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For the last six months Thailand has been in the midst of a political crisis. Two weeks ago on May 7, Thailand’s Constitutional Court ordered the removal of Yingluck Shinawatra as the nation’s prime minister. Shinawatra’s supporters, who also followed her brother Thaksin, a telecommunications billionaire that served as the nation’s leader from 2001-2006, are rural and poor. Middle-class and professional Thais look down on Shinawatra’s supporters and believe that Thailand’s political system is rigged against them. As a result, they have taken to the streets against the Shinawatras and the remaining members of the existing government, choosing to go outside of normal political channels and undermine existing political institutions. The current environment is causing analysts to worry that political tensions could produce a civil war or, at the very least, drag the Thai economy into recession.
This topic brief will give an overview of Thailand’s political problems, analyze the current political stalemate, and highlight scenarios that extempers should consider for speeches as the Thai political crisis deepens.
Readers are also encouraged to use the links below and in the related R&D to bolster their files about this topic.
Thailand’s Political History
At the beginning of the twentieth century Thailand, then referred to as Siam, as ruled by an absolute monarchy. In 1932, the monarchy was replaced by military rule, which was sustained for six decades. Civil Society, Markets, and Democracy Initiative’s book Pathways to Freedom: Political and Economic Lessons in Democratic Transition notes that business elites and the monarchy aligned themselves with the interests of the military government during those years. The military chose to let technocrats handle the country’s economic system, while they focused on national defense, politics, and controlling the Thai media. As a result of allowing technocrats to manage the economy, as well as generous U.S. aid during the Cold War, the Thai economy grew significantly during the 1960s and 1970s and now stands as the second largest economy in Southeast Asia. However, as the economy grew, a growing middle-class developed and agitated for a greater voice in political decisions. Agitations in 1973 and 1976 opened the door for political changes, but military rule did not effectively end until a coup in 1991 was criticized by the king. In May 1992, the military ceded control and Thailand passed a constitution in 1997 that created a bicameral legislature elected directly by the population. Unlike other parliamentary systems, Thailand’s legislature is determined through a “first past the post” system whereby a candidate with the most votes in a district wins the seat. Therefore, Thailand has a parliamentary system (the Thai House of Representatives selects the prime minister), but uses a voting system like the United States. The Thai political system also lacks democratically-elected governors at the provincial level, so all political power is concentrated on the national level (the country’s Interior Minister appoints governors to handle provincial issues).
Thailand is a country that is divided into two camps. A select group of Thais in Bangkok, the capital city, and elements of the country’s educated middle-class are on one side and rural and poor Thais, who live in the north of the country, are on the other. Only 45.7% of Thais live in urban areas, so political candidates that appeal to rural voters stand the best chance of winning elections. The problem is that educated and wealthier Thais have never accommodated themselves well to the country’s democratic transition. They believe that poor and rural Thais should defer political decisions to them. Thailand’s poor are also suspicious of the cities because during military rule, the Thai budget was not put towards infrastructure development that would have benefitted thte rural population. The lack of investment by the government on behalf of the poor is evidenced by Thailand having an income inequality problem. Slate reports on December 2nd that the richest 20% of Thais own 70% of the nation’s wealth. In January 2001, Thaksin Shinawatra, a telecommunications billionaire, recognized that he could assemble a winning political coalition with the help of poor Thais and his Thai Rak Thai Party triumphed in national elections against the Democrat Party, which champions the interests of business and the educated middle-class. Thaksin enacted policies to provide assistance to his poor constituency such as a universal healthcare policy, increased infrastructure spending, and loose credit policies. These policies enhanced Thaksin’s popularity among the poor, but wealthier Thais criticized his government for reducing judicial independence, weakening the independence of the nation’s media, and using government funds to buy votes. After Thaksin’s government won re-election in 2005, his opponents took to the streets and agitated for a new government. While Thaksin was abroad, the military, whose loyalty is still linked to business interests and the king (the nucleus of the six decades of military rule), re-entered politics and deposed his government in September 2006. Thaksin fled Thailand in 2008 because the military put him on trial for corruption and banned the Thai Rak Thai party from politics. The military also drafted a new constitution that turned the Senate into a hybrid body where half of its members are directly elected and the other half are appointed by a Senators Selection Committee composed of the President of the Thai Constitutional Court, Chairman of the Election Commission, Chairman of the State Audit Commission, and judges on the Supreme Court and Supreme Administrative Court.
When new elections were held in 2007, a party representing Thaksin’s interests called the People’s Power Party won and formed a coalition government. However, the protests that brought down Thaksin’s government re-emerged the next year and Prime Minister Samak Sundravej was forced out of power for the awful offense of “illegally” appearing on a popular television cooking show. His successor, Somchai Wongsawat, was also forced out after the country’s Constitutional Court found the People’s Power Party guilty of election fraud and dissolved the party. To stave off a military coup, smaller parties abandoned the People’s Power Party and gave the Democrat Party a majority. Critics alleged that the government lacked a democratic mandate and was allowed into power due to military pressure and a “judicial coup.” New elections in 2011 saw the Pheu Thai Party, once again representing Thaksin’s platform and led by his sister Yingluck, win in a landslide against the Democrat Party. The election win made Yingluck the first female prime minister in Thailand’s history.
Extempers that are following the political events in Thailand will take note of the colors that each faction uses to represent their interests. The “red shirts” are supporters of the Shinawatras and are affiliated with the political pressure group United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD). The “yellow shirts” are opponents of the Shinawatras and they chose the color yellow because it is the color of the Thai royalty. Their pressure group is called the People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC)
The Recent Political Stalemate
Observers of Thai politics did not believe that Yingluck Shinawatra’s 2011 victory would pacify Thailand’s political unrest. First, she was viewed by Thais on both sides of the political divide as an instrument of her brother, who was likely directing some of the Pheu Thai Party’s political activities from his exile in Dubai. Second, she went back to pursuing policies that shored up her party’s political base. The most notable, as The Diplomat reports on May 16th, was a rice subsidy scheme whereby the government bought rice from local farmers at prices 50% above market value. This provided more income to Thai farmers, but it cost the central government $4.4 billion and the government ended up with large stockpiles of rice that it could not unload on the global market. Opponents of Shinawatra warned that the scheme was another attempt to buy votes and threatened the country’s finances. Finally, as CNN writes on May 16th, the Pheu Thai Party tried to pass an amnesty bill in November that would have barred prosecution for those engaged in political offenses dating back to the 2006 military coup. The bill passed the House, but the PDRC rallied against the bill, arguing that it would have led Thaksin to return to Thailand and re-enter politics. The outside pressure weighed on the Thai Senate, which has to pass legislation in conjunction with the House, and the Senate rejected the measure 141-0. The bill gave the PDRC an excuse to ramp up its protests against Yingluck’s government and charge that it was abusing its powers.
To counter protests against her rule, the government dissolved the House of Representatives last December and held new elections in February. However, the PDRC protested the holding of the new poll, arguing that the deck was rigged in the Shinawatra’s favor. PRDC activists blocked polls in more than sixty of the 375 constituencies. The Democrat Party also boycotted the election. The Center for Research on Globalization on May 15th points out that less than 50% of Thai voters participated in the February elections and some that did vote either defaced their ballots or wrote “no vote” on their ballot before casting it. The New York Times writes on May 9th that the Election Commission drug its feet on helping the government organize the poll, which only added to the problems Shinawatra’s government faced. Without the participation of the country’s largest opposition party, as well as the apathy of some bureaucrats to organize the poll, the results were not legitimate and on March 21st the Thai Constitutional Court annulled the poll.
Since the February elections were inconclusive, Yingluck’s government stayed in power in a caretaker role, meaning that they would govern before new elections were held, but opponents agitated for a neutral caretaker government (meaning one that they believed they could control to shift a future election in their favor). The Economist on May 10th points out that since parties loyal to the Shinawatras have won elections in 2001, 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2011, their opponents do not want a fair and impartial process because they know that they cannot beat them. Yingluck’s opponents took to the courts, which have sided with the Democrat Party and its supporters over the last decade, in an attempt to remove her, and two weeks ago the Thai Constitutional Court unanimously found that she had abused her office and demanded that she step down along with nine other cabinet officials. The justification, as The Economist on May 7th reports, was Yingluck’s decision to remove Thawil Pliensri as the country’s national security chief in favor of a relative. Although this move reeked of nepotism, it was hardly an offense that warranted the removal of Yingluck from power. Yingluck endured more bad news the same week as the Thai Constitutional Court decision as the National Anti-Corruption Court indicted her for dereliction of duty and recommended that she be impeached for her role in facilitating the national rice subsidy problem. If found guilty, Yingluck would be barred from politics for five years.
The ruling against Yingluck caused her supporters to argue that she is yet another victim of a judicial coup, and the rulings against her by the Thai Constitutional Court and the Anti-Corruption Court illustrate that those institutions are politically biased. Since Yingluck was forced to step down as prime minister, power has passed into the hands of Commerce Minister Niwatthamrong Boonsongphaisan. However, his efforts to establish a new poll were disrupted last week when protesters broke into an air force base where he was meeting with the Election Commission to schedule a new poll for July (a poll that the PDRC says they will agitate against). Also, The Diplomat on May 10th argues that Boonsongphaisan is a well-known ally of the Shinawatras, so it is unlikely that opposition groups will trust him to serve in a caretaker role before a new poll could be held in the future. The Christian Science Monitor adds on May 8th that Boonsongphaisan may not last long in his role since he could also be implicated in the rice program that brought down Yingluck.
Tensions are also rising between the yellow and red shirt camps. According to The Wall Street Journal on May 15th, twenty-eight people have been killed in grenade attacks, gunfights, and violent clashes tied to the country’s political unrest. The BBC on May 15th points out that last week red shirt forces attacked a yellow shirt camp in Bangkok that has congregated to put pressure the Thai Senate to remove the remaining elements of Shinawatra’s government. The attack killed three people and caused more than twenty injuries. It also caused the Thai military chief, Prayuth Chan-ocha, to warn that the army could get involved if political violence continues. The Economist on May 17th reports that the PDRC is demanding that the Thai Senate establish a “people’s council” to appoint a new caretaker prime minister, but red shirt forces are saying that they will protest such a caretaker regime because it will have no democratic legitimacy. More radical reds are warning about taking up arms and inaugurating a civil war if the rest of Shinawatra’s government is removed. Thus far, according to the Strait Times on May 16th, the Thai Senate has rejected the PDRC’s call to remove the existing government, likely recognizing that they are bound to antagonize one of the groups if they take any significant action.
Scenarios to Consider
While the political situation in Thailand looks stalemated, there are some scenarios that extempers should consider for their speeches to either highlight how damaging the political crisis is for the country and how it could be solved. First, extempers should be aware of the economic impact of Thailand’s political unrest. Fortune on May 12th writes that Thailand has been referred to as “Teflon Thailand” because its political problems, which have been taking place for nearly a decade, have yet to weight down its economy. However, that is beginning to change. Moody’s, a notably credit ratings agency, announced that Thailand was “credit-negative” after Yingluck was removed from power and Bank of America is forecasting a measly GDP growth rate of 1.1%. Tourism, which is 9% of Thailand’s economy, may also become depressed due to the country’s political unrest as Chinese tourists, sensitive to the political conditions of the nation’s they travel to, choose to go elsewhere (20% of Thailand’s tourists are Chinese and there is a strong ethnic Chinese contingent in Bangkok). Also, The Diplomat article previously cited from May 16th writes that Japan’s Honda Motor Company recently announced that it is delaying the building of a new factory in the country, thereby taking $530 million out of the Thai economy. Without a stable government, economic planning is difficult and subsidies that have stimulated some industries, like automotives, are evaporating and harming the country’s economic projections. Since the Thai economy is the second biggest in Southeast Asia behind Indonesia’s, this is a very big deal.
Extempers also need to watch what the country’s military chooses to do. The South China Morning Post on May 15th points out that Thailand’s military has staged eighteen successful or attempted coups since 1932. Although the army has sent signals that it might intervene to end the political stalemate, the Cato Institute argues on May 14th that this is unlikely because the military recognizes that it does not have the magical solution to the current crisis. The military learned this lesson in 2006, which is why it quickly handed back power. Furthermore, even if the military did intervene it might plunge the country into civil war, since it is not guaranteed that soldiers from rural areas or those appointed by the Shinawatras will support a new coup. The Agence France Presse reports on May 13th that a military coup would not be supported by the United States as well (Thailand is the U.S.’s oldest Asian ally). The U.S. imposed temporary sanctions on Thailand when the military deposed Thaksin Shinawatra in 2006 and it is likely that this would happen again, especially since the Obama administration loves the use of sanctions as a diplomatic tool. Therefore, while the imposition of a new military government is a possibility, the odds are against it because the military has been seen by the red shirts as a political tool and it could further fracture the country instead of unifying it.
A side story that also merits consideration is the role of King Bhumibol Adulyadej, who has reigned since June 9, 1946, making him the longest reigning monarch in the world. While the Thai king no longer has absolute power, they are not a mere constitutional monarch like Queen Elizabeth in Great Britain. For example, the king is the head of the armed forces, approves legislation, and pardons criminals. The Thai king is protected by lese-majeste laws, which criminalize disrespectful statements made about the monarchy (what defines a “disrespectful statement” is also open to interpretation and as a result, these laws can be used to serve political ends). King Bhumibol is currently eighty-six years old and was in the hospital between 2009 and 2013. The king commands a great deal of reverence and respect in Thailand, but the political crisis is causing his position to erode. Even though the king has tried to stay neutral between the red shirt and yellow shirt forces, the red shirts believe that he is against them. After all, one of the demands of elements of the yellow shirts is to abandon Thai democracy and move toward an absolutist monarchy. Reuters on May 14th reports that royal succession could change the future of Thai politics as Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn does not command the same devotion as Bhumibol, but the red shirts think he is sympathetic to their interests. If so, it could begin to shatter business-military-monarchy nexus that is the backbone of traditional Thai politics and opposition to Shinawatra-style policies.
If extempers draw a question on how Thailand could end its political stalemate, it would be wise for them to recommend significant electoral changes. Thailand’s unitary system, which concentrates power at the national level, turns elections into high intensity, winner take all affairs that harden political attitudes and make political minorities feel that they have little say in what takes place. As noted earlier in this brief, Thailand’s provinces do not have elected governors. The Economist previously cited from May 10th recommends that Thailand expand democracy to these positions, rather than having the central government appoint provincial governors, because this would enable the yellow shirts to win some political power. It would also help the Thai government deal with a Muslim insurgency in the southern half of the country, which has been taking place since 2004. Devolving some of the government’s powers over budgetary issues to these areas would also give a stake for political minorities in the Thai political system. This would require amending the existing constitution, or the possible drafting of a new document, but bringing both sides together as long as they would theoretically get something out of it (red shirts keep their national power, while yellow shirts win power in more prosperous areas of the country) might be possible, especially if it will break the existing political deadlock.
Finally, it might quell some of the tension in Thai politics if the Shinawatras were to step aside. This may not be a popular move among their supporters, but it may reduce the anxieties of yellow shirt forces that direct as much of their anger against the Shinawatras as their political platform. However, the Shinawatras might only leave if their personal security and fortunes were assured. They may also need to be given legal immunity, which may not be something vindictive yellow shirters want. That said, getting rid of the Shinawatras is not a long-term solution because it will not solve Thailand’s structural problems with income equality, the belief of educated Thais that the poor should defer to them, or the deficit of trust that Thailand’s political and legal institutions have built up in recent years. Opposition activists must also be willing to return to the political fold and cease operating outside of existing institutions. The fact that Democrat Party members resigned from the national legislature before the February poll and have joined the PRDC protests highlights how they have greatly harmed the credibility of the country’s political process.
In the end, Thai politics will cease being dysfunctional when all groups realize that they are best served working together rather than against each other. Although the Western media makes the Shinawatras appear as victims, there is credibility to some of the claims made by their opponents that they have weakened the country’s fiscal situation and the independence of the country’s judiciary. However, their opponents have their own problems, namely the belief that Thai democracy only works when it works for them. The country will need significant political reforms to get out of its current impasse and unfortunately, it is likely that extempers will be talking about Thailand’s political dysfunction for the foreseeable future.