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Since 1962, Myanmar has been dominated by a military junta. This junta isolated Myanmar from the rest of the world and abused the rights of its citizens, notably those of ethnic and religious minorities. In 1990, the junta flirted with holding national elections, but after the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD) won it the junta annulled the result and went about governing as if there was no election at all. In 2011, Myanmar’s generals finally began the process of modernizing their country, making strides toward opening the nation’s economy to foreign investment, trying to reach a ceasefire with ethnic militias, and transitioning to a quasi-democratic system that allows Myanmar’s citizens to elect 75% of the national legislature, which in turn elects the nation’s president. Last week’s elections were the first in more than five decades and once again, the NLD achieved a significant victory behind its Nobel Prize-winning leader Aung San Suu Kyi. Unlike 1990, the military and its political allies publicly announced that it would respect the result, thereby paving the way for Myanmar to return to civilian rule. However, winning an election and governing a country are separate tasks, and there are concerns that Suu Kyi may find it difficult to maintain her popularity and keep her diverse coalition of supporters together.
This topic brief will provide some important information about Myanmar’s elections, highlight how the elections do not mean that Myanmar has embraced universal democracy, and then discuss the challenges that Suu Kyi will face in a governing role next year.
Readers are also encouraged to use the links below and in the related R&D to bolster their files about this topic.
Myanmar’s 2015 Elections
The recent elections were the first national elections since 1990 and there was widespread enthusiasm for them. The Economist explains on November 13 that in Yangon, the country’s largest city, people formed lines several blocks long in order to cast their ballots. The BBC adds on November 15 that turnout was estimated to be 80%, which an impressive figure as thirty million citizens were eligible to cast ballots. The enthusiasm that accompanied the poll was seen as a rejection of the repressive policies of Myanmar’s military leaders, which seized power from a democratically elected government in 1962. Aung San Suu Kyi, whose father was a significant part of Burmese resistance to Japanese forces in the Second World War (as well as part of the anti-British resistance), is the leader of the National League for Democracy (NLD), the country’s largest opposition group. Suu Kyi created a diverse coalition of Muslim minorities, factory workers, and poor villagers, all of whom hoped to elect a government that would seek social and economic justice. Suu Kyi joined the national parliament, called the Hluttaw, several years ago, but prior to that she was under house arrest by the junta due to her ability to rally forces against the regime. She was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1991 for her democratic activism, thereby illustrating her ability to acquire significant international support.
Under Myanmar’s constitution, elections were held for 75% of the seats in the two houses of the national legislature. The reason that only 75% of the seats were up for election is the fact that the constitution reserves 25% of the seats to the military and its allies. This gives the military a veto over constitutional changes. The NLD had to win two-thirds of the vote in order to form a government and work around the military’s share of the legislature and they managed to clear that threshold by capturing 80% of the vote. The BBC noted that the NLD won 387 of the 478 seats in the Hluttaw, while the military-aligned Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) won only forty-one of the 478 available seats.
It was not surprising that the NLD won the election. After all, they did win the last time that a national vote was held in 1990, and the BBC reports on November 13 that in by-elections in 2012 they won forty-three of forty-five available seats in the legislature, capturing 66% of the popular vote in those races. What surprised experts was the sheer size of the NLD victory, which some thought may not occur due to Buddhist attacks on the NLD. A group of hardline Buddhist monks called Ma Ba Tha (the Committee for the Protection of Race and Religion), which draws strength in Burmese-dominated areas, has campaigned for the last eighteen months for Islam to be suppressed in Myanmar. According to these Buddhist activists, Islam is a threat to Myanmar’s Buddhist identity. The NLD ran afoul of Ma Ba Tha due to the fact that it has a history of supporting Muslim rights in the country, although The Guardian on November 15 reports that the NLD reportedly asked Muslims in its party not to run for office so as not to draw the ire of moderate Buddhist voters. Still, the NLD has a better record towards religious toleration than other political forces in the country and their electoral victory appears to be a sign that Myanmar’s voters were not swayed by the nationalist and sectarian appeals of Ma Ba Tha.
Extempers should note that not all people in Myanmar were able to cast ballots in the election. For example, the Muslm Rohingya peoples, one of the nation’s many ethnic minority groups, were not allowed to cast ballots as they have been stripped of their citizenship. This was a departure from previous norms as the Rohingya voted in 2010 and 2012 by-elections. The BBC explains that seven areas with ongoing ethnic conflicts were not allowed to participate in the poll either. Collectively, this means that hundreds of thousands of people were not able to cast ballots.
There was skepticism in the international community about how fair the vote would be. Myanmar’s military is very hesitant to establish a true democratic republic, fearing that it could open the door for charges against some of its leaders for human rights abuses or the loss of their economic privileges (more on this below). President Thein Sein promised a fair poll and despite some reports of delays or faulty voting rolls, the results seem to conform to popular opinion. International observers that watched the election judged it to be “reasonably fair,” and the international community should be glad that Myanmar’s people were finally able to cast a ballot for or against their sitting government. This could be the first step toward restoring full civilian rule in Myanmar, although that process will probably take at least another decade.
Limits on True, Universal Democracy
Aside from limitations on some of the people that were allowed to vote in the election, the structure of Myanmar’s government does not provide for a true, democratic system. As noted above, the recent elections were for 75% of the seats in the national legislature because the constitution gives the military the other 25%. This provision was placed into the constitution – drafted and ratified in 2008 – so that the military can preserve its existing privileges. These include economic riches as The National of the United Arab Emirates reports on November 15 that it is estimated that Myanmar’s military controls 75% of the national economy. The sizable share of seats in the national legislature also enables the military to block constitutional amendments that it does not like.
The veto on constitutional amendments matters because Suu Kyi is prohibited from serving as president. Article 59F of the constitution bars someone whose “legitimate children [owe] allegiance to a foreign power” from becoming the nation’s executive. This applies to Suu Kyi as she married a British national and has two sons with British passports. When the constitution was drafted seven years ago this provision was seen as a direct attack on Suu Kyi’s ability to be the nation’s leader. The NLD has never cared for the constitution and would like to amend it in order to establish a system where Suu Kyi could become president, but as long as the military holds 25% of the seats in the legislature – something that cannot be changed with a constitutional amendment or a new constitutional convention (both of which the military can block) – this will not change. It is notable, though, that Suu Kyi can be the Speaker of the Hluttaw, so she will have some legislative influence. She will simply not be able to handle executive matters directly.
Myanmar’s military will play an instrumental role in the election of the next president, though, even if they do not get their choice approved. The BBC explains that the constitution provides for an indirect system of presidential and vice-presidential election whereby the elected representatives in the Lower House, the elected representatives in the Upper House, and the military’s representatives each select a candidate for president. These candidates are then voted upon by a joint meeting of all three groups, with the candidate with the most votes becoming president and the two losing candidates assuming the post of vice-president. These elections will likely not take place until March 2016, but there are lots of questions over who is going to assume this post. The military will likely favor the continuation of Mr. Thein’s presidency, while the NLD is keeping its cards close to the vest about its choice. Its top candidates are expected to be Tin Oo, a former commander-in-chief of the Burmese army and a founding member of the NLD, but he is eighty-eight years old and there are concerns about his health. Another candidate could be Win Htein, a former military officer that is close to Suu Kyi, but Buddhist monks dislike him due to his defense of Muslim rights and he is also seventy-four. In the run up to the recent elections it was thought that Suu Kyi had worked out a deal with USDP leader U Shew Mann, who at the time was the Speaker of the Hluttaw, whereby Mann would have been elected president in return for pushing through constitutional changes that would eventually allow Suu Kyi to become president. However, the military disliked rumors of such a deal, as well as Mann’s attempt to disqualify some of their candidates for office, so they forced him to step down. If the NLD cannot make up their mind and unify behind a candidate, the military may be able to arrange the votes for their candidate as they only need to combine their allocated percentage of seats with one-third of the elected seats of the Hluttaw to override the NLD. Extempers can expect to see some backroom deals on who the next president will be, which will also include some maneuvering by Suu Kyi as she says she wants a candidate that will bend to her will.
A final limitation on the ability of Myanmar to enjoy a stable civilian government is that the military controls a large portion of the national bureaucracy and important ministerial portfolios. For example, the military controls the home, defense, and border affairs ministries, giving it complete control over national security issues. This means that the newly elected government will play a limited role when it comes to reaching peace deals with ethnic minorities. Also, the portfolios listed above give the military control of the national police so that can allow them to clamp down on democratic dissent if they feel that it gets out of control or threatens their interests. It would be a stretch to say that the military is poised to retake the country after the election, but if there is sizable unrest in the future they could easily marshal their forces and reimpose a dictatorship like their counterparts have done in neighboring Thailand.
Suu Kyi’s Challenges
The first challenge that Suu Kyi will face as Myanmar’s leader is how to handle the selection of the next president. As explained above, Suu Kyi cannot stand for president. This leaves her with the option of backing another NLD member that could one day rival her power or selecting a figurehead and trying to lead that individual along. Reuters explains on November 15 that Suu Kyi appears to prefer the latter option, telling reporters that she plans to install an NLD loyalist that will take orders from her. This has created some backlash, though, as opponents claim that she will try to become a dictator after winning one election. Reuters also points out that the constitution prohibits any other official from having more power than the president, who the constitution says “takes precedence over all other persons.” Even if Suu Kyi wants to appoint a figurehead as president, she will run into some opposition from the military, who she needs to negotiate a settlement with in order to ensure that the military continues to support Myanmar’s democratic experiment. Furthermore, there is always the likelihood that her choice may grow tired of her manipulation and carve out their own path, potentially splitting the NLD.
Another challenge will arrive in the form of governance. The Agence France Presse reports on November 14 that some of the NLD’s winners in the election include poets, hip-hop stars, political prisoners, and doctors. This is not the stuff of great statesmen and the NLD will bring a team into the Hluttaw that has very little experience. Governments that typically have few “professional” politicians are prone to mishaps such as embarrassing scandals and this could eventually distract the NLD from the process of governing. In addition, the lack of experience by the NLD may make it hard for the party to present a unified front in the Hluttaw regarding minority rights, education, and economic reforms.
With regards to specific issues, Suu Kyi will be split between those who want a government based on social justice and those who wish to preserve existing economic gains. Quartz reports on November 14 that multinational companies are racing into Myanmar because it is one of the last undeveloped nations in Southeast Asia. Those who missed out on booms in China and Vietnam are looking to profit from the nation’s oil and timber resources, but this flood of foreign capital has produced policies that have damaged some of Myanmar’s poorer communities. According to The Christian Science Monitor on November 15, mining and infrastructure projects that are funded by foreign money are displacing poorer peoples and land seizures are becoming more common. Those who oppose these actions backed the NLD in the election and want Suu Kyi to do something about it, but if she tries to act she risks undermining recent economic gains. She could also incur problems with the military, which has profited the most from the recent investments. However, if she fails to act she could undermine the reach of her coalition as poorer voters may seek out alternatives in future election cycles.
Suu Kyi must also find a way to defend the rights of the Muslim Rohingya community. As stated earlier in this brief, the Rohingya have been stripped of their citizenship and they were not allowed to vote in the recent election. The Hindustan Times explains on November 15 that poor treatment of the Rohingya, which Newsweek claims on November 13 borders on a genocide, has created sizable foreign relations problems for Myanmar. The United States and the European Union (EU), among others, have been critical of what they perceive as anti-Muslim policies. For example, repression of the Rohingya has caused more than 140,000 to flee their homes and thousands of others have sought refuge in Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia, constituting a Syria-like migrant flood. During the campaign, Suu Kyi was relatively silent on minority rights, but she did pledge near the latter stages to prosecute those who inflame ethnic hatred. Fighting for greater religious expression may prove difficult, though, in a nation that is 90% Buddhist and where Buddhist monks are still revered as powerful political and social actors.
Finally, Suu Kyi will attempt to use a more conciliatory policy to settle Myanmar’s outstanding conflicts with various ethnic minorities. The Hindustan Times reports that last month Myanmar’s government concluded a two-year peace process with fifteen rebel groups. These groups have long sought greater autonomy within Myanmar, something that the military rejects on the grounds of national unity. In fact, the military changed the name of the nation from Burma to Myanmar to reflect its desire to maintain the country as a territorial unit (the name of Burma was deemed to Burmese-centric) and it has historically justified its authoritarianism on these grounds. Since the NLD will not control defense portfolios, whatever policy it enacts toward ethnic militias must be agreed to by the military. Therefore, Suu Kyi and the NLD will only have a limited say in how these militias are dealt with.
There is little doubt that Myanmar’s voters rejected military rule, but winning elections and governing are two separate tasks. The danger for the NLD is that its relative inexperience and the heightened expectations that surround its victory may cause it to underperform and if that happens, Myanmar could fracture along ethnic, sectarian, and socioeconomic lines. The NLD will probably lose some of its coalition when it starts governing next year, especially when tough decisions must be made on maintaining the economy and handling national security issues, but it is arguably Myanmar’s best hope of achieving a stable democratic system.