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The citizens of South Sudan, the world’s youngest country, have had their daily lives disrupted by a civil war since December. The war, waged between two political factions that break along ethnic lines, has escalated in recent months and brought back memories of the Rwandan genocide of 1994. The war threatens the country’s oil-based economy, the stability of central Africa, and risks creating a humanitarian disaster. Since South Sudan won its independence through a civil war that lasted more than two decades, it is tragic that it has become the most recent global victim of civil unrest and the international community is struggling to contain the violence and provide assistance to people in need. Due to the fact that the situation in South Sudan is more likely to get worse over the coming months, extempers should be prepared to talk about South Sudan’s woes as they are likely to headline any African or international organizations round.
This topic brief will discuss the causes of the recent outbreak of violence in South Sudan, the course that the war has taken thus far, and highlight some pressing issues that extempers should be prepared to include in their speeches on the subject.
Readers are also encouraged to use the links below and in the related R&D to bolster their files about this topic.
Why Are They Fighting?
For a quick overview of the South Sudanese civil war, I suggest watching this brief video from the International Crisis Group that highlights the two competing sides of the conflict.
Before going into why fighting has broken out in South Sudan, it is important to highlight a few facts about the country. First, South Sudan is a landlocked African nation and it is the world’s youngest country, having acquired its independence via a referendum in 2011. The territory was ruled by the British government during Africa’s imperial period as a separate unit. The Southern Sudanese population objected to having the British consolidate their territory with Northern Sudan after the Second World War because Northern Sudan has a Muslim and Arabic population, in contrast to South Sudan which has a large Christian and animist population. Traditionally, South Sudan has seen its focus on sub-Saharan African issues, whereas North Sudan (today’s Sudan) has associated itself more with North African nations like Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and Egypt. Sudan was plagued by two civil wars between its northern and southern halves, with the first taking place between 1955-1972 and the second between 1983-2005. The first war killed more than 500,000 people and was provoked by South Sudan fighting for more autonomy. The Addis Ababa Agreement that ended that war did give a degree of autonomy to the southern part of the country, but tensions over oil, which is Sudan’s main source of wealth, produced the second civil war, which killed an estimated two million people. The Southern rebellion was led by the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and in 2005, the United States helped broken the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that granted South Sudan autonomy for six years and scheduled a referendum in 2011 that would allow its people to choose whether to become independent. There were fears that Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir would not honor the accord, but these proved to be unfounded and South Sudan acquired its independence when more than 98% of its population voted in favor of becoming a separate country.
The current president of South Sudan is Salva Kiir Mayardit, who you will see referred to in news stories as Salva Kiir. He is easily identified in pictures of African leaders by a black cowboy hat these he wears, which was given to him as a gift from former President George W. Bush. After the Second Sudanese Civil War, the SPLA became the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). The SPLM became the governing vehicle of the country and Mr. Kiir is at the head of it. Kiir’s vice-president from 2011-2013 was Riek Machar, a former rebel commander during the Second Sudanese Civil War. Both men represent different ethnic constituencies, as Kiir is a Dinka (South Sudan’s largest ethnic group) and Machar is a Nuer. The relationship between both men gradually became strained within the SPLM-led government as Machar accused Kiir to consolidating too much power and trying to become a dictator. Such charges are typical in African politics and ethnicity is likely at the root of some of Machar’s accusations, as the Nuer fear that the Dinka may create and lead a government that only serves their interests. Foreign Policy on April 25th writes that last July, Kiir sacked his entire presidential cabinet, including Machar, and did not bother to explain why he did this. International observers believe that the dismissals were caused by Kiir fearing that popularity and ambitions of Machar. Machar stewed over the dismissal for several months and then began publicly criticizing the growing political powers of Kiir. On December 14, Machar met with senior SPLM officials and that evening, the capital city of Juba saw an outbreak of violence and the civil war began.
For his part, Kiir has charged that Machar was planning to lead a coup against his government and that the unrest in Juba that occurred in December was part of a plot to install Machar as the new South Sudanese president. As a result, Kiir had eleven of his former officials arrested in December and charged with treason. However, the BBC on April 24th writes that all eleven officials have now been released. The SPLM government has the SPLA at its disposal to use against the rebels, who are composed of a ragtag group of politicians angry at Kiir’s rule, army officers, and young fighters. Machar’s group has called itself the SPLA in Opposition. The goal of the SPLA is to annihilate Machar’s rebel faction, whereas Machar’s group is seeking to harm the economic standing of the country, weaken Kiir, and possibly force him from power.
The Current State of Fighting
The SPLA in Opposition is targeting South Sudan’s oil wealth in order to bring down Kiir’s government. The Economist on January 4th writes that forces loyal to Machar have seized parts of Jonglei, Unity, and the Upper Nile states, all of which are oil-producing areas. The map below helps make some of these gains clearer:
The reason that control of these oil-producing areas matters is that without oil, the South Sudanese government cannot function. Foreign Policy on April 24th points out that the World Bank describes South Sudan as “the most oil dependent country in the world” as 97% of the government’s revenues come from oil. Most of this oil is pumped through Sudan to the north and China buys 80% of the oil that comes from South Sudan, which makes the area very important in Chinese foreign policy calculations. The Christian Science Monitor on April 2nd writes that Machar’s current strategy is to take over the oil-producing states in the northern part of the country, consolidate his forces, and then make a drive on Juba. Al-Jazeera reports on April 17th that foreign oil workers have been told to leave areas that the SPLA in Opposition have taken. Thus far, elements of Machar’s strategy are working as the Council on Foreign Relations notes on April 16th that oil production has fallen from 250,000 barrels a day to 150,000 since the conflict began.
One of the biggest concerns about the current fighting is the ethnic violence that it has unleashed between the Dinka and Nuer factions. The Washington Post reports on April 23rd that when rebels took over the town of Bentiu in Unity State last month, non-Nuer ethnic groups were warned on the radio that they would be hunted down and killed and Nuers were urged to rape non-Nuer women. The use of the media to encourage ethnic killings was a tool that was used in the Rwandan genocide of 1994. There were reports that when rebels took Bentiu that they went through mosques, churches, and hospitals and killed non-Nuers. Rebels also allegedly killed Nuers that refused to celebrate the taking of the city or tried to defend other Dinkas. For their part, Dinkas attacked a UN compound in Bor that was sheltering Nuer refugees last month and killed 46 people, according to the BBC on May 1st. Revenge killings have also taken place after cities are recaptured by SPLA forces from the SPLA in Opposition. The Economist on April 26th adds that Darfuri rebels of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) have gotten involved in the conflict and Darfuri civilians in South Sudan have been killed in the recent violence. Extempers may recall that Darfur is a western area of Sudan that is fighting for its independence and Darfur was subject to a genocide in the mid-2000s (this is why Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir has been indicted by the International Criminal Court). Not only is all of this ethnic killing troubling, it is also an impediment to eventually reaching a peace deal between both sides because of the bitter feelings that have now been sowed between the country’s ethnic groups.
The United Nations currently has 10,000 peacekeepers in South Sudan and its mission is called Unmiss (United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan). However, The New York Times reports on May 1st that UN peacekeepers have not done a very good job protecting civilians or themselves over the last month. In December, the UN Security Council unanimously voted to enlarge the peacekeeping force to more than 13,000 troops, with African states taking the lead in providing the necessary peacekeepers. However, African nations have thus far been unwilling to place their troops under a common command structure. The delays in figuring out which African nations will send troops (Ethiopia, Kenya, and Rwanda have been identified as the nations to contribute) and what the rules of engagement of a new UN force will be is also giving each side of the civil war time to settle in and reinforce itself, which could lengthen the duration of the conflict.
Kiir has sought to strengthen the SPLA’s hand against Machar’s forces by calling upon other African states to help him. The Economist of January 16th writes that Uganda troops are now in South Sudan and are protecting vital infrastructure like airports and government buildings. This has enabled Kiir to free up more SPLA forces to go after the rebels and stage larger offensives. Uganda is also reportedly sending fighter jets to help SPLA forces. Rwanda has promised to send troops to assist the SPLA and even Omar al-Bashir of Sudan has supported Kiir’s efforts against the rebels. East and Central African states are worried about the South Sudanese conflict for two reasons. First, instability could easily cross into their borders and inflame ethnic tensions. Our previous topic brief on Libya this season explained how Libya’s unrest has produced a weapons-exporting state, which has contributed to recent bouts of insurgency on the continent. This is something that South Sudan’s neighbors want to avoid at all costs. A second reason is oil. Uganda, Kenya, Sudan, and Rwanda all hope to gain generous concessions from Kiir if he wins the civil war. The Economist article previously cited explains how Uganda and Kenya have contracts to build an export pipeline for the country and Sudan needs South Sudan’s oil for exporting purposes. There is a danger that these countries may turn the South Sudanese war into a multinational effort and that could risk regionalizing the war if Machar succeeds in getting another African state to support him. This could happen if the rebels consolidate their hold on an oil-producing territory and then offer generous conditions to another state, possibly Sudan, in return for military aid.
The five-month-old conflict has already produced a great deal of devastation and hardship. The West Australian of May 1st writes that tens of thousands of people have been killed and 1.2 million people have been displaced out of a total population of ten million. The UN Refugee Agency on April 29th reports that those who have been displaced were unable to take basic household items with them and lack the ability to stay warm, cook, or maintain daily hygiene. Refugees now occupy more than 170 sites in the country, some of which have been spontaneously organized and lack proper supplies and sanitation. Nearly 300,000 refugees are estimated to be camped just outside of South Sudan’s borders and are waiting to see how the conflict turns out and if they can return to their homes. The Guardian on May 1st adds that women have also borne a great deal of the violence as women and girls have been brutally raped and others have been kidnapped by rebel factions. Thousands of children have also been allegedly pressed into service by the warring factions, which has continued an unfortunate international tradition of using child soldiers in conflict zones.
Pressing Issues
One of the biggest issues that extempers should follow in South Sudan is the state of its food supply and the ability of the government and the international community to avoid a massive famine. Slate reports on April 23rd that seven million South Sudanese are facing food insecurity in 2014-2015 since the civil war has destroyed markets and international food aid has been stolen. The country’s rainy season begins in May and due to the conflict, farmers were not able to plant a large number of crops. Additionally, the rainy season will make many of the country’s roads impassable and that could hinder aid distribution efforts. The World Food Program on April 10th writes that South Sudan faced food insecurity before the conflict as it ranked eleventh in the world for child hunger and 32.5% of its children under the age of five were underweight. The New York Times on April 3rd reports that South Sudan needs $230 million in international aid within the next month or it could suffer a famine on the scale of the Ethiopian famine of the 1980s, when hundreds of thousands died. Unfortunately, UN fundraising efforts have fallen well short of their mark as conflicts in Syria and the Ukraine have distracted donors from conflicts in African states like South Sudan and the Central African Republic. Also, Reuters notes on April 1st that UN aid convoys have encountered an unhelpful bureaucracy in segments of South Sudan as its flights and vehicles are being checked and in some cases rejected, which inhibits aid deliveries. If the levels of violence do not stop and if the international community does not acquire the necessary aid to deal with the crisis, a full blown humanitarian disaster may exist in South Sudan by the latter part of this year. Extempers should pay careful attention to the food crisis in South Sudan in conjunction with the violence and should call attention to it in speeches.
In terms of global impact, the South Sudanese crisis might be a time for China to show the world that it can be a responsible foreign actor. It is also a test of the U.S. sanctions policy. In the past, China has been chided for supporting dictatorial regimes in Sudan, Zimbabwe, and North Korea, but with regards to South Sudan it has shown a greater willingness to act as a positive force. Despite the world’s divisions on Ukraine and Syria, they have reached a consensus on ending the fighting in South Sudan and the Foreign Policy article from April 24th that was previously cited in this brief points out that China has been traveling East and Central Africa searching for a solution to the crisis. Granted, China’s interests in the area concern South Sudan’s oil, as the country’s oil supplies 5% of China’s energy needs, but South Sudan could prove to be a test case of China’s willingness to intervene in the affairs of other nations (which is something that China has tried to avoid based on its own history of being colonized by a European power). South Sudan will also test President Barack Obama’s sanctions policy as the White House has looked into asset freezes and travel bans for the individuals responsible for the violence. However, the State Department has said that these steps will take time and they need cooperation from Uganda, Ethiopia, and Angola to make them effective. The International Criminal Court (ICC) has announced that it is looking into the conflict, but the ICC has a poor reputation amongst African states at the present time, who argue that it is a tool of Western imperialism that mostly targets African leaders, so it is not likely to play a positive role in ending the violence. The ICC has also taken a credibility hit because Omar al-Bashir continues to govern Sudan after being indicted by the body years ago.
The international community has sought to mediate the conflict in neighboring Ethiopia at Addis Ababa, which was a site for negotiating prior Sudanese peace deals. America, Chinese, and other foreign officials have been there for months trying to get Kiir and Machar to agree to a permanent peace deal and they did achieve a ceasefire agreement from both sides in January. However, that ceasefire was quickly violated by both sides and the violence has continued unabated. One of the problems for reaching a negotiated settlement is that Kiir is unlikely, as long as he has the backing of several friendly African states, to reach any type of power-sharing accord with Machar. The same could be said of Machar, who is unlikely to sign an agreement that would keep Kiir in power if his forces are able to maintain control of South Sudan’s oil-producing states. Also, even if an accord is reached there is a problem of demobilization. Similar to what is taking place in Ukraine, who demobilizes and disarms forces? The UN mandate would have to be enlarged by the Security Council to undertake such a task and there is a question about whether Machar truly controls all of the units in the SPLA in Opposition. One of the problems of civil wars is that cleaning them up is messy as some groups typically do not favor the eventual peace deal and go back to fighting. Extempers should point to the trouble of disarming the various groups fighting under the SPLA in Opposition umbrella, as well the ethnic tensions that have exploded during the conflict, as reasons to expect a rough transition from war to peace when the conflict ends.
Finally, there is the question of when the conflict might end. Assuming that no foreign power intervenes to back Machar, it is likely that his forces will grow weaker over time. Machar’s rebellion is not financially self-sufficient and his rebels are having to subsist on the land, which is why human rights abuses are widespread. Also, his forces do not have the military equipment to effectively resist Kiir, especially because Kiir has sizable military aid coming in from Uganda. Machar’s forces also recently ceded the town of Bentiu to government forces after a struggle, which could symbolize the weakening of the opposition relative. However, based on the dispersed nature of the fighting, it may take many more months or longer for the fighting to end. International observers speculate that a power sharing agreement, harnessed within a transitional government where Kiir remains president and Machar returns as vice-president (with Machar then contesting Kiir for the presidency in an election) is the best way to end the fighting, but the biggest obstacle to overcome will be the bitterness that lingers from the civil war. The best time to create a deal is probably before Kiir and the SPLA acquire a dominant edge on the battlefield and corner Machar (because they will be less likely to negotiate) or before Machar seizes more oil-producing territories (since he will be less likely to negotiate on favorable terms if he holds the country’s oil). Thus, a stalemate might be the best chance for a negotiated settlement that lasts and extempers should watch for this in the coming months.