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Last week, Russian aircraft dropped bombs on Syrian rebel positions, inaugurating an escalation of Russia’s participation in Syria’s four-year civil war.  Russian President Vladimir Putin has calculated that it is in Russia’s geopolitical interest to preserve the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, and Russia’s bombing runs mark a potential turning point of the conflict.  Russia’s intervention could improve Assad’s position and force Western nations backing the Syrian rebels to temper their opposition to Assad’s role in a political transition.  In addition, Russia’s intervention is cloaked within the bounds of an ongoing war against the Islamic State, also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), reflecting how the Syrian Civil War has transformed from an attempt to overthrow Assad to a multi-faceted war where neither side looks good.  Although the West insists that Russia will fail in its intervention, extempers should be prepared to discuss this change in the Syrian Civil War at tournaments throughout the fall as it could have implications for the ongoing fight against ISIS, the ability of Syrian rebels to displace Assad, and Russia’s position in the Middle East vis-à-vis the United States.

This topic brief will discuss the reasons for Russian intervention in Syria, highlight what actions it has taken thus far to bolster Assad’s chances in the conflict, and analyze the risks inherent in a more direct Russian role in Syria.

Readers are also encouraged to use the links below and in the related R&D to bolster their files about this topic.

The Reasons for Russia’s Intervention in Syria

First, it is very important for extempers to have a handle on the history of Russian-Syrian relations so as to best explain why Russia feels the need to intervene in Syria’s civil war.  During the Cold War, Syria reached out to the Soviet Union for military assistance.  The Los Angeles Times notes on October 4 that then-Syrian President Hafez Assad cast his lot with the Soviets over Western powers, which also led to cultural exchanges between both nations.  Syria’s decision was similar to that of other Arab powers during the 1950s and 1960s as those states chose to go with the Soviets over Western nations that had previously colonized and subjugated the Middle East (Western support for Israel also played a role in their respective decisions).  In return for the aid, the Soviets acquired a naval base at Tartus in 1971.  Today, the base at Tartus constitutes Russia’s sole Mediterranean port for its Black Sea fleet.  Furthermore, the close ties were a boon to Soviet firms as the BBC reports on October 5 that Syria gave the Soviet Union lucrative contracts in the oil and gas industry, as well as the ability to design the infrastructure of the Syrian capital Damascus.  Educational opportunities were extended to Syrians as well.

Today, this history of close cooperation is one of the reasons that Putin has moved to protect Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who is the son of Hafez.  Syria is arguably Russia’s closest ally in the Middle East and if Assad’s regime falls, it could possibly endanger Russia’s ability to project influence throughout the region.  Since the Syrian conflict began in 2011, Russia has been a reliable partner of the Assad regime, with the BBC reporting on October 1 that Russia has provided weapons, aircraft, anti-aircraft systems, and military advisers to the Syrian government.  Experienced extempers may remember that Russia was against an intervention by the West in Libya’s civil war in 2011.  Russia did not veto a United Nations Security Council resolution that allowed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to protect civilians in that conflict, but it later accused NATO of going beyond the UN resolution by providing air support for rebel attacks that eventually toppled long-time Libyan leader Moammar Gaddafi.  Noting the chaos that has followed Gaddafi’s ouster, Russian President Vladimir Putin has warned the West that the same fate would befall Syria if Assad was ousted.  Additionally, Putin has vetoed UN resolutions hostile to Syria.

Another reason for Russia’s intervention in Syria concerns its attitude about fighting global terrorists.  Whereas the United States became incredibly interested in combating terrorism after the September 11 attacks, Russia faced a threat from Islamic terrorism much earlier, especially when it came to pacifying the Chechen Republic.  Since 1990 Russia has fought two wars to subdue Chechnya and terrorists affiliated with the Chechen independence movement have attacked schools, public theaters, and other locations in Russia.  The rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in the Middle East has endangered Russian security, with The Los Angeles Times explaining that more than 2,000 Russian citizens are thought to have gone to the Middle East to fight for the group.  As Putin himself has explained, these “thugs” cannot be allowed to return home and threaten Russia, so Russia finds it preferable to fight ISIS in Syria (although it has said little of carrying that same fight to Iraq where ISIS also holds territory).  One of the difficulties of talking about the Syrian Civil War is that the conflict has become increasingly fragmented over time.  A BBC backgrounder report that was published on March 12 explains that whereas the battle was initially waged to bring democratic reforms to Syria, it has now become a sectarian struggle that pits the nation’s Sunni majority against its Shi’ite minority (of which Assad’s ruling Alawite sect is a part of).  As the BBC explains, “whereas once secular moderates outnumbered Islamists and jihadists, that is no longer the case…”  The fractured Syrian opposition, which The Guardian on October 5 notes includes more than forty groups, has made it difficult to oust Assad and complicated the efforts of Western nations to provide effective assistance.  The West has struggled determining which forces in the opposition movement are moderate and which are bent on creating a radical Islamic state if Assad were to fall from power.  According to CNN on October 5, Russia is arguing that only 10% of those fighting the Assad regime are “secular opposition” movements.  Although Russia is claiming that it only wants to fight ISIS in Syria, recent statements by the Russian government have expanded that fight by saying that Russia plans to target “all terrorists” in the country, which under its definition could mean any opponent of Assad.

Putin’s emphasis on Islamic extremism in Syria and his use of that threat to justify his intervention may explain another aim of his Syrian strategy, namely to divide a Western coalition that has arisen to oppose his interests in Eastern Europe.  Since its annexation of Crimea last year, Russia has endured economic sanctions that have created economic hardship (more on this below) and created a threat to Putin’s domestic standing.  Russia has never cared for a powerful European Union (EU) or an expanding NATO alliance, which explain why it has tried to bolster the fortunes of far-right groups in Eastern European nations such as Hungary and keep Ukraine and Georgia away from NATO.  The Atlantic writes on October 2 that Putin has been a great tactician in his regional neighborhood, using separatist sentiment in Transnistria against the Moldovan government; keeping Georgia in line by supporting separatists in Akhazia, South Ossetia, and Adjara, and going to war with Georgia in 2008; and exploiting the political and economic weaknesses of the Ukrainian government when it tries to move into the Western orbit.  Prior to its recent intervention in Syria, Russia has played the role of persona non grata at international gatherings, with Western leaders criticizing its stances on gay rights, its handling of political dissidents, and its aggressive moves toward its neighbors.  However, Putin is apparently trying to break out of this logjam by offering Russian assistance in a region of the world that is becoming increasingly problematic for Europe.  Although European nations do not favor keeping Assad in power, they are coping with the refugee crisis created by the Syrian conflict, with The New York Times noting on October 5 that 50% of Syria’s population has been displaced.  This year, Germany is expecting more than 1.5 million refugees and this could become a political handicap for Chancellor Angela Merkel in the future.  Foreign Policy writes on October 2 that Putin is trying to convince Merkel, French President Francois Hollande, Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, and British Prime Minister David Cameron that ISIS is the bigger threat in Syria.  In other words, Putin is presenting Western leaders with a stark choice:  back Syrian opposition elements and potentially deal with a radical Islamic state or turn a blind eye to Russian intervention and thereby allow the existing Assad government to pacify the situation and fend off extremism.  Foreign Policy writes that far-right parties in Europe are encouraging their members to support Putin, arguing that Russia is a natural alliance partner in the fight against Islamic terrorism.  These groups are also sympathetic to Putin’s claims that Western Europe has become nihilistic and decadent, so Putin’s appeals to fight radical groups such as ISIS may gradually get a stronger hearing among his enemies.  The UK Independent reflects some of the Western sentiment that Putin is trying to tap into on October 3 when it writes that the West should welcome Putin’s intervention in Syria.  Mirroring some of Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump’s remarks on the issue, The UK Independent finds that Putin’s influence may place some restraints on Assad and at the very least keep Syrian from disintegrating into the chaos that befell Iraq and Libya over the last twelve years.

And Russia’s intervention in Syria does serve as a distraction from the ongoing events in Ukraine.  The Atlantic article previously cited notes that Russian escalation in Syria has produced a silencing of its guns in Eastern Ukraine.  Doing so puts Russia in line with the Minsk ceasefire agreements, which were finalized last month.  A ceasefire in Ukraine benefits Russian interests as it keeps Ukraine fractured into two halves and leaves the existing Ukrainian government perpetually weak and in no position to join NATO or the EU.  By not fighting in Ukraine, Putin is opening the door for the elimination of Western sanctions against his regime which, as Foreign Policy explains, the EU will reconsider in January.  Already, Greece, Hungary, and Slovakia are taking positions against the renewal of sanctions, saying that they are inflicting an sizable economic cost – evaluations are that the sanctions against Russia are costing European economies 0.3% of their GDP in 2014 and 2015 – and are counterproductive.  Therefore, Russia’s intervention in Syria may be a way for Putin to pivot away from his Ukrainian venture and eliminate Western sanctions.

Russia’s Ongoing Intervention in Syria

Russia began air strikes in Syria on September 30, which constituted an escalation of its participation in the conflict on Assad’s side.  Whereas before Russia was merely providing resources to Assad, it is now taking a direct role in striking out against those who oppose his regime.  Putin did secure parliamentary approval for the strikes, which Russia says it is launching to “preventatively…fight and destroy militants and terrorists on the territories that they already occupy.”  The BBC explains on October 5 that its airstrikes have thus far destroyed twenty tanks that Syrian militants seized from the government, two ISIS command centers near Damascus and Aleppo, and two ammunition dumps.  The New York Times article previously cited says that Russia seems intent on running twenty or more sorties a day, with it focusing on destroying command points, ammunition and explosive depots, communication centers, and terror training grounds for the Syrian opposition.

However, Western nations, although they say that they do welcome Russian support if it is directed against ISIS, say that Russia’s initial strikes were not directed toward ISIS at all.  Instead, they claim that Russian strikes have taken place in areas where ISIS is not operating.  NATO also warned Russia about violating Turkish airspace, which Russian planes did earlier this week.  U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry went as far as to say that if Russian incursions into Turkish airspace continued – Turkey is a NATO member – that Turkey would be within its rights to shoot those planes down.  Another reason that the West has been critical of Russia’s enhanced role in Syria is that they see it as prolonging the conflict by strengthening Assad’s side at a critical moment when rebels were making significant advances against the regime. They also see it as breaking down diplomatic channels that would strengthen moderates over the long-term.  Russia’s intervention has also scuttled existing plans among NATO and its Sunni Arab allies such as Saudi Arabia to handle the conflict.  For example, Slate writes on October 5 that in July, Turkey and Jordan agreed to cooperate with the U.S. on establishing no-fly zones to protect civilians and rebels in Northern and Southern Syria, but Russian deliveries of anti-aircraft systems to the Syrian government and its direct participation in the conflict renders these agreements void.  After all, a no-fly zone is only effective if the participants decide to shoot down enemy aircraft, but doing so to Russian aircraft could set off World War III, something that the United States and NATO would probably not be willing to risk over Syria.

Extempers should consider what Russia hopes to achieve with its air war in support of Assad.  The BBC writes on October 1 that the Russian Air Force will likely relieve pressure on Assad, thereby keeping him around for a final negotiation.  It is not clear whether Russia is firmly committed to keeping Assad around if the conflict ends, but what is certain is that they do want him or someone that shares his views to succeed him as that would preserve Russia’s strategic position in the Middle East.  By making sure that Assad does not collapse in the face of opposition forces, Russia thereby enables Assad to have some say in a negotiated solution to the conflict and at the very least Russia is also able to have a place at the final table.  Simply being able to play a role in a final peace settlement gives Russia some international credibility and that is something Putin is always seeking to preserve.

What will give Russia’s air power a greater punch relative to those backing the rebels – a U.S.-led coalition has led 7,000 air strikes against ISIS for more than a year now – is that it will be in close cooperation with the Syrian Army.  The BBC reports on October 2 that Western nations have had a hard time backing the Syrian opposition because it is so fractured.  For example, a U.S. plan to train 5,000 moderate rebels has been suspended after the millions of dollars placed in the program only produced a handful of fighters.  This was a clear embarrassment for the Obama administration’s foreign policy toward Syria and now it appears that the administration is more concerned with containing ISIS than wiping it out.  The overriding principle of Russia’s intervention, though, will be reasonable sufficiency.  Foreign Affairs on October 1 writes that this principle has been the basis of Soviet military action since Mikhail Gorbachev ruled the Soviet Union in the 1980s and calls for Russia to limit the degree of its intervention.  Russia’s priorities appear to be to reduce ISIS’s chain of command and control structure, its supply chains, and its economic hubs so that it can fracture the group and then allow Syrian Army units to pick it apart.  However, these principles will likely extend beyond ISIS and will probably encapsulate other opposition elements as well.

The Syrian Risk

Putin may have a grand strategy for lending a greater hand to the Assad government, but there are also sizable risks for Russian participation in the conflict.  Since becoming Russian president for the first time in 2000, Putin has staked his reputation on restoring Russia’s international reputation, alleviating the nation’s economic ills, and reducing problems such as crime and corruption. However, much of Russia’s success during Putin’s first tenure in office was owed to rising global oil prices, which have bottomed out over the last year.  Time writes on October 5 that a combination of low oil prices and Western sanctions have caused the Russian economy to enter recession, with the ruble (the nation’s currency) falling in value by more than 50% since Russia annexed Crimea last year, and inflation reaching 16%.  Although Putin’s popularity has remained high, economic problems are taking a toll as polls show that his approval ratings have fallen from 89% to 84%.  The Syrian conflict could exacerbate these economic difficulties as The Atlantic explains that Putin had to cover a budget deficit last year by redirecting contributions made by Russian workers to the national pension fund.  This will have to be done this year and next year now that Russia is diverting its military resources away from Ukraine and toward what could be an expensive conflict in Syria.

There is also the risk of greater escalation by Russian forces, notably by placing “boots on the ground” to complement the air strikes.  Putin has said that Russian troops will not be going to Syria, but The New York Times points out that Russian defense officials are leaking information that veterans from the Ukrainian conflict could begin showing up in Syria as “volunteers.”  Furthermore, even if Putin does not make an explicit commitment of Russian forces to Syria, if Russian pilots are downed by opposition forces or other Russian personnel are killed by opposition forces it could give Putin a pretext or temptation to overtly commit the Russian military in favor of Assad.  Nevertheless, a greater Russian commitment to Syria beyond air strikes would be politically unpopular as Time reports that 70% of Russians have said that they do not support direct military assistance to the Syrian government.  In fact, only 14% of Russians support such action despite the fact that 58%, according to The Guardian on October 3, perceive ISIS as a major threat to Russia and the world.

Russians are wary of extended military commitments and this is a legacy of the disastrous Soviet-Afghan War of 1979-1989, a conflict that played a role in the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union.  The campaign became the Russian version of Vietnam where the U.S. supplied Afghan guerillas to defeat a much more powerful military force.  The Guardian previously cited argues that Russia thinks it can re-run its Vietnam intervention during the 1960s and 1970s whereby its weapons and air support for the North Vietnamese proved decisive in helping communist forces overrun the country.  However, such plans are predicated on a policy of limited action.  As Foreign Affairs warns, Russia may find itself at odds with other partners in Syria such as Assad loyalists and Iran, who may wish to use the Russian intervention as a way to push harder into Eastern and Northeastern Syria in an attempt to secure the survival of the Assad regime.  After all, if Assad starts to see battlefield successes due to Russian airpower he would likely opt to become more aggressive in his maneuvers rather than endure a stalemate that could result in his ouster through international negotiations.  Russia must find a way to resist such aggression on behalf of its allies because it can ill-afford further escalating the conflict.  Doing so may prove financially disastrous and become more difficult for Putin to justify.

Time will tell whether Russia’s intervention in Syria proves decisive, but its participation will likely extend a war that has already taken too many lives and destabilized an important part of the Middle East.  Russia may keep Assad in power, but doing so may actually cost it influence in the Middle East by placing Sunni Arab sentiment against it.  Nevertheless, Russia’s increased role in the conflict illustrates that Putin is not content to allow Western policymakers to set the tone of the Syria debate even if a desire to get involved runs counter to the will of the Russian people.