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Extempers are probably filing a great deal of articles at the moment about the ongoing conflict in Syria. The United States is preparing for a possible intervention there, but it is important to go back to a conflict that also involved some of the current issues regarding Syria: a country that is under the rule of a tyrant, questions of weapons of mass destruction use, and uncertainty about who will fill the power vacuum if that tyrant is eliminated. The invasion of Iraq in March 2003 was supposed to inaugurate a process of nation building in the Middle East, whereby Iraq would be a beacon of democracy for other Middle Eastern nations. Ten years later and two years after the withdrawal of American troops, Iraq is witnessing an increase in sectarian violence, at its highest levels since 2008 and there are fears that if Iraq descends into anarchy and violence that the sacrifices of American and coalition personnel made in the 2003 invasion and occupation were for naught. The U.S. media has largely ignored Iraq over the past year, focusing most of its attention on Syria and other uprisings in the Arab world. However, this neglect is unwarranted, as Iraq could have significant implications for American foreign policy in the region.
This brief will summarize some facts about the rising tide of sectarian violence in Iraq, the causes of that violence, and potential solutions for ending it and putting Iraq on the path towards domestic tranquility and economic prosperity.
Readers are also encouraged to use the links below and in the related R&D to bolster their files about this topic.
Rising Violence & Sectarian Tensions
July and August have been violent months in Iraq. The Economist of August 24th pointed out that more than 1,000 people perished under violent circumstances in July and more than 500 were killed in bombings and other terror-related incidents in August. Violence at these levels has not been seen since 2007 and 2008, when the Iraqi insurgency against the coalition’s occupation reached its height. During those years, the United States worked to change its occupation strategy, which led to President George W. Bush’s controversial “surge” decision, the appointment of General David Petraeus as Commanding General of the Multi-National Force – Iraq (MNF-I), and a policy of involving Sunni tribes to fight against al-Qaeda militants. The fear is that without any sizeable coalition forces left in Iraq and with an apparently ill-equipped Iraqi security force to deal with the nation’s problems that the nation could return to the bloody days of 2007 and 2008 with grave implications for the Iraqi national government.
Before discussing the recent violence in more detail it is important to clarify Iraq’s sectarian divisions, since that is one of the underlying factors behind the violence. Iraq is primarily a Muslim country and Muslims are 97% of its population. However, as some extempers are likely aware, the Islamic world is divided into Shiite (Shia) and Sunni dominated countries. Shiites are the smaller of the two groups in the Muslim world, holding that the leadership of the Islamic caliphate should pass to descendants of the Prophet Muhammad, whereas Sunnis believe that it can pass to other members of Muhammad’s clan that are not related to him by blood. Iraq, like its neighbor Iran, is a predominately Shiite nation and Shiites are 60-65% of Muslims in the nation. Sunnis are 32-37%. The remaining three percent of the nation’s population are Christians or believers in other faiths like Judaism, Zoroastrianism, Yazidism, and Mandaeism. Shias tend to live in the southern half of the country, Sunnis live in the central and northern parts. Iraq also has ethnic divisions, with Arabs dominating most of central and southern Iraq and the Kurds, an ethnic group that has Iranian origins, live in the north, where they were protected by international forces after the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War due to former dictator Saddam Hussein’s aggressions toward them. The Kurds continue to enjoy a decent amount of autonomy under the existing Iraqi government and have their own president and nationalist Kurds seek to one day have their own country, which would include parts of Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey. In fact, a fear that a U.S. invasion of Iraq would lead to the creation of an independent Kurdistan is one of the reasons that Turkey refused to allow the U.S. to access its air space for that invasion in 2003.
The problem in Iraq is that under Saddam Hussein, Shias were significantly oppressed. Hussein thought that divisions between Shias and Sunnis weakened Iraq and pressed forward with a nationalistic program to encourage the build of an Arab interest. Hussein’s Ba’ath Party rested on the principle of Arab unity and Hussein built his political regime on the support of the Sunni population. Extempers might ask why Shiites did not like the Ba’ath Party’s message of Arab nationalism and the answer is that since Sunnis are a majority of the Islamic world, Shiites saw the project of pan-Arabism and Arab nationalism as a way for Sunnis to rule over them and pressure them to give up their beliefs. When the Iranian Revolution in 1979 brought about a Shiite theocracy, Hussein feared that this would galvanize Iraqi Shiites to rise up against him, so he launched a war against Iran that took up much of the 1980s. Iraqi Shiites that did not go along with Hussein’s program were made targets of Iraq’s security apparatus and subject to torture, jail terms, and executions. When Shiites rose up against Hussein after the Persian Gulf War, thinking that the international coalition that kicked him out of Kuwait would fight to overthrow him, Hussein massacred an estimated 60,000-130,000 of them.
After deposing Hussein’s rule in 2003 a democratic government was formed and since Iraq is a predominately Shiite country, the government empowered the Shiite majority. Coalition forces that participated in the 2003 Iraqi invasion were not prepared for Shiites demanding a return of land taken by the Hussein government and give to Sunnis and other Shiite demands to overturn parts of Iraqi society that favored the Sunni minority. The decision to disband the Iraqi army in May 2003 is considered a bad policy move by experts because it left many prominent Sunnis unemployed and tossed several Sunni trained soldiers and leaders into the Iraqi insurgency, which attempted to expel coalition forces from the country and destroy the Shiite-led Iraq government. This insurgency was also backed by al-Qaeda, which is Sunni affiliated. The insurgency eventually grew, reaching its highest levels in 2007 and 2008, placing considerable pressure on the Bush administration to pull out of Iraq. Instead, Bush sent in more than 20,000 American troops and the U.S. began to cooperate with Sunni communities to fight al-Qaeda. As the Agence France Presse of August 25th explains, this program involved more than 100,000 Sunnis, paid a regular salary by the United States and trained by the United States. The U.S. called these militiamen the “Sons of Iraq,” but they were also referred to in Arabia as the Sahwa (“Awakening”) forces. Due to the cooperation of these Sunnis, who became tired of the violent tactics of al-Qaeda, the U.S. succeeded in reducing insurgent violence and it could be argued that if it was not for the 2008 economic collapse, the surge might have given Senator John McCain, who was one of the few vocal proponents of the surge in 2007, a narrow victory in that year’s presidential election.
However, the departure of American forces from Iraq in 2011 after the Obama administration was not able to reach a new status of forces agreement with the Iraqi government to keep American troops inside of the country led to a decline in the effectiveness of fighting the Iraqi insurgency, as evidenced by the latest violence. The Economist of July 17th notes that a new al-Qaeda affiliate called the Islamic State of Iraq (there is also a Syrian branch of this organization) has targeted security forces, government officials, Shia mosques and markets, and cafes and funeral gatherings. As Sunni-affiliated terrorist violence is on the rise, there is a fear of the sectarian conflict of the insurgent years breaking out again. The New York Times of September 3rd writes that Shiite militias are rearming, which is a bad sign because these forces participated in extensive human rights abuses against Sunnis during the height of the insurgency. However, it is a sign that Shiite communities have little faith in the Iraqi government to protect them.
The sectarian violence is also taking a toll of Iraqi Christian communities, which have fled Iraq since the 2003 invasion in response to attacks and a mood of general hostility towards Christians in the region. One of the under reported phenomenon of the Arab Spring and its conflicts is the state of the Arab world’s Christian minorities, which have been targeted by Islamic extremists in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. Al-Hayat on August 21st notes that 1,000 Iraqi Christians were killed in sectarian violence last year and that 700,000 Christians have left Iraq since the 2003 invasion. Prior to the invasion Iraq had more than 1.4 million Christians, but it is estimated that less than 400,000 remain in the country. As that article goes on to explain, some of Iraq’s Christians have fled to the northern part of the country controlled by the Kurds, but Kurdish society is very conservative, to the point of saying that Christian celebrations of birthday parties are a form of apostasy. As a result, many of Iraq’s Christians are fleeing the country and the Middle East for Western Europe.
Finally, the Iraqi government is not completely innocent from engaging in its own violence against the Sunni minority. Some opponents of the government allege that its security forces are intentionally allowing attacks on Sunnis and not protecting Sunni neighborhoods. Also, Reuters on September 3rd reported that the United Nations recently discovered fifty-two bodies at an Iranian dissident camp, most of which had gunshot wounds to the head and were bound. These dissidents were members of the People’s Mujahedeen (MEK), who want to overthrow Iran’s theocratic government and were used by Saddam Hussein as mercenaries against Kurdish and Shiite communities during his rule. The United Nations is trying to relocate MEK members, but in the meantime they enjoy an uneasy refugee-like existence within Iraq. MEK supporters allege that the government launched a mortar attack on their camp and then fired on residents that tried to get out. This unfortunate episode shows that violence can flow from a multitude of directions in Iraq and that finding innocent actors can be difficult.
Causes of the Violence
One of the primary reasons for the rise in sectarian violence is the ongoing struggle in the Syrian conflict, where Shiite forces loyal to Iran, which include the terrorist group Hezbollah, are fighting to keep Bashar al-Assad in power against Sunni forces sponsored by Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and al-Qaeda. Syria is an inverse example of Iraq, where Shiites are the minority and Sunnis are the majority. For example, Assad’s government represents the country’s Alawite sect, which is part of Shia Islam, and that sect makes up a mere twelve percent of the country’s population. The Economist of August 24th notes that militants, Sunni and Shiite, are using the same routes that foreign militants used to get into Iraq from Syria to fight coalition forces during the Iraqi occupation to spread mayhem in Iraq. As the Economist explains, recent attacks show an increasingly sophisticated, as car bombs are detonated in multiple locations via remote control and are done simultaneously, potentially demonstrating that militants are bringing over more advanced tactics from the Syrian conflict. Also, since the Syrian conflict has become a battle between Shiites and Sunnis, some of those sectarian tensions are dividing Iraqi society, although its government has proclaimed its neutrality for that conflict. In fact, the United Nations warns that the Syrian and Iraqi sectarian conflicts might be “merging” which could violently engulf a large portion of the Middle East.
Another primary cause of the violence has been the inability of the Shia-led Iraqi government to work with other ethnic and religious groups and protect its population. Foreign analysts postulate that if the Shiite government worked on trying to create more “buy in” by other groups that militant violence would increase because it would not be appealing to minority communities. The Economist of August 15th explains that Iraqi Kurdistan has been in a political fight with the central government over the oil-rich province of Kirkuk, the central government blocking parts of the Iraqi budget, and Kurdish willingness to work with Turkey to construct a pipeline to funnel oil in Northern Iraq to Turkey. The Iraqi government does not care for this, since they see it as a way to further pull Kurdistan out of Iraq and that it will eventually partition the country. However, this spat is minor compared with the problems the Shiite government has with its Sunni minority. As Al Jazeera explains on August 28th, Sunnis believe that they have not been given a sufficient voice in the Iraqi government and that they have been unfairly singled out by security services. Also, as the Middle East Institute of August 20th reveals, the Iraqi government has failed to provide electricity, clean water, and clean up corruption within the central government. As a result, Sunnis feel that they are not part of the Iraqi state and are willing to listen to potentially violent alternatives to overthrow it.
A final cause of the violence is the poor state of security throughout Iraq. Iraqi forces claim that they are effectively responding to the violence by going after militant training camps and arresting and killing groups of militants. However, Iraqis, Shia and Sunni, argue that the security forces are lazy, incompetent, and show no willingness to conflict militias and terrorist groups that target them. In fact, some Iraqis fear, as the Economist documents on July 17th, that some of the country’s political parties are funding the groups responsible for the violence and then undermining the country’s security services from within. After all, what else explains the rash of bombings and attacks that the security services have not been able to prevent? The Economist of August 24th explains that it is very disconcerting to Iraqis that violence has spread to the Shiite south, where a terrorist presence was very low during the height of the Iraqi insurgency in 2007 and 2008. The U.S. trained the security forces in Iraq and as the Christian Science Monitor explains on September 3rd has spent more than $60 billion on Iraqi reconstruction. However, these services are not showing their ability to squelch growing violence and are undermining faith in the Iraqi government by all ethnic groups and people’s of various religious beliefs.
Solutions for the Violence
One of the preferred solutions for the violence is for the Iraqi government to clean up its act. An interesting report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, released on August 22nd, emphasizes that the Iraqi government cannot quell the insurgency through force. Instead, it needs to forge a new political consensus that will build an effective government structure and reduce sectarian tensions. The report claims that economic reform would not hurt, since petroleum exports account for 95% of Iraq’s revenue. There are growing fears in the Western world that Iraq is moving down the path to dictatorship, which would only make sectarian conflict worse. For example, the San Francisco Chroncile explains on September 6th that the Iraqi government revoked the licenses of ten television channels last year because it thought their news reporting was too critical of the government and the Interior Ministry banned further anti-government protests on security grounds (the idea is that letting large groups assemble is bad because militants and suicide bombers can get into the protests and cause havoc). The Christian Science Monitor of September 3rd also notes that Iraq’s security services shut down protests of Iraq’s controversial pension program, which, as the aforementioned San Francisco Chronicle article explains, sees Iraqi legislators acquire pension benefits of $8,000 a month and $96,000 a year, while the gross national income per capita in the country is a mere $5,870 and 25% of the country’s residents live below the poverty line. According to Al-Monitor on September 5th, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki does not deserve a third term in office, but his supporters want him to seek it based on security grounds despite him doing little to fix the Iraqi economy and security situation. There are fears that Shiite political forces are creating a dictatorship, ignoring the Iraqi constitution unless it suits them, and oppressing their political opponents just like Saddam Hussein used to do. The San Francisco Chronicle of September 6th laments that Iraq’s government has not passed a piece of meaningful legislation in years and is the eighth most corrupt nation on earth. Until Iraq can fix these problems it will not acquire the respect of its population and win people over to the idea that democracy can remedy their problems. If things cannot be resolved passively, violence begins to look like a better option.
In the immediate future, returning to the idea of working with Sunni militias and tribal leaders to fight against the re-emerging al-Qaeda militia looks like a good idea. The Agence France Presse of August 25th explains that Iraqi authorities are now returning to the idea of training Sunni militiamen to fight insurgents and to protect their communities. One of the problems when American forces left Iraq is that the Iraqi government felt that it no longer needed to use these Sahwa forces and stopped paying them and went back on promises to incorporate them into the civil service or security forces. The rebuilding of these forces might lead to a positive development, since it would employ thousands of Sunnis and it would give these younger Sunnis a stake in whether the national government succeeds or fails. Interreligious cooperation is necessary for the eventual emergence of a strong Iraqi state and the Sahwa program might be the best way to do this.
A more radical idea would call for the United States to return to Iraq to assist in rebuilding the nation’s security services and civil service. The San Francisco Chronicle of September 6th brings up this idea, basing it on a conversation with Iraqi diplomats who want American “soft power” to return, but not the “hard power” of its military. However, as the article explains, if the United States were to send experts it would likely want military forces to accompany them based on the current state of security in Iraq, but the al-Maliki government would likely not approve of this. The idea of placing U.S. forces back into Iraq, especially at a time when the idea of shooting cruise missiles at Syria is arousing significant public opposition, is likely to be very unpopular with American voters. President Obama championed the fact that he got troops out of Iraq during the last presidential election and plans to do the same in Afghanistan in 2014. Going back to Iraq would likely engender problems for Obama, not so much among Republicans as his Democratic base.
There is also the radical idea of eventually partitioning Iraq into three different countries, but this is an idea that is deceiving in its simplicity. Shortly after the 2003 invasion, then-Senator Joe Biden suggested that Iraq be partitioned into three countries: one for the Kurds, one for the Shiites, and one for the Sunnis. This could theoretically work when one looks at the map of Iraq and how groups occupy defined parts of the country. However, there are areas in the southeast where there is a large overlap of Shiites and Sunnis and a partition of that area calls forth images of the violence that accompanies the partition of India and Pakistan, where Hindus and Muslims massacred each other when the religious minorities in Muslim Pakistan and Hindu India relocated voluntarily or under the threat of violence. Also, the idea of an independent Kurdistan would be opposed by Turkey, who would fear that it might attract a sizeable number of Kurds in its southeast, to secede and join the new state. Finally, if Iraq was divided along sectarian lines, there is a strong possibility that the Sunnis would end up in a state that would not have sizeable oil resources, likely condemning that region to immediate poverty and producing lots of resentment.
In the end, Iraq’s instability is a product of some poor U.S. choices made during the occupation from 2003-2011, but also by its internal problems that rest in modern history. The American Prospect lamented on September 6th that an intervention in Syria might eventually produce the sectarian violence and postwar political dysfunction present in Iraq today and that Iraq might have reached this point by itself if Saddam Hussein was ousted by the Arab Spring. Until Iraqis can forge a collective national identity progress will likely be fleeting, but the opportunities are there if the Iraqi government can make substantial reforms that give its various ethnic groups and religious groups a stake in the country’s future.