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In less than a month, the war in Syria will be entering its fifth year. The conflict has led to the deaths of more than 250,000 people, injured more than a million others, and displaced half of the country’s population. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad appeared headed for defeat in the fall, but the intervention of Russia rescued his regime and has allowed him to reverse the momentum of the conflict. President Barack Obama has refused to provide sufficient support for Syria’s rebel factions, hesitant to get America involved in another sectarian war in the region and despairing that there are no “good” forces to support in the conflict. Experts note that the war has become a proxy battle of American and Russian influence in the Middle East and that a wider war cannot be discounted between Sunni and Shi’ite powers. The United States and Russia have recently agreed to move toward a “cessation of hostilities” later this week, but the agreement excludes attacks on terrorist groups and the tortured nature of that term is likely to help Assad solidify his gains and potentially win the war with significant ramifications for U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East.
This topic brief will provide an update on the status of the conflict, discuss the recent agreements trying to wind down the war, and analyze the conflagration’s potential outcomes.
Readers are also encouraged to use the links below and in the related R&D to bolster their files about this topic.
The Status of the Conflict
For all intents and purposes, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has survived much longer than his enemies thought he could. Uprisings against his rule began in March 2011 and other regional dictators such as Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and Moammar Gaddafi in Libya were gone from power or on their way out. Like Gaddafi, Assad stubbornly clung to power and refused to leave even after the United States expressed its desire for “regime change.” It is possible that Assad realized that the “Arab Spring” would run out of momentum or that he thought his ties to Iran and Russia may save him whereas American support for Mubarak quickly collapsed and Gaddafi had alienated his previous allies. It seemed that Assad might be ousted in the fall of 2013 when reports of chemical weapons use against his own citizens surfaced, but this crossing President Obama’s “red line” by triggering no significant American intervention. This past fall it seemed as if the Syrian Army was weakening despite the fact that Iran had sent military advisors to work with Hezbollah militia units to back his regime. However, Russian President Vladimir Putin made the significant decision to send Russian air forces and other units to Syria to protect Russian naval interests on the Mediterranean and this has turned the tide of the conflict.
Most of the recent international attention about the Syrian conflict is focused on the city of Aleppo. Aleppo is Syria’s largest city and opposition forces seized control of it early in the conflict, hoping to use it as a springboard for the takeover of the rest of the country. Supply lines from Turkey maintained opposition groups in the city, but now those supply lines are under assault. The Middle East Eye reports on February 20 that recent weeks have seen Syrian forces, with the help of their Russian counterparts, besiege the city. National Public Radio writes on February 12 that the siege of Aleppo could put the lives of more than 300,000 people at risk and reports are surfacing that Russian airstrikes are indiscriminate, hitting schools and hospitals. The Economist speculates on February 20 that this may be part of a new regime strategy of driving as many civilians out of Aleppo as possible so that more devastating tactics can be used to regain the city at the expense of the militants that remain there. The Washington Post explains on February 12 that Shi’ite fighters from Lebanon under Iranian command severed a significant supply line that U.S.-backed rebels were using to sustain their anti-government efforts at the beginning of the month. If opposition forces lose Aleppo it would be a significant victory for Assad’s regime and symbolize a significant turning point in the conflict. The Economist notes that 40,000 opposition fighters are in Aleppo, so it provides an ample opportunity for forces loyal to Assad to obliterate the manpower of fifty opposition groups. Extempers should conceptualize the fall of Aleppo as the fall of another nation’s capital during a war. Capturing a capital in RISK can end sessions of that board game and the same effect may take place in Syria. An Assad victory in Aleppo could solidify his grip on Western Syria, which some observers have called “essential Syria.” The Atlantic writes on February 11 that if Assad wins Aleppo he may be able to send his forces on the offensive elsewhere, making possible an eventual reconquest of more of the country.
In the meantime, Syria’s conflict has also become intermixed with Turkey’s clampdown on its Kurdish population. Syria is one of three nations in the Middle East with a significant Kurdish population (Turkey and Iraq are the others) and Kurdish nationalists hope to use parts of each nation’s territory to create a new country. The Kurds are allies of the United States, but Foreign Policy writes on February 18 that Turkey has the opposite perspective. In fact, Turkish politicians consider the Kurds a bigger security threat than the Islamic State and it has focused its military efforts on slowing the operations of Kurdish militia units in Syria. The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a group that the United States State Department lists as a terrorist organization, has fought with Turkey since 1984 for independence (it now wants autonomy) and its affiliate in Syria is the People’s Protection Units (YPG). The YPG is currently fighting Islamic State units in Northern Syria, consolidating gains and pressing the town of Azaz, which is supplying Syrian rebels. Foreign Policy explains that the Turkish military considers the fall of Azaz a “red line” and is shelling Kurdish groups, some of which have received American backing such as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), that are moving toward the city. Russia has given backing to Kurdish nationalists in the region, possibly due to growing tensions with Turkey over border clashes near Syria. The Economist writes that Russia is seeking to lock in Kurdish gains, especially as they help to close supply lines to Aleppo. In fact, the PYG has an office in Moscow and that office has a map of a Syrian Kurdistan region named “Rojava.”
Finding a Negotiated Solution
U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry is working feverishly to try to broker an international settlement over the Syrian conflict. On February 12 the International Syrian Support Group (ISSG), a group that is composed of twenty nations with an interest in Syria, pushed for a cessation of violence at Munich (the site of another ill-fated attempt to avoid war in 1938 when Great Britain, France, Nazi Germany, and Fascist Italy met to decide the fate of Czechoslovakia). The Guardian writes on February 19 that the modified ceasefire was supposed to go into effect within a week, but Russian airstrikes continued. Extempers may wonder why Russia could get away with such actions, but they should note that the Munich agreement permitted attacks on terrorist groups. After all, Newsweek reports on February 15 that the Islamic State and the al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra have never been party to any talks on Syria. Newsweek adds that Russia’s case for continuing airstrikes is strengthened by the fact that Nusra militants do not hold territories and operate in the midst of other militant groups, thereby making it difficult to distinguish who are “moderate” rebels and which ones are radical. The Munich agreement was also not a ceasefire since it did not include major militant organizations, although the High Negotiations Committee (HNC), a group of various opposition and rebel factions, said it would accept a temporary ceasefire if Russian and Iranian involvement in the conflict ceased. Unfortunately, it appears as if the Munich accord did not produce an immediate end to hostilities as The Voice of America on February 21 reports that sixty Syrians died in double bombing attacks in Homs on Sunday.
Still, the Munich accord has freed up valuable humanitarian assistance for thousands of Syrians. As with most warzones, civilians are put into significant harms way as access to basic essentials such as food, water, and medicine becomes difficult. The New York Times admits on February 21 that while the tenets of the Munich agreement were largely a failure, aid corridors became open as a result of the deal. The Guardian explains that seven besieged areas have received aid since February 12, including Deir el-Zor that is under siege by the Islamic State. Nevertheless, some militant outfits such as the Free Syrian Army argue that more needs to be done. They point out that cities such as Daraya, which is west of the capital of Damascus, are in dire need. The United Nations has also warned that residents of Madaya, home to 20,000 civilians, is in danger as citizens there are reportedly eating grass and insects to survive. Providing aid is important to halt some of the flow of Syrian refugees that are becoming a political nightmare for European leaders, especially those on the political left. With the violence continuing, though, these aid deliveries remain tenuous and again, Syria’s leadership and its allies are reluctant to provide long-term humanitarian assistance because of fears that terrorists are mixing with civilians. For example, CNN reports on February 20 that Assad recently said he supported a pause in the fighting for aid deliveries but on the condition that terrorists were not helped and that Turkey did not find it easier to send more recruits into the ranks of the rebels.
Additionally, while Munich may have been a failure in the short-term it does appear to have laid the groundwork for another attempt to halt hostilities in the area. Several days ago U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry announced that he had brokered an agreement with Russia to temporarily halt the fighting in the country. The truce will reportedly go into effect on Friday, with the United States and Russia defining which parties will adhere to the agreement. However, once again militant groups such as the Islamic State and the Nusra Front are not party to the accord and Russian and U.S. attacks on them can continue. This still provides a loophole for Russian offensive action and that could easily disrupt the agreement, but if the U.S. and Russia are clear to each other about which groups and areas are not active that may restrain some of Russia’s actions. The New York Times argues that Kerry will keep plugging away at trying to broker a Syrian peace agreement because his eternal optimism was crucial for securing a nuclear deal with Iran last year and finding a way to get a global climate change pact in Paris several months ago.
Extempers should keep following the progress of negotiations because a “cessation of hostilities” could easily breakdown. First, major powers are trying to solve the conflict by brokering agreements with each other, but those powers have to convince their factions to abide by the terms and that makes for a very tenuous peace process. Second, just because there is a “cessation of hostilities” does not mean that peace talks are immediate. Kerry is hoping that a lull in the fighting can produce a restart of United Nations-brokered talks between government forces and rebel groups and then eventual monitoring, disarmament, and a lasting political solution. However, this approach will take a long time and will require clarification about Assad’s future. President Obama has indicated that he wants Assad to leave, but Assad has felt emboldened by recent gains and insisted the he wants to reconquer the entire country. Assad has always felt that he is fighting radicalism in Syria and Al Arabiya writes on February 21 that he told reporters recently that he wants “saving Syria” to be his legacy. The Russians have thus far supported Assad’s position, agreeing with other regional powers such as the Israelis that it is much better to keep Assad around because no one else can replace him. The world has seen Libya, Egypt, and Iraq fall into chaos after their strongmen were eliminated so according to these nations it makes little sense to reboot nation building in Damascus. Still, it is difficult to see how the Syrian peace process makes any progress if Assad wishes to stay and that could complicate the creation of a lasting solution to the conflict.
Possible Outcomes of the War
It was once considered unthinkable that Assad might triumph in the Syrian conflict. Yes, he had the backing of Iran and Hezbollah, but he was also confronting rebels with some powerful friends in the West and from neighbors such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Russia’s intervention has turned the tide and Assad is now looking at a possible victory, although such a victory could lead him governing a fractured country. For example, a peace settlement could lead to Assad governing Western Syria with rebels in charge of areas recaptured from the Islamic State in Eastern Syria and the Kurds in control of areas in Northern Syria. Newsweek writes on February 21 that Putin’s endgame is likely to help lock in Assad’s and that he is reluctant to resume peace talks until enough territory has been captured to solidify Assad’s position. A fractured Syria would do little for long-term stability, though, as Assad would probably face constant guerilla action (this would also present itself were Assad to recapture the entire country with the help of the Russians and Iranians) and radicalism would be an ever-present danger to his regime.
Like Ukraine, it appears as if Putin has achieved a significant victory in Syria. It is far from certain that Russia will back Assad to the very end and it may agree to see him go if another strongman can emerge that is also acceptable to other Western powers. Putin has long made the case that removing Assad would fuel more radicalism in the region and he appears to be winning this argument in the face of growing concerns in Europe about Islamic jihadists. Newsweek writes that if Putin saves Assad he may give Russia significant clout in the Middle East. It is common knowledge that many Arab leaders were unhappy about American reactions to the “Arab Spring” and how the U.S. turned very quickly on Hosni Mubarak. Putin, like his Chinese counterparts, has shown little appetite for democracy or social justice and is more than willing to back dictators if it serves Russian interests in the region. Newsweek even speculates that Putin may have exported Russia’s Chechen strategy to Syria by making deals with some rebels and killing the leaders of troublesome factions. Like the Spanish Civil War nearly a century ago, Russia has used Syria to test some of its armaments and nations are slowly stepping in to buy it. For example, Algeria’s government is making overtures to buy Russian military equipment and this could be a boon for a depressed Russian economy. Furthermore, if other regional dictators see Russia as a more reliable ally than the United States this could displace America as the predominant outside power in the region.
It does appear that a byproduct of the Syrian conflict might be the weakening of the Islamic State. Indeed, that is one goal that the United States and Russia might be able to eventually agree on. Russia argues that it is attacking militants inspired or recruited by ISIS, but the U.S. insists that Russia is largely targeting moderate rebel factions. Some analysts insist that one component of Russia’s ongoing strategy is to wipe out moderate rebels and present Western leaders with a stark choice of backing Assad or leaving Syria in the hands of ISIS, who would be the only significant force left. The Guardian explains that ISIS is losing territory in Syria and Iraq, with the Kurds encroaching on its Syrian capital of Raqqa and Iraqi forces closing in on its control of Mosul. Reports suggest that the group is having to cut the pay for its fighters and that it is becoming paranoid about traitors, but its demise will not be immediate. Still, its days might be numbered as Assad’s forces begin to turn the tide in Syria and contemplate more offensive action against moderates, thereby leaving ISIS to be pulverized by the West and the Russians.
The biggest concern about the Syrian Civil War that has been mentioned in several past topic briefs is that the war could become wider and engulf the entire region in a Sunni-Shi’ite struggle. Shi’ite powers such as Iran are putting their weight behind Assad while Saudi Arabia and Turkey, two powerful Sunni states, are backing the opposition. The Guardian writes that the Saudis recently warned in Munich that if peace talks fail that they and other Sunnis states such as Jordan may launch attacks into Syria with the help of Western intelligence, air power, and technical support. Several weeks ago Saudi Arabia even floated the idea of sending ground forces into Syria. It would alarmist to say that this could trigger a global war, but one can easily envision a scenario where Kerry’s attempts at a lasting ceasefire fail, Assad continues to make gains against the rebels and the Kurds continue to make advances near the Turkish border by possibly seizing Azaz. In this situation, Gulf states intervene in order to reverse the tide, but in so doing end up in armed conflict with Russian military forces in the air (or even some Russian commanders on the ground) and/or with Iranian generals that are leading Lebanese militia units and/or Iranian-backed Hezbollah groups. That would constitute significant escalation and since Turkey is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) it may call upon other members for help, especially if its intervention was precipitated by continued Russian incursions into its airspace or Russian airstrikes against refugee camps that it has established along its Syrian border. If NATO refused to help Turkey – something that would be likely due to continued anti-Turkish sentiment in the European Union (EU) and Europeans lack of an appetite for fighting Russia – then it could erode the Article V guarantees of the NATO charter that an attack on one NATO member is an attack on all. Thus, in one action Russia could undo NATO’s collective security apparatus and possibly prepare the groundwork for continued encroachments into Eastern Europe.
Neverthless, extempers should not get too carried away with such an analysis. First, the ceasefire that Kerry is pushing may end up achieving success if Russia’s economy remains depressed. The Russians do not want another Afghanistan in Syria and they will do everything they can to avoid it. Second, Saudi Arabia is tied down in Yemen fighting Iranian-backed Houthi militants so it is unclear how they would even launch a ground operation into Syria, especially if such an operation lacked Western air power. It is far from certain that President Obama would even back an escalation of the conflict as involving America in another Middle Eastern war would probably play into the hands of Republicans in an election year. And finally, Sunni leaders would be careful to attack Syria because a loss could jeopardize their own political standings. For example, if King Abdullah led Jordanian forces into Syria and suffered significant casualties it could undermine his monarchy.
Sadly, the Syrian Civil War will continue to drag on in the immediate future. Even with a cessation of hostilities by major powers, strikes against terrorist groups will continue and civilian casualties are bound to occur as collateral damage. A future Syria with Assad still at the helm is a more distinct possibility than at any other time in the conflict and extempers should update their analysis accordingly.