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Two weeks ago, citizens of Hong Kong took to the streets to agitate for universal suffrage. In 2017, Hong Kong will be able to elect its chief executive, but the candidates for that office will be approved by a nominating committee that is sympathetic to mainland China. Once a British colony, Hong Kong reverted back to Chinese rule in 1997. Since that time it has agitated against the Chinese government’s attempts to impose greater control over some of the city’s affairs. The recent protests have caused some observers to remark that there are parallels between the agitation for wider democracy in Hong Kong and the aims of the Tiananmen Square protesters of 1989, who sought to turn China into a democratic republic. China violently suppressed the Tiananmen protests over two decades ago, but doing the same in Hong Kong could do significant damage to the country’s international reputation and economic standing.
This topic brief will give an overview of the events that led up to the Hong Kong protests, discuss the course of the protests thus far, and breakdown some scenarios for how China may deal with the protesters demands.
Readers are also encouraged to use the links below and in the related R&D to bolster their files about this topic.
Hong Kong Agitation
China officially refers to Hong Kong as a “Special Administrative Region.” Hong Kong acquired this special status because of its previous interactions with European powers and its colonial status within the British Empire. In the First Opium War of 1839-1842, Great Britain defeated China and imposed the first of what became known as the unequal treaties. China gave special trading rights to British merchants, permitted the importation of opium, and ceded Hong Kong Island. Great Britain’s victory in this war ushered in the beginning of the end of China’s dynastic period, with the last Chinese emperor being deposed in 1912. In 1898, the British signed a 99-year lease for Hong Kong with the Chinese government and over the ensuing century they implemented labor, education, welfare, and environmental reforms. The British also oversaw the industrialization of the city. When Deng Xiaoping liberalized the Chinese economy in the 1970s, Hong Kong became the main conduit for foreign investment into mainland China. In 1984, the British government negotiated the Sino-British Joint Declaration with China. This finalized the takeover of Hong Kong by Chinese authorities and stipulated that Hong Kong would remain a “Special Administrative Region.” This meant that it would preserve its free market economy; its adherence to British common law; and would enjoy independent executive, legislative, and judicial powers. These freedoms were codified within a constitutional document called the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, which is commonly referred to as the Basic Law or Hong Kong Basic Law. The Chinese government agreed to this document on April 4, 1990 and on July 1, 1997, the British pulled down their flag for the last time and handed control of the territory back to China.
Hong Kong is governed by an executive council that is headed by a chief executive. The Chief Executive serves a five year term and is chosen by an election committee that consists of 1,200 members. The Chief Executive has the authority to appoint judges and consent to legislation passed by the Hong Kong Legislative Council. The Basic Law mandates that the Chief Executive work with a series of advisers on an executive council before making significant decisions such as introducing legislation or dissolving the Legislative Council. The Executive Council is composed of fifteen members, who are mostly senior officials from the city’s political parties. Hong Kong’s current chief executive is Leung Chun-ying, who has held the post since July 1, 2012.
Since 1997 Hong Kong residents have been very suspicious of China. Hong Kong angers Chinese officials by paying homage to the victims of the Tiananmen Square protests each year. Human Rights Watch on October 2 writes that in 2003 Hong Kong’s government attempted to enact national security legislation as required by Article 23 of the Basic Law. This article mandates that Hong Kong enact measures to prohibit treason, secession, and sedition against the People’s Republic of China. Hong Kong residents took to the streets, fearing that the proposed legislation would curtail freedom of speech and the press, and forced the government to back down. In July 2012, China attempted to push a new education curriculum on the city that would make Hong Kong teaching congruent with education in mainland China. However, protests emerged over this as well due to Hong Kong residents being protective of their special identity within the Chinese state. Once again, government officials were forced to back down.
One of the most significant disputes between the city and mainland China has been how and when universal suffrage will be granted to Hong Kong. Article 45 of the Basic Law stipulates that the Hong Kong Chief Executive should eventually be chosen by universal suffrage. The problem, as The Atlantic writes on September 30, is that the Chinese government does not want to grant Hong Kong democratic rights because it fears other dissident regions such as Macau, Tibet, and Xinjiang may agitate for the same privileges. In 2007, China gave in to some of Hong Kong’s demands by allowing a vote on who the city’s chief executive will be in 2017. However, this comes with limitations. As The Wall Street Journal writes on October 2, Chinese authorities announced on August 31 that there will not be an open election for the chief executive position. Instead, voters will be given the choice of three candidates, who will be approved by a nominating committee loyal to China. Hong Kong’s pro-democracy forces see this as a violation of the Basic Law and are protesting to force the Chinese government to allow full suffrage, whereby Hong Kong voters would choose the candidates nominated for the position and then elect the chief executive among those candidates.
The Umbrella Revolution
The protests that are being held in Hong Kong are largely composed of young people. One of the groups participating in the protests is the Hong Kong Federation of Students and Scholarism (HFKS). On September 22, the HFKS staged a one-week boycott of classes. This boycott was lengthened on September 26. The HFKS is demanding universal suffrage and seeks the resignation of Chief Executive Leung. The HFKS is assisted in the protests by Occupy Central with Love and Peace (OCLP), a pro-democracy organization that also seeks universal suffrage. The name of this group comes from its threat to occupy the central business district on Hong Kong Island, which OCLP thinks would financially coerce China into granting universal suffrage to the city.
The current protests began on September 26, when a group of 100 protesters affiliated with the HFKS assembled in front of government offices. The OCLP joined the protests two days later and Time on October 2 notes that riot police were called in to disperse the crowd. However, tens of thousands of Hong Kong residents flooded into the streets to support the protesters and effectively shut down the major roads leading into the central business district. Protesters, wearing swimming goggles and plastic wrap to beat back riot police, also used umbrellas to shield themselves from the smoke generated by tear gas canisters. This had led the foreign media to dub the protests the “umbrella revolution.” The heavy handed police response played into the hands of the protesters as Slate on October 1 writes that students did not fight back and moderate Hong Kongese became sympathetic to the movement. The protesters have helped attract sympathy to their cause by maintaining order within their ranks. Slate notes that students are doing homework, passing out food donations, and picking up litter instead of smashing shops or fighting with police, which is what happened during the Ukrainian political protests earlier this year.
Last Friday it appeared as if a violent clash was looming between government authorities and the protesters after the protest movement indicated that it may seize government buildings if Leung, who they see as an instrument of Chinese authority, did not resign. The New York Times reveals on October 2 that police were seen carrying containers of rubber bullets, tear gas, and other riot gear into government offices last Friday in anticipation of the protesters actions. Tensions de-escalated when Leung announced that he would send officials to negotiate with the protesters, but these talks were scuttled when pro-government forces attacked protesters. The Associated Press on October 3 writes that pro-government forces, wearing blue ribbons, tried to drive the protesters out of the central business district. Some of these forces were reportedly composed of those Hong Kongese sympathetic to mainland China and those who are tiring of the protesters tactics of blocking streets in the area. After police removed these pro-government attackers, the protesters announced that they would not negotiate with Leung’s government.
For its part, China is trying to remain out of the situation, lest it antagonize the protesters further. However, through the Communist Party’s newspaper The People’s Daily it has criticized the protests. The Associated Press notes that the People’s Daily said that the protesters were doomed to fail and that China would not make concessions regarding universal suffrage. The justification for not giving concessions was that Hong Kong is under the jurisdiction of China’s central government and the city is not politically independent. Furthermore, The Washington Post writes on October 2 that the People’s Daily has informed protesters that if they do not stop their actions that there will be “consequences [that] will be unimaginable,” thereby recalling the way Chinese authorities dealt with the Tiananmen protests in 1989. However, although the Chinese government is trying to stay above the fray in Hong Kong it is clamping down on the ability of mainland Chinese to learn about what is taking place in the city. The UK Independent on October 2 reports that the Chinese government has participated in more than 12,000 acts of censorship since the protests began at the end of September. By comparison, the government engaged in less than 4,000 acts of censorship in April. The Slate article previously cited points out that the Chinese government has banned the photo-sharing website Instagram and increased its censorship on the Chinese social media website Sina Weibo. Foreign newscasts transmitting into China have also been blocked with The Washington Post reporting on October 1 that television channels such as CNN have “gone black” in the country for simply commenting on Hong Kong. The Economist writes on October 4 that China is also using its usual rhetoric about how the protesters are “political extremists” that are being controlled by “foreign anti-China forces.”
Mainland Chinese who are informed about Hong Kong tend to support the national government’s response to the protests. Foreign Policy writes on October 2 that mainland Chinese see the Hong Kong protesters are “alarmist,” coerced,” or “spoiled.” Mainland Chinese have a very troubled relationship with Hong Kong residents, who they criticize for withholding tax revenue from Beijing and being ungrateful for the water and food that the mainland provides (China provides Hong Kong with 70% of its potable water and 90% of its fresh meat and vegetables). Mainland Chinese are quick to present their own conspiracy theories for the unrest, arguing that George Soros, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), or the National Endowment for Democracy are aggravating the situation. This resentment cuts both way as well, with Hong Kongese seeing Chinese tourists as “locusts” and overwhelming their city’s precious resources. That said, there are some pro-democracy forces in China that are sympathetic to Hong Kong, but due to government controls they cannot voice those opinions publicly, especially not in light of the current political climate.
Possible Outcomes of the Umbrella Revolution
At the time that this topic brief was written, the Chinese government and Leung are hoping that the protests fizzle out on their own. One of the problems of mounting a long-term protest is that many of the protesters have lives that they need to get back to and they cannot occupy the central business district forever. While it is true, according to The Los Angeles Times on October 1, that some Hong Kong businesses have donated food, clothing, and other materials to the protesters, many of those on the streets have jobs or school to go back to. Furthermore, the protests currently lack a leader. This is not like the protests playing out in Pakistan, which have Imran Khan to give speeches demanding change. The lack of a leader may eventually be the downfall of the protest movement because The Washington Post on October 2 comments that there is division within the movement on tactics and strategy. Some forces think calling for Leung’s resignation is not feasible, while others are not sure whether a prolonged occupation of the central business district is such a good idea. Without a leader to make decisions or a group of leaders to hammer out compromises, the protest movement might dwindle to something insignificant and make it easier for the Chinese government to proceed in its plans for the city.
The Center for Strategic and International Studies on October 1 breaks down several scenarios that could unfold in Hong Kong in the coming weeks. The first is a scenario that extempers may encounter most frequently on their respective circuits: the Chinese violently crackdown on the protests using police, paramilitary forces, or the Hong Kong police. This would produce significant casualties, but provide the Chinese government with a powerful display of its authority. However, it carries significant risks. Western leaders would likely sanction China and East Asian nations such as Japan would welcome the action as a way to win over new allies. The Atlantic previously cited explains that it would do economic damage to China as well since Hong Kong’s capital markets provide substantial funding for Chinese companies. Instability in Hong Kong could lead to a capital flight from the city’s exchanges and that could trigger a banking crisis on the mainland since Chinese corporate wealth has been funneled into the city’s real estate markets over the last decade. A crackdown could also imperil the Chinese yuan, since Hong Kong is the global center for yuan trading. These are not far-fetched scenarios as The Huffington Post on October 2 reveals that Hong Kong’s Hang Seng Index fell 7.3% last month. Banks and other financial institutions are already moving their staff outside of Hong Kong in anticipation of the protests getting worse. All of this means that although Chinese hardliners might favor a crackdown it would be the least advisable option for Chinese President Xi Jinping.
A second option sees the protesters reach some type of compromise with Chinese authorities. The Center says that the framework of this solution would see Hong Kong authorities, acting with authorization from Beijing, permit Hong Kong voters to directly elect 40% of the seats in the Chief Executive Election Committee. This would give Hong Kong voters some voice in the nominating process and potentially separate the moderates from the more strident protesters. The trick for China in this scenario would be to enable Hong Kong leaders to make concessions because part of the current problem is that, as The Global Post writes on October 1, Leung has nothing to offer the protesters since the Chinese government is unwilling to give in to any of the protesters demands. Therefore, China would have to give in to some of the protesters demands to make this work.
A third option would be complete suffrage in Hong Kong for legislative and chief executive elections, with China arguing that Hong Kong’s special status allows it to participate in an open, democratic process. Since Britain surrendered Hong Kong to China, Chinese officials have deemed Hong Kong’s association with the mainland as “one country, two systems.” Agreeing to universal suffrage would completely give into the protesters and end the standoff, but it would send a dangerous signal, at least in the minds of many Chinese officials, to other regions such as Tibet, Macau, and Xinjiang that would want more autonomy. The protesters would welcome this scenario, but it is very unlikely the Chinese government pursues it. To grant full suffrage to Hong Kong after denouncing the protests and saying that their actions were futile, the Chinese government could not afford to lose face with its population by reversing course. At a time when China’s economy is slowing and occasional protests emerge in rural areas, President Jinping can ill afford to appear weak. Backing down in the face of the Hong Kong protests could also create dissension in the Chinese Communist Party since Jinping has targeted senior officials in an anti-corruption probe. A more liberal China would go down this path, but that is not the China that exists today.
Another question extempers could confront is how the United States should respond to the protests. This has been a rough year for the Obama administration when it comes to foreign policy. The growing power of the Islamic State, Russian aggression in Ukraine, Libya’s unrest, and West Africa’s Ebola problem have put the administration on the defensive. The Hong Kong protests could add yet another foreign policy headache for President Obama as The Christian Science Monitor on September 30 writes that some officials want to impose sanctions on China immediately. Extempers may remember that the Obama administration came under fire in 2009 for not aggressively supporting the Green Revolution in Iran, so it may not want to repeat that situation. Thus far, the U.S. State Department has said that the U.S. supports universal suffrage in Hong Kong and the “aspirations of the Hong Kong people.” If China violently cracks down, U.S. sanctions would likely follow. The Obama administration’s hands-off approach might be the best option, though, because if the United States forcefully supported the protesters that could serve to legitimize the Chinese government’s argument that the unrest is an American-led conspiracy. If the protests escalate the U.S. will be pressured to provide a more forceful response so as to not to appear weak on democracy promotion efforts.
In the end, the odds are against the protest movement creating significant political change in Hong Kong. China will not grant universal suffrage and may resort to force if the protests continue in the coming months. It is more likely that the protests fizzle out for lack of leadership and economic reasons, but they have put the Chinese government on notice that the city has democratic aspirations that China cannot put off forever.