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Although terrorism is not unknown in Indonesia, it had been seven years since the world’s largest Muslim nation was victimized by a large-scale terrorist attack. On Thursday, terrorists reportedly aligned with the Islamic State fired upon a busy shopping district in the capital of Jakarta, killing two people and wounding more than twenty others. Indonesian President Joko Widodo, also known as Jokowi, was quick to condemn the attacks and stated his nation’s resolve not to succumb to the extremist message that the Islamic State propagates. However, there are fears that the attack may be a sign of bigger aims by the Islamic State in Southeast Asia as the group is reportedly looking into ways to extend its reach to weaken international efforts against it in Iraq and Syria. The attacks have also called into question whether Indonesian authorities are doing enough to fight extremism and the radicalization of young Muslim men.
This topic brief will provide a brief overview of Indonesia’s battles against Islamic extremists, discuss why the Jakarta attacks could be a sign of growing instability in Southeast Asia, and analyze how Indonesian authorities may react to the attacks.
Readers are also encouraged to use the links below and in the related R&D to bolster their files about this topic.
Indonesia’s Struggle with Islamic Extremists
Extempers that are well versed in world history might remember that Indonesia was once a colony of the Netherlands. After the Second World War Indonesia became independent and almost immediately afterward it was challenged by Islamic extremists. The Atlantic writes on January 3 that in 1949 an organization called Darul Islam proclaimed an “Islamic state” in the country, claiming that the nation’s government was an apostate. Darul Islam’s battle with authorities lasted for two decades before it was finally driven underground. The Atlantic explains that Darul Islam then broke into several factions, the most prominent of which were Lashkar Jihad, which focused on attacking Christians, and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), which became an arm of Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda network in the region. Some of these groups were composed of hardened veterans from previous jihadist activity, notably the Soviet-Afghan War of the 1980s and the Afghan Civil War that followed. Extremists benefitted from Indonesia’s political turmoil in the 1990s as well, which culminated in the ouster of the Suharto regime in 1998.
America’s declaration of the war on terrorism after the September 11 terror attacks created new opportunities for terrorist groups in Southeast Asia that used America’s campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq to recruit new followers. Western businesses, embassies, and cultural centers also became targets as evidenced by JI’s attack on the resort island of Bali in 2002 that left 202 people dead. In 2009, JI militants carried out suicide bombing attacks on the Ritz Carlton and J.W. Marriott hotels and this provoked a more aggressive series of actions by the Indonesian government to wipe out the group. Time reports on January 15 that after 2009 JI had its leadership jailed and counter-terrorism forces killed some of the masterminds of previous terrorist attacks. This heavy handed approach was brutal, but it proved to be relatively effective at driving the group further underground and prevented another significant terrorist attack until recently.
The rise of the Islamic State has exposed one of the weaknesses of Indonesian officials despite their success in clamping down on the JI, that being the radicalization of young Indonesian men. One of the biggest places of radicalization are Indonesian prisons where young men are exposed to radical Islamic sermons, often from extremist clerics that have been jailed on security grounds by the Indonesian government. The Islamic State’s ability to broadcast its message via Twitter and other social media outlets is well known. The Christian Science Monitor explains on January 16 that radical Islamic websites have a following among Indonesian youth (eleven such websites were closed after the Jakarta attacks). Also, authorities believe that the Jakarta attackers communicated with Bahrun Naim, a former Internet café manager-turned-terrorist that officials believe lives in Raqqa, Syria, the capital of the Islamic State, via social media. Naim has been deemed as the mastermind behind the attacks and the Internet and mobile phone technology allegedly allowed him to drive the actions of the militants the carried out the attacks in Jakarta. Monitoring and shutting down radical Islamist activity on the Internet is gradually becoming a priority for governments around the world, although such actions arouse civil liberties concerns.
A Sign of Growing Instability in Indonesia
In some ways, the attacks on Jakarta were not surprising. Commentary explains on January 14 that although international pressure is causing the Islamic State to lose ground – it has lost 14% of its territory since last year – it appears to be willing and able to stage terrorist attacks abroad with growing frequency. For example, Time notes that in recent weeks the Islamic State has successfully carried out attacks in Istanbul, Paris, Beirut, the United States, and Afghanistan. There is a dispute about whether the attacks were using the Paris template of attacking civilians in a crowded place that is affiliated with Western culture. The Straits Times of Malaysia writes on January 16 that the militants in Jakarta carried guns and explosives like the Paris attackers, but the links between the two stop there. In fact, The Straits Times postulates that domestic factors may have been at behind the attacks since a tiny police station was one of the primary targets. Since the Indonesian government began to crack down on militants several years ago there have been minor attacks on local police. The attacks may have also been in retaliation of police sweeping up several suspected militants before Christmas. The Christian Science Monitor explains on January 14 that this took place due to a threat issued by militants that said they were planning an attack that would attract significant international media coverage. Indonesian officials stationed 150,000 police officers throughout the country on New Year’s Eve to ward off attacks on Christian churches, airports, and other public locations. This show of force may have prevented attacks and one of the good things about the Jakarta attacks, if such a claim can be made, is that civilian casualties were very low. Still, the willingness of gunmen to get into firefights with security forces and detonate bombs in crowded places signifies a change in Indonesian terrorism as militants have been less likely to target civilians in the past.
Terrorism experts have always feared that Indonesia could be a new battleground in the war on terrorism. The country is the world’s largest Muslim nation, with The Times of India explaining on January 16 that more than 200 million Muslims live in Indonesia where they constitute 87% of the population. According to The Diplomat on January 14, the Islamic State has announced its desire to establish a foothold in Southeast Asia in 2016, eyeing Indonesia and the Philippines as expansion targets. Like Indonesia, the Philippines has struggled with Islamic terrorism with the government fighting Abu Sayyaf, a group that was once allied with al-Qaeda. Reports indicate that ISIS desires to win recruits and the allegiance of some of the local groups in both Indonesia and the Philippines, using that as a cover for establishing training grounds for militants. The Diplomat adds that a Southeast Asian safe haven could help ISIS win over recruits that cannot afford to make the journey to fight for it in Syria and Iraq. According to Vox on January 14, ISIS has been directing recruitment videos at Indonesians since July 2014 and these videos have attracted some support. The Economist writes on January 15 that 2,000 Indonesians have attended rallies to support the group and Vox notes that an estimated 600 Southeast Asians are fighting with the group. This might appear small, but The Wall Street Journal argues on January 15 that this is a larger number than those who fought with the Taliban and al-Qaeda against coalition forces in Afghanistan during the 2000s.
However, extempers should not get ahead of themselves when looking at the position of ISIS in Indonesia. First, a very, very small percentage of Indonesians are taking off to go and fight for ISIS. Vox explains that Belgians are twenty times more likely to join ISIS as Indonesians and The Wall Street Journal points out that an estimated 4,000 to 5,000 Western Europeans have gone to Syria and Iraq to fight for ISIS, thereby dwarfing the number of Indonesians that have taken up arms for the group. Second, it has always been a dream of emerging Islamist groups to set up a base in Indonesia, but these dreams have not been realized. CNN explains on January 15 that al-Qaeda once predicted that Southeast Asia would become a major front in the war on terrorism, but this prediction never came to fruition. Third, it is not yet clear who would be the leader of an ISIS-inspired group in Southeast Asia and Al Arabiya writes on January 17 that infighting among Islamist rebels over leadership is probably one of the reasons that ISIS has yet to establish a sizable footprint in the region. Fourth, Indonesia has a record as a free, tolerant country. The Atlantic argues that Indonesia does not provide Islamic militants with a great deal of propaganda since it is not under occupation by a foreign power, has a stable political system, allows dissent to be expressed democratically, and does not persecute Muslims. Nations that have problems with ISIS such as Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Libya, and Russia share one or more of these factors. And fifth, Indonesia’s form of Islam is not the same as its more radical counterparts in the Middle East. Time writes that Indonesian Muslims largely follow a form of the faith that blends it with local mysticism (extempers that are in AP World History may recall that when Islam spread to other regions it often evolved to include some of the characteristics of pre-Islamic religious practices in certain areas). This Indonesian brand of Islam is much less fundamentalist than Salafist or Wahhabist Islam and the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), a large Islamic organization in the country that claims fifty million members, encourages religious tolerance and this been a great counter to radical propaganda.
Reaction of Indonesian Authorities to the Jakarta Attacks
The Jakarta attacks are likely to increase pressure on President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo to take stronger actions against Islamic radicalism. As noted earlier in this brief, Indonesian officials were aware of the danger of a terror attack during the holiday season. The roundup of suspected militants saw Indonesia work with the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and officials in Australia and Singapore. That kind of cooperation is likely to continue in an effort to root out future militants. Also, the government arrested twelve people with alleged links to the attack who were reportedly plotting future attacks on Indonesian government offices, foreigners, and Indonesians that were working for foreign interests.
Additionally, the government will have to do much more than make new arrests or bolster counter-terror operations. After all, the government has done most of what it can do from a force perspective for bringing radical groups such as JI to heel. Time writes that nearly two million Indonesians may be sympathetic to ISIS and it is the job of the Indonesian government to prevent the group’s message from attracting new followers. One of the ways that the government could fight radicalization is to crackdown more on radical clerics behind bars. Time explains that one of the Jakarta attackers had met Aman Abdurrahman, a jailed cleric. Mr. Abdurrahman has often had mobile phones confiscated from his cell, with Al Arabiya explaining that he had ten phones taken back in September, but he reportedly has a new phone at his disposal with which to direct up to 200 followers that are part of his Jamaah Ansharut Daulah organization. Extempers may wonder why Abdurrahman gets away with such behavior and the reason is intimidation. Time points out that prison guards often receive death threats and as a result they give radical clerics like Abdurrahman special privileges such as allowing them to do sermons, not forcing them to wear prison clothes, and letting them cook their own food. After the Jakarta attacks the government might be pressed to ensure that such privileges do not exist and that Abdurrahman’s contact with the outside world is shut off.
Jokowi will also investigate how to track Indonesian citizens that have fought for the Islamic State. CNN writes on January 14 that ISIS may begin directing its foreign fighters back to their respective countries to either recruit new members or to unleash attacks on what is becoming a growing international coalition aligned against it. Although Indonesia has had a small number of people go fight for ISIS, several hundred fighters could do a lot of damage if they helped other Islamist organizations establish links to ISIS and/or work to train other would-be jihadists what they learned in Syria and Iraq. CNN adds that at present, Indonesia has no way of knowing how many of its citizens have returned from fighting for ISIS and it has very few controls to keep people from leaving the country. Jokowi has agreed to investigate ways to revoke the passports of radicals and possibly look for better ways to monitor veteran jihadists, but the shape of the legislation that would do these things has yet to be determined. It is notable, though, that Jokowi does not simply want a “hard war” against terrorism. Instead, he has argued that a “soft approach” that involves better anti-poverty programs and religious outreach can reduce the likelihood that young people will become terrorists.
The Jakarta attacks are a reminder that Indonesia has not won its war against terrorism. Yes, the government has made significant strides to reduce the capabilities and functioning of terrorist organizations, but more steps need to be taken to reduce the scope of terrorist propaganda and prevent the radicalization of youth. Jokowi wishes he could focus on other domestic reforms, as he has staked his political career thus far on ways to help Indonesia’s poor and fight corruption, but his response to the Jakarta attacks may go a long way to defining his presidency and historical legacy.