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After existing for twenty months Israel’s coalition government has collapsed. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu held a press conference last week to announce the firing of Justice Minister Tzipi Livni and Finance Minister Yair Lapid on the grounds that they were insubordinate and plotting behind his back. Livni and Lapid were the two moderate members of Netanyahu’s Cabinet and their dismissal removes their political support for his coalition, thereby necessitating that new elections be held. Israeli voters went to the polls to create Netanyahu’s existing coalition in January 2013 and now, in the Israeli tradition, they will head back to decide whether Netanyahu deserves a fourth term, which is the one defining issue of the race thus far. The elections are tentatively scheduled for March, with March 17 looking like the probable election date.
This topic brief will break down why Israel is heading for new elections, assess what the United States would like to see take place in March, and analyze what early polls are saying about the possible outcome of the 2015 Israeli parliamentary elections.
Readers are also encouraged to use the links below and in the related R&D to bolster their files about this topic.
The Road to New Elections
First, extempers should realize that Israeli governments are always tenuous due to a combination of electoral rules and multi-party politics. It is very rare for a party to win enough seats in the 120-seat Israeli Knesset (the name of its parliament) to govern without entering into a coalition with other parties. Israeli politics is unlike other political systems, which tend to see a handful of parties dominate at the expense of smaller foes. In recent years, previously powerful entities such as the left-wing Labor Party and the centrist Kadima Party have seen their fortunes wax and wane, while new parties such as Yesh Atid, a centrist, secular political force headed by former Finance Minister Yair Lapid have performed well. There are three Arab parties in the Knesset as well – United Arab-Ta’al, Hadash, and Balad – and these tend to draw votes from Israel’s Arab minority. Israel’s current government is headed by Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud Party, a right-wing party founded in 1973. In contrast with left-wing parties, Likud had often favored tougher negotiations with the Palestinians. Likud is not the farthest right-wing force in Israeli politics, though, as very conservative Orthodox parties and those favoring expanded settlements in Palestinian areas (such as the Jewish Home Party) also contest elections and have performed well in recent years. Illustrating the fractured nature of the Israeli Knesset, Likud and Yisrael Beiteinu, a right-wing nationalist party, who ran on the same slate in the 2013 elections, are the Knesset’s largest political force, yet they occupy only thirty-one of the chamber’s 120 seats. To make Israeli politics more governable and to benefit larger parties, an electoral change was passed this past March, mandating that for a party to receive representation in the Knesset it must win at least 3.25% of the vote. This is an increase from the 2% threshold that had existed since 2003.
The reason that Israeli governments are so unstable is that government’s typically have to form partnerships with a wide array of parties, some of which make extreme demands. For example, a right-wing government may be forced to coalition with Zionist-inspired parties that demand more settlement construction in the West Bank (Zionism is a nationalist Jewish philosophy created in the late nineteenth century that called for the establishment of a Jewish state in Israel). A sitting government may not want to do this because settlement construction garners Israel international criticism for invading land that the Palestinians are supposed to have reserved for them in a future two-state solution. If that government refused to do this, these parties could then leave the coalition and if the sitting government did not find other parties willing to replace them then it would be forced to call new elections. Remember, in a parliamentary system if a prime minister does not command the majority of a chamber he or she has to call for new elections. There are some exceptions to this, for example a minority parliament where a party is able to create a government after receiving the tacit support of other parties without forming a coalition agreement, but for the most part when a leader fails to command a majority of a parliament, in this case the Knesset, new elections must be held. Israeli governments are elected to serve a four-year term, but in recent decades very few of them do. A fun fact to include in speeches is that for the last thirty years, not a single Israeli government has served a full term. The BBC explains on December 2 that Israel has had thirty-two governments in its sixty-seven year history, which is an alarming figure. While early elections can help a prime minister solidify their power, they can also waste time as leaders have to campaign instead of handling vital domestic and foreign policy issues. They can also produce too much instability, making it difficult for government policies to be implemented effectively.
Following the 2013 elections, Netanyahu reached a coalition agreement with three other parties (the number of seats the party won in the Knesset are indicated in parenthesis next to their name): Yesh Atid (19), the Jewish Home Party (12), and Hatnuah (6). This gave Netanyahu’s coalition control of sixty-eight of the Knesset’s seats, enough to ensure a majority. Under Israel’s electoral rules, the party leader that wins the most seats in national elections gets the first opportunity to create a government (the President of Israel officially grants this power). When Netanyahu came to power in March 2009 he actually came in second to Tzipi Livni’s Kadima Party (Livni is now the leader of the liberal Hatnuah faction), but the other parties that won larger shares of the vote were right-wing factions. These factions refused to coalition with Livni, thereby giving Netanyahu the ability to create a coalition and become prime minister.
The problem with the existing Israeli government is that Netanyahu never wanted it. As Haaretz explains on December 3, Netanyahu hoped that he would win a sizable share of the vote in the 2013 elections and be able to coalition with like minded right-wing parties. This was why he wedded Likud on the ballot with Yisrael Beiteinu (it should be noted here that Israeli voters cast their ballots for parties and not for specific individuals). Pollsters predicted that right-wing parties would do well in the election, and they did, but Yair Lapid’s Yesh Atid Party did better than expected, finishing in second place with nineteen seats. The left-wing Labor Party finished in third place with fifteen seats. The Likud-Yisrael Beiteinu joint ticket actually lost eleven Knesset seats. Netanyahu’s wish to coalition with solely right-wing parties was dashed because if he did so it would only give him sixty-one seats. On face, this was enough to command a majority of the Knesset, but it would require all the votes of each Member of Parliament (MP) from the right-wing factions to pass legislation. Netanyahu wisely decided that this majority was too thin to be relied upon, so he decided to cast a wide net for coalition partners.
In coalition negotiations, Netanyahu had to give into Lapid’s demand that he would not join a coalition that included ultra-Orthodox parties such as Shas and United Torah Judaism (UTJ). Lapid was also made Finance Minister because of his campaign that called for a solving Israel’s problems with income inequality. Al-Monitor reports on December 6 that Yesh Atid did well in the 2013 elections as a result of its ability to capitalize on social protests that began in Israel in 2011 by young people angry about jobs, a rising cost of living, and the country’s housing shortage. Therefore, Netanyahu handed Lapid the Finance Ministry in an effort to calm these problems and make it appear that he was attune with voter concerns. In retrospect, this was probably a poor idea as Lapid had little finance experience before entering office, having made his career as a broadcast journalist. Livni was brought on board with her Hatnuah faction after she was promised the position as Justice Minister, which would allow her to lead negotiations with the Palestinians. It might seem unusual that Netanyahu would welcome a former political rival into his cabinet, but it actually was not the first time. In his previous government, Netanyahu worked with Ehud Barak, who he named Defense Minister. Barak defeated Netanyahu in the 1999 Israeli general elections.
For the last year, there was a lot of feuding within Netanyahu’s cabinet. Time on December 2 writes that Lapid and Livni grew frustrated over Netanyahu blocking some of their initiatives. For example, Lapid wanted to pursue far-reaching socioeconomic reforms, yet Netanyahu’s allies within the Cabinet scuttled plans to cancel a tax on apartment home purchases for first-time home buyers and enact healthcare reform. Netanyahu allies also resented Lapid’s push against Orthodox religious factions within Israel, as he sought to revoke their control of marriage rights and force men from the country’s religious communities to serve in the Israeli Army. Israel is one of the countries in the world that has compulsory military service and all men and women, so long as they are not of Orthodox faith or of Arabic heritage, must serve for two to three years (three years for men and two years for women). There are other exemptions to compulsory service, which result in about half of Israel’s citizens participating in military service at some point in their lives, but Israel has this system because of its small population and the threats it faces on a continual basis from its neighbors. Livni drew Netanyahu’s ire for pressing him on renewing peace talks with the Palestinians, which Netanyahu has recently been loath to do after a war against Hamas in Gaza this past summer and the refusal of Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas to recognize Israel as a Jewish state. Livni also drew Netanyahu’s wrath by meeting with Abbas without permission in London earlier this year.
One of the largest clashes on policy that divided the coalition was Netanyahu’s recent drive to enact a constitutional amendment proclaiming Israel as a Jewish state. Netanyahu feels that this is necessary to protect Israel’s purpose and The Economist writes on November 29 that indeed, Israel was defined upon its creation by the United Nations in 1947 as a Jewish state. Nevertheless, the Israeli Declaration of Independence in 1948 calls for “complete equality of social and political rights” and The Economist points out that Netanyahu’s proposed legislation would limit the rights of non-Jewish citizens. Lapid and Livni were critical of the legislation, as was Israeli President Reuven Rivlin. They fear that the legislation will alienate Israel’s Arab citizens, worsen the country’s international image, and complicate negotiations with the Palestinians. Liberal Israelis fear that the amendment would lead to the establishment of a Jewish theocracy, thereby harming the rights of women and homosexuals, while some religious conservatives do not feel comfortable having their religious identity blended with their nationality.
Therefore, the inability of liberals, centrists, and conservatives to see eye-to-eye within Netanyahu’s coalition is what led him to call a press conference last week and announce Lapid and Livni’s firings. The Atlantic on December 1 explains that Netanyahu blamed Lapid and Livni for causing the breakup of the coalition, arguing that their insubordination is what drove him to fire them out of necessity. Some analysts argued that Netanyahu appeared too bitter and angry when making the announcement, but regardless of what emotions the Prime Minister showed, it was the opening salvo in what will be a very short campaign season.
The American Position on the Israeli Election
The United States has been Israel’s strongest supporter since the country was founded. It bailed Israel out of the Yom Kippur War in 1973 and has been an avid supporter of a peaceful resolution to its conflict with the Palestinians. The United States official position on the Israeli-Palestinian question is to support a two state solution, which is in accordance with the United Nations initial mandate for the Palestinian territory following the Second World War. This would call for Israel to withdraw to its pre-1967 borders (basically its territorial position prior to the 1967 Six Day War) and ideally the United States sees East Jerusalem as the capital for a future Palestinian state. Although the United States continues to support Israel in the international community, especially at the United Nations, ties between the two sides have been strained in the past. The United States does not like the Israelis constructing Jewish settlements in Palestinian territory in the West Bank, viewing such settlements as a hindrance to the peace process. It has also been caught in a bad position when Israel pursues military operations in Gaza, such as this past summer, or some of its neighbors, such as Lebanon. In an age when the United States needs Arab cooperation for oil resources, as well as intelligence to fight terrorism, its partnership with Israel has strained relations with other countries in the region.
It is no secret that Netanyahu and President Obama do not get along. Netanyahu opposes the President’s insistence that negotiations can force Iran to abandon its drive for a nuclear weapon, and he has chafed at the Obama administration’s insistence that it move more aggressively toward solving its dispute with the Palestinians. The Obama administration sees Netanyahu as a hindrance to the peace process and it has lent tacit support to his political opponents. It probably did not help Netanyahu’s cause that he was a regular contributor to Fox News prior to regaining the prime minister position in 2009. International analysts see the strained Netanyahu-Obama relationship as harmful for Israel’s prospects in the region since it counts on the United States to shield it from Palestinian interests in international organizations such as the United Nations. Israel also receives billions of dollars in annual U.S. military aid, which the Obama administration could move to limit or cut off if Israel fails to comply with demands. There is no proof that the Obama administration is going to abandon Israel, but they do wish for a new prime minister to take the reins.
So what would the Obama administration like to see? Commentary Magazine on December 4 writes that President Obama would favor someone more liberal to win the upcoming elections. His ideal prime minister would be someone like Livni, who has shown a greater willingness to talk with the Palestinians and adopt less hawkish rhetoric when discussing Israel’s future in the region. The State Department believes that with the right prime minister negotiations with the Palestinians can proceed more quickly and thus achieve a lasting peace. The problem is that when Israel has had such a leader – such as Yitzhak Rabin or Ariel Sharon – tragedy strikes. Rabin was assassinated by an ultranationalist in November 1995 and Sharon suffered a debilitating stroke in 2006. However, Commentary criticizes President Obama’s approach to Israeli politics, arguing that he fails to realize that Israel is not evenly divided between left-wing and right-wing blocks. Netanyahu may appear extreme in some cases, even stubborn in others when it comes to making concessions in the peace process, but any right-wing alternative to him would be much worse. For example, Avigdor Lieberman, leader of the Yisrael Beiteinu Party, has called for the legal segregation of Jews and Arabs in the past (although he says he has now backed off that idea), while Naftali Bennett’s Jewish Home Party would try to construct even more settlements in the West Bank. The basic argument of the piece is that President Obama has not done enough to engage Netanyahu since he views him as the worst available choice where there are other poor options. It also chides him for thinking that Livni can be prime minister when her party won only six seats in the 2013 elections.
The Daily Beast writes on December 4 that American presidents have gotten involved in Israel elections in the past, albeit with limited success. American presidents may favor moderate Israeli leaders, but all of the major breakthroughs in the peace process – the 1973 solution to the Yom Kippur War, the 1979 Camp David Accords, the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991 – were brokered through hardline Israeli prime ministers. In 1992, President George H.W. Bush successfully undermined the position of Likud Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir when Shamir refused to stop settlement construction. Bush’s team cut off billions in loan guarantees that Israel needed and voters punished Shamir at the polls, helping his Labor opponent Yitzhak Rabin win the elections. In a great example for speeches on the U.S.-Israel relationship, President Bill Clinton tried to prevent Netanyahu from winning the 1996 Israeli elections after Rabin’s assassination by arranging for a peace summit in Egypt with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. This was meant to prop up the chances of Shimon Peres, but Netanyahu still managed to win the election anyway, thereby leading to a strained relationship between both men. In July 2000, Clinton tried to rescue the Labor government of Ehud Barak by hosting a peace summit at Camp David with Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat. However, the summit ended without an agreement, the Palestinians launched their second intifada, and Barak’s government collapsed, leading to the election of then-hardliner Ariel Sharon in 2001.
Most pundits believe that Obama should stay out of the Israeli elections and not endorse a candidate. Doing so may serve to harm the interests of those he wants to win. Haaretz on December 5 writes that President Obama needs to have a hands off role because he is very unpopular among Israeli voters. The Israeli electorate has moved to the right in recent years and just like the 2014 midterms, the President’s presence may serve to galvanize Israeli conservatives to go to the polls and cast ballots for Netanyahu and other right-wing parties. Overt support for opposition parties may also work against Obama’s long-term interest because if Netanyahu wins that will only worsen the ties between he and the Israeli prime minister. Therefore, extempers can expect that President Obama will remain out of the Israeli elections in hopes that a moderate candidate manages to defeat Netanyahu and coalition with parties that are more amenable to the peace process.
Prognosticating the Outcome of the Election
Netanyahu has said that this election is more about him and whether he deserves a fourth term rather than a single substantive issue. The Guardian on December 3 notes that Netanyahu sees the elections as a determinant of how Israel will confront growing foreign unrest and economic problems. However, based on his press conference announcing the firing of Lapid and Livni, according to The Jerusalem Post on December 3, Netanyahu has made the elections more about the specific behavior of politicians than actually solving those foreign policy and economic challenges. Currently, it appears as if Netanyahu will win the elections, but that trend will need to hold through March. The Christian Science Monitor on December 3 writes that Israeli opinion polls show that Likud is likely to win twenty-two seats in the election, more than any other party. Other right-wing forces may also fair well as the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation points out on December 3 that the Jewish Home Party could see its share of seats in the Knesset rise from twelve to seventeen. The trump card that Netanyahu has going into the election is that he has the best national security credentials. Haareetz writes on December 3 that no other candidate contesting the election can match his experience in defense and foreign policy. For example, Labor leader Isaac Herzog and Lapid have never spent time in the defense or foreign affairs ministries. If an independent candidate jumped into the election with a strong security background such as former military intelligence leader Amos Yadlin that may give Netanyahu fits as Yadlin could position himself as a centrist and thereby reduce Netanyahu’s monopoly on a core issue. Also, CNN reveals on December 3 that Netanyahu disappointed Israelis by not completely decimating Hamas in the recent Gaza War so his strength on this issue may be declining. As of right now, though, Netanyahu appears the early leader.
That does not mean that Netanyahu’s election is assured, though. As that same Haaretz article points out, voters are experiencing a great deal of “Netanyahu fatigue.” Netanyahu has spent twenty-six years in Israeli politics, fourteen of which were spent serving as a cabinet official under other prime ministers and nine of which he governed the country. His approval rating has fallen from a high of 77% during the Gaza War to 38% today. Some electoral analysts wonder if Netanyahu was the impetus behind the drive for early elections in order to avoid his approval ratings falling further and thereby damaging his chances to win a fourth term. U.S. News and World Report reveals on December 5 that in theory most Israelis would prefer a new leader. When asked if they would like to see someone other than Netanyahu win the elections, 60% of Israeli voters answer in the affirmative. However, in a country where the population cast ballots for parties instead of individuals and voters can choose to vote for an array of smaller parties polls like this are meaningless. For example, supporters of UTJ may want their leader to be prime minister but there is no chance that they will win enough seats to have that opportunity.
If the vote does not become an election solely about whether Netanyahu should enjoy a fourth term what might it be about? The U.S. News and World Report article previously cited is instructive here as it shows that 34% of Israelis are worried about the economy and 30% are worried about security. Only 5% of voters think that the status of Arab-Jewish relations is important. As previously stated, Netanyahu’s cabinet has been unable to resolve some of the country’s lingering economic problems, particularly those tied to a growing cost of living and housing shortages. Lapid argued that he was the candidate that could solve these problems in the 2013 elections, but he was largely ineffective in the Finance Ministry and it is very likely that Netanyahu will try to blame him for all of Israel’s economic problems. Indeed, the U.S. News and World Report article shows that in a head-to-head matchup, Israeli voters prefer Netanyahu over Lapid by a seventeen point margin.
The biggest threat to Netanyahu in the election may come from a figure in his pre-2013 cabinet: Moshe Kahlon, who served as communications minister. Kahlon opted to leave politics after the 2013 elections, citing some policy differences with Netanyahu (others thought that Netanyahu was coming to see Kahlon as a political threat and tried to undercut him). Instead of pledging to return by Netanyahu’s side, Kahlon announced the creation of a new political force under his leadership. The Associated Press on December 3 concludes that Kahlon is likely to campaign on economic issues and will try to appeal to younger Israeli voters. This was the Yesh Atid playbook so any seats that Kahlon wins are likely to come at its expense. Again, this is hardly new in Israeli politics as centrist parties are constantly being undercut by fresher faces and movements. Polls show that Kahlon may win ten to twelve seats and that may end up making him the eventual kingmaker of the election if Likud, Yisrael Beiteinu, the Jewish Home Party, and ultra-Orthodox parties fail to win a comfortable number of seats in the Knesset. The ten or twelve seats that Kahlon captures might be enough to give Netanyahu a way back to a fourth term or he might hold out and throw his weight behind a new, centrist, liberal figure and try to make them prime minister. In a head-to-head matchup, Netanyahu loses to Kahlon 46-36%, so he clearly faces some type of political threat from this direction.
Netanyahu has to be careful when campaigning that he does not alienate centrist forces. There are reports that Livni is willing to throw her weight behind a centrist-leftist coalition that could include Kadima, Kahlon’s forces, Yesh Atid, Labor, and Israel’s three Arab parties. The Arab parties, according to The Jerusalem Post on December 2, are likely to combine into one block for the election because otherwise they may end up with no Knesset representation due to the new 3.25% threshold. If Netanyahu wins a plurality of the seats in the Knesset he will need to draw a centrist force into his cabinet. Thus far, no one is making gestures that they would rule out coalitioning with him, but it seems very unlikely that Livni or Lapid would come back into a government they were just fired from. After all, would you go back to someone who humiliated and insulted you on national television? If all the centrist parties refuse to collaborate with Netanyahu, he may fail to win a fourth term despite winning the most seats in the election because he would fail to generate enough seats to form a governing coalition that would command a majority of Knesset MPs. Therefore, make sure to pay attention to pronouncements made before the election in terms of what conditions parties may impose to join a governing coalition and who they may refuse to coalition with as that will determine the makeup of the next Israeli government.
Another large question that surrounds that elections and one that extempers should be prepared to answer is how the elections will affect the peace process. Israel is seeing European governments turn against it, most of all France, who is seeing rising clashes between its growing Muslim minority and its Jewish minority. The Palestine News Network reports on December 3 that France is looking to present resolutions to the UN Security Council mandating that Israel make a serious effort to resume negotiations with the Palestinians in two years or face sanctions. In addition, The Los Angeles Times reports on December 3 that Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas is moving to have the Palestinians join the International Criminal Court, which could expose Israeli troops operating in Palestinian territories such as Gaza and the West Bank to international war crimes charges. The likely result of the elections is that it will give Israel a small reprieve from growing international pressure to make headway on the peace process. The Council on Foreign Relations writes on December 4 that President Obama will likely use the elections as a reason to veto France’s UN resolution. Palestinians are frustrated by what they see as an election designed to get Netanyahu off the hook regarding the peace process. They are similarly hoping for a victory by liberal and centrist forces, but have little hope that will actually take place.
In the end, the Israeli elections will probably end up as a very messy affair. If Netanyahu wins with the support of right-wing parties that could move the Israeli government farther from the negotiating table, but if centrist parties win a sizable chunk of the vote he may have to coalition once again with forces he does not favor. If centrist parties perform well it is also within the realm of possibility that Netanyahu is bounced from the prime minister spot. Much will hinge on whether Netanyahu can successfully sell voters on the idea that he can improve Israeli security and the economy and that a cabinet of his allies will be more successful than a cabinet composed of people he does not want. Ultimately, Israeli voters must decide between Netanyahu or a fresher commodity, with the nation’s future hanging in the balance.