 2011 Arab Spring arrived in Egypt from Tunisia on January 25, 2011 as Egyptians staged nationwide demonstrations against Mubarak’s rule. Mubarak attempted to silence the protesters through his use of the nation’s armed forces (it is important to take note of the fact that Mubarak used to be the commander of the Egyptian Air Force) and hundreds were killed. However, elements of the military gradually sided with the protesters so that on February 11, 2011 Mubarak was forced to step down and the military dissolved parliament and suspended the old national constitution.
The West was caught off guard by the Arab Spring, but hoped that new national elections would lead Egypt on a democratic path, a path that would delight neoconservatives who dreamed during the George W. Bush administration that they could remake the Middle East in America’s image. The United States government backed the overthrow of Mubarak and then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made it clear that Mubarak had to go. The problem with holding new elections in Egypt, though, is that there was really only one strong opposition force ready to participate in national elections: the Muslim Brotherhood. Despite being a banned organization, the Brotherhood participated in parliamentary elections in the 2000’s and their work in poorer communities throughout Egypt, work that is akin to the social services provided by Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Gaza Strip, made them popular. The Brotherhood also has a following among young men, who feel that their masculinity is challenged by a liberal order that places an emphasis on gender equality and are unemployed and looking for a place to belong. In February 2012, Egypt’s parliamentary elections concluded and the Brotherhood won nearly half the seats in the national parliament. Ultraconservative Salafi forces took about twenty-five percent, and more liberal parties, which favor a secular Egypt, took another quarter. Egypt then moved onto a two-round presidential election between May 23rd and June 17, 2012 and Brotherhood candidate Mohammed Morsi, a former member of the Egyptian parliament, defeated Ahmed Shafiq, the last Egyptian prime minister under Mubarak, with 51.7% of the vote.
The problems began when Morsi took office and quickly tried to squelch the opposition and empower himself. Charles A. Kupchan, professor of international affairs at Georgetown University and a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations writes an excellent article in The New York Times of August 16th where he reveals that Egypt was simply not ready for a transition to democratic government because often rapid transitions to democracy in places that lack a history of constitutional constraints and democratic accountability lead to the winners of national elections embracing a “winner-take-all” mindset and that produces more national unrest. As evidence, Kupchan cites the cases of Russia, Bosnia, Ukraine, and Iraq. The Economist notes on August 17th that after taking power Morsi packed a constitutional committee with Islamists, who then pushed for a highly conservative constitution that was anathema to most of the Egyptian population. Morsi also gave unilaterally gave himself greater executive powers and prevented the national judiciary from reviewing his decisions. He caused protests by not allowing the courts to dissolve the constituent assembly after liberal and secular groups withdrew from it and was accused by Western religious groups of allowing attacks on Egypt’s Coptic Christian minority. Anti-government groups also accused the Brotherhood of torturing political dissidents. Morsi was also unable to jump-start the Egyptian economy, which USA Today on August 15th explains grew seven percent annually leading up to the 2008 financial crisis and still grew five percent a year after that until the Arab Spring. After the 2011 revolution, GDP slowed to 2.5%. Foreign direct investment (FDI), which is physical investment in a country by outside interests through factories or an outside company buying up native companies, has fallen by nearly ninety-percent. Egypt used to average $10 billion worth of FDI, but now it has just $1.3 billion. The political unrest also scared off tourists and tourism is ten percent of the Egyptian economy according to The Guardian on August 16th. Furthermore, Business Week on August 15th points out that unemployment in Egypt stands at thirteen percent and could reach fifteen percent by the end of the year. The Brotherhood, while comfortable in criticizing the old Mubarak regime, was incapable of resolving any of these problems and after one year in power most of the Egyptian population was looking for a change.
On June 30th, anti-government forces launched the Tamarod (the “Rebel revolt) and these protests were larger than their predecessors. Protesters demanded that Morsi step down or, at the very least, a referendum be held on his rule. Morsi refused, arguing that he was democratically elected and would not cave to pressure. A day later, the Egyptian military, which the Brotherhood had attempted to placate while in power, said that it would give Morsi and the opposition two days to resolve their problems or they would step in to resolve the crisis. The next day, the army revealed that its plan would include removing Morsi, suspending the Islamist constitution written and pushed by the Brotherhood, and calling for new elections within one year. Morsi refused to step down in the face of renewed pressure and the military’s threats, possibly banking on Western assistance and intervention, and the military removed and imprisoned him on July 3rd. Supreme Constitutional Court Chief Justice Adly Mansour was sworn in one July 4th as interim president and the next day dissolved the upper house of the Egyptian parliament, which was still in operation, and which the Brotherhood and its Islamist allies controlled. To protest these actions, the Brotherhood staged six week sit-ins around Cairo, Alexandria, and other parts of the country. During these sit-ins, the Brotherhood stoked up anti-government sentiment and spread propaganda about its views of the political struggle. The Egyptian military warned that it would soon clear the camps on August 11th and after delaying for a few days, likely due to diplomatic pressure, it cleared the camps on August 14th, with reports of armed clashes between the army, police, and the Brotherhood. The government initially denied that its forces used live ammunition, but the number of casualties, which total over 600 (the Brotherhood claims thousands), shows that not to be true. Foreign journalists also reported that government snipers picked off protesters.
U.S. Policy Toward Egypt
In the aftermath of the crackdown, the European Union condemned the government’s actions and President Obama did the same, showing his displeasure by cancelling annual military exercises with the Egyptian army. The Washington Post reveals on August 15th that these exercises, called Operation Bright Star, have been held since 1980 after the Camp David Accords and are a way for American and Egyptian military officials to get to know each other and make the Egyptian military seem important to its people. The EU and the U.S. have also announced that they will keep reviewing their foreign aid to the Egyptian government in light of ongoing developments. For their part, the Brotherhood vows to fight on, although it cancelled a new wave of protests because they feared that the government would again use armed force against innocent protesters. And the Egyptian government is supposedly looking into prosecuting other Brotherhood members and disbanding the organization (which would not be an unusual occurrence in Egyptian history as you have already read).
President Obama has a lot of supporters in the national media, much to the ire of American conservatives, but some of those pundits are turning against him. Eugene Robinson, a Pulitzer Prize-winning columnist for the Washington Post who has largely been a champion of the president, condemns his inaction on Egypt. In an op-ed reprinted by the Lebanese Daily Star on August 17th, Robinson claims that President Obama has been “spineless” on the Egyptian issue. The U.S. government has not called the Egyptian military’s overthrow of Morsi a “coup” because doing so would require an immediate cut off of American aid to the Egyptian government. Kentucky Senator Rand Paul has been leading this effort in the Senate, although he sought to cut off American aid to Egypt shortly after the Brotherhood came to power and showed that it was not willing to be inclusive towards other groups. The New York Times on August 17th reported that Paul’s attempt at getting Congressional action on Egypt failed when he tried to attach an amendment to a recent Congressional bill that would have immediately severed aid. The American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) opposed the move and the measure failed by an 86-13 vote. The problem with President Obama’s strategy is that he supported the ouster of Mubarak and Morsi’s election, which irked liberal and secular Egyptians. Now that there has been a military coup, President Obama does not want to call it for what it was and Secretary of State John Kerry went off the cuff, always a dangerous thing to do in foreign affairs, by saying that the Egyptian military “restored” Egyptian democracy. This, of course, has alienated the Brotherhood and Islamists who thought that President Obama had their back. George W. Bush’s deputy assistant Secretary of Defense and senior director at the National Security Council Michael Doran criticizes Obama’s “sit back and watch” approach in USA Today on August 15th by pointing out that to solve the crisis the U.S. needs to bring in European allies and Persian Gulf states like Qatar (who is a strong regional supporter of the Brotherhood) and Saudi Arabia and formulate a cohesive policy for the region. Doran alleges that President Obama has allowed himself to become so concerned with the Israel-Palestinian issue, of which John Kerry is actively attempting to coax back to the negotiating table, and Syria that they are missing a broader objective for a region-wide peace.
Extempers must recognize that America has tried to convince the Egyptians to reform and move in favorable policy directions for years by dangling the military aid carrot but has never gotten much in return. The same can be said of America’s relations with Saudi Arabia. Consider that during his first term, President George W. Bush tried to make Hosni Mubarak open up the Egyptian political process and make his country more democratic. Part of this was done in the 2005 Egyptian elections, but as previously noted, those were plagued by fraud. Nevertheless, did the U.S. cut off aid when those elections were poorly managed and likely did not reflect the will of the Egyptian people? The answer is no. Egypt is such an important country in Middle East geopolitical and global economic affairs that the U.S. can offer aid, but is very unlikely to take it away. Taking away aid for the Egyptians, as the Los Angeles Times of August 15th reported, could lead to the Egyptian government not working with Israel to suppress rising Islamist violence in the Sinai and/or not protect Egypt’s Christian community. Worse, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), who have uneasy relations with the Brotherhood, have pledged $12 billion in aid to the interim government. This can erase the financial leverage of the United States. Egypt’s generals are not stupid and they know that they are vital to America’s Middle East strategy.
Egypt also demonstrates that the push to Middle Eastern democracy is fraught with peril. As Pat Buchanan notes in his weekly column, which actually finds some small praise for President Obama (something you do not see very often from the very conservative Buchanan), that Egypt, like other parts of the region, is divided between secular and fundamentalist forces that are largely irreconcilable in their visions of what a future Egypt will look like. As Kupchan’s article cited above points out, Islamic tradition makes no distinction between separate of church and state, but in fairness, Europe did not really have a tradition of dividing these until the nasty religious wars of the sixteenth century concluded. Couple this with the fact that Middle Eastern countries have high rates of unemployment and illiteracy and the attraction of some populations to anti-Western and Islamist parties that oppose Western interests and you have a messy democratic situation. The groups, like the Brotherhood, that are likely to win elections in some Middle Eastern countries do not like Israel, are not favorable to secular politics, and are not always friendly to the rights of women, ethnic minorities, and homosexuals. For example, in the 2006 Palestinian elections, the U.S. was somewhat horrified that Hamas defeated Fatah and it backed away from Hamas when it refused to recognize Israel’s right to exist and renounce violence against the Israeli state. Similarly, the U.S. likely turned the other cheek to voting fraud in the 2005 Egyptian presidential election because it knew that it could work with Mubarak better than a radical opponent. It’s a Cold War mindset that should be emphasized in speeches. During that time period, the U.S. backed authoritarian regimes that had awful human rights records, but the only thing that really mattered is whether they supported America or the Soviet Union. This explains how fascist General Francisco Franco in Spain, who was an enemy during World War II (although a declared neutral) became a Western friend by the end of his reign and remained Spain’s undisputed ruler until he died in 1975.
The Road Ahead
Analysts worry that the military-backed government, where Army Chief and Minister of Defense Abdel Fattah el-Sisi is pulling the strings, has adopted the mindset that it must rid Egyptian society of the Brotherhood. For Pat Buchahan, the actions of the military toward the sit-ins show that the Egyptian military has “crossed the Rubicon” and is engaged in an “us or them” struggle with the Brotherhood, with Egypt only big enough for one faction. In this sense, the Egyptian military is trying to act like Pakistan, who’s military has played a role in curtailing radical Islamic forces and somewhat like Turkey, which ousted an Islamic government in 1997 and tried to oust the Islamic Justice and Development (AK) Party in 2007. The problem with this approach is that it is likely to bring a long and protracted struggle to Egypt, which could destroy tourism and business. The Gulf Times of August 18th points out that more than 4,500 factories have been shut since the Brotherhood came to power, food inflation stands at twenty percent, and forty percent of Egyptians live at the poverty line. The United States and European governments have issued travel warnings to Egypt as well. It is not immediately clear what the military-backed government plans to do about the economy and there are fears that prolonged military rule will dampen the nation’s economy because it will focus more on the Brotherhood than on the liberal economic reforms that Egypt most desperately needs. There is also the fear, as The Economist reveals on August 17th of an Algeria-like situation, which is a scenario that extempers would be wise to incorporate into their speeches. In 1991, Algeria legislative elections, which the Islamic Salvation Front won a majority of parliamentary seats in the first round and it was expected they could win a super majority and rewrite the nation’s constitution. This was unacceptable to the national military, which cancelled the election and an eleven year civil war broke out, which left 50,000 to 200,000 people dead. If Egypt follows this path it could have significant ramifications, as it could pull more radical groups into Egypt, destroy the national economy, cause significant unrest with Israel since the Egyptian military may not able to coordinate offensives in the Sinai if it was tied down, possibly cause a national revolt against the military-led government, lead to a reduction in the military’s national prestige that it highly values, and perhaps most important for the United States, make spike oil prices because the Suez Canal may be deemed too hazardous to travel through. This would reroute vessels around the Cape of Good Hope in southern Africa, but the extended trip would add to the cost of oil, thereby reinvigorating a debate in the U.S. over foreign oil dependency and potentially affecting the outcome of the 2014 midterm elections, probably to the benefit of the Republicans.
The United States and the EU hope that national elections can be held soon, but the chances for that are slim. The military-led government can reach out to moderate Islamists, but the recent crackdown on the sit-in protest by the Brotherhood may have isolated these elements in the Brotherhood movement and galvanized extremists. Extempers should remember that the Egyptian military is the most popular institution in the country and that most of the country supports their efforts against the Brotherhood. The Economist on August 17th estimates that Brotherhood’s support in Egypt is only around thirty percent and show no sign of growing that support. If violence surges, the Egyptian population will likely continue to back the existing government, at least in the short-term, but the economic damage may lead to more problems. The United States will continue to publicly argue for national elections, but it probably knows at this point that national reconciliation is not going to happen and conditions will not be stable to quickly transition back to civilian government. Without an aid cutoff, which might immediately catch the Egyptian general’s attention, the U.S. will likely appear as a paper tiger to the Egyptian government, who seems determined to root the Brotherhood out of society and resist pressures for an inclusive government that involves Islamist forces.