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Two weeks ago, terrorists from the Somali al-Qaeda affiliate al-Shabab entered the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya and after telling all Muslims to leave began firing indiscriminately on those that remained. After a four day siege, the Kenyan government’s forces took out the militants, ending the worst terrorist attack that Kenya has seen since the bombing of the U.S. embassy in 1998 that killed more than 200 people. At least sixty-one people died in the attack and nearly 200 were wounded. The Red Cross also estimates that there are more than sixty people missing, some of which are feared dead after several mall floors collapsed during the final hours of the siege. Al-Shabab says that the justification for the attack is Kenya’s occupation of Somali territory and they have pledged to continue their attacks. The issue is further complicated by Kenya’s president and vice-president standing trial at the International Criminal Court (ICC) this fall.
This topic brief will provide some background information on al-Shabab and their hostility toward the Kenyan government, discuss the Westgate shopping mall attack, and examine what lies ahead for Kenya’s struggle with the al-Shabab terrorist group.
Readers are also encouraged to use the links below and in the related R&D to bolster their files about this topic.
Who is al-Shabab and Why Do they Hate Kenya?
Al-Shabab is a militant group that emerged from the collapse of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU)-led Somali government in 2006. Somalia has had a rough history in the modern era and extempers are encouraged to check out past topic briefs on the country that are available on Extemp Central. As Foreign Affairs discusses in a review of several books about al-Shabab and Somali history, the country was better off than most African states when it received its independence in 1960 because of a lack of ethnic divisions, but poor leadership created an economic collapse by the early 1990s. This led to a humanitarian disaster and warlords fighting for control of the country, a situation that produced a power vacuum that allowed militant groups like al-Shabab to become major political actors. This situation also produced a piracy problem off of Somalia’s shore, which threatened trade through the Red Sea and across the Indian Ocean. A concerted international response has helped to quell this problem, but the current Somali government is weak and corrupt and is only holding onto power because of a 17,000 strong African Union (AU) force that has United Nations (UN) sanction. This force is called the African Union Mission to Somalia, or AMISOM for short.
Islamic militants that were part of the ICU became the effective government, albeit not recognized by the international community, of Somalia in 2006 when they took over Southern Somalia from warlords and seized the capital Mogadishu. The ICU tried to restore some order to Somalia, but its ideology called for bringing in Muslim-majority territories in Kenya and Ethiopia, which unnerved both of those countries. In December 2006, Ethiopia invaded Somalia to help out the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and this drove the ICU out of Mogadishu. The ICU adopted guerilla tactics against the Ethiopian occupation forces, replicating the situation American forces faced in Iraq, and Ethiopian forces left the country in January 2009 after a power sharing agreement between the TFG and some elements of the Islamic militants. The United States supported Ethiopia’s invasion of the country as part of the global war on terrorism.
However, some of the militants desired to continue the fight to create an Islamic state within Somalia and one of those groups that emerged after the 2006 war was al-Shabab, which stands for “the Youth.” The organization was formed by dedicated Islamists, but had a decentralized structure until a leader named Godane (full name Mukhtar Abu Zubeyr) took power within the organization in mid-2008. The Washington Post of September 26th explains that Godane has been in a power struggle for complete control of the organization for the last several years, since he desires to take the Somali jihad out of Soamlia and onto a regional and international stage and other Somali nationalists want to keep the fight going within Somalia’s borders. Godane has an opening to expand al-Shabab’s role in the global Islamic terrorist network since American drone strikes have damaged al-Qaeda’s operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In 2010, Godane announced that al-Shaabab’s alignment with al-Qaeda, but he had a tough time cooperating with Osama bin Laden before his death. As the Washington Post article previously cited mentions, bin Laden opposed some of the harsh punishments al-Shabab meted out in the areas it controlled in Southern Somalia under the guise of sharia law. Al-Shabab practiced public executions, stoning, and public amputations and killed other Muslims that opposed its rule. As the Agence France Presse of September 25th reveals, the U.S. State Department lists Godane as one of the world’s top terror fugitives and there is a $7 million bounty for his capture.
Al-Shabab took advantage of the continuing violence in the country to seize a great deal of the southern half of the country by 2010, which included the port of Kismayo. In October 2011, Kenyan forces invaded Somalia to go after al-Shabab after the militant group was linked to the kidnapping of one tourist and the killing of another in Northern Kentya. The Atlantic on September 24th explains that Kenya’s action was not sanctioned by the international community, but was deemed justified by the Kenyan government to protect Western investment and tourism, which the country heavily depends on. Kenyan forces successfully drove al-Shabab away from Kismayo and the United Nations sanctioned the operation after the fact by putting them under the AMISOM banner in June 2012. As the BBC reveals on September 27th, Kenya currently has more than 4,000 troops in Somalia to battle the al-Shabab militia, which has an estimated 7,000-9,000 fighters at its disposal. However, Kenya has created a great deal of animosity within Somalia because of its continued occupation of Kismayo, which as the Atlantic previously cited explains, is seen by some international experts as a de facto annexation of that port city for Kenya. The New York Times writes on September 25th that Kenya believed that its operation would be short, but its warlord allies squabbled among each other and its occupation has dragged on. This has had the added effect of making the existing Somali government in Mogadishu appear weak, thereby undermining Western attempts at creating a stable governing situation.
The Westgate Mall Attack
The Westgate Mall is located in Nairobi, the Kenyan capital city and one of Africa’s flourishing commercial centers. The Christian Science Monitor on September 24th argues that Nairobi has come a long way in the last decade, since it was once referred to as “Nairorobbery” because of its high crime rate. Now, it has hundreds of regional and corporate offices that are staffed by Kenyans and Westerners and the influx of tourists and Western revenue has produced many Western-style shopping malls throughout the country. These malls symbolize Kenya’s integration into the global economy and its ties to Western nations, since Israelis and Europeans own stores in them. Israel has very close ties to the Kenyan government as well, which makes the government a top target of Islamic militants. The Christian Science Monitor also notes on September 21st that Westgate was frequented by UN officials and staff from foreign missions, so it gave al-Shabab a target that would not only strike the Kenyan government, but international forces that supported Kenya’s operation within Somalia.
The details about the attack are still unclear and extempers must be wary of reading too much into the early reports of the mall attack. In the “fog” of a violent incident many reports tend to be exaggerated and they cloud what actually happens in certain situations. An example of this was Hurricane Katrina when reports surfaced that people were being killed and raped in the New Orleans Superdome, which later proved to be untrue. What we currently know from eyewitnesses, though, is that a group of up to ten militants entered the mall two Saturdays ago, called for all Muslims to leave, and then began firing on others. Despite this, though, many Muslims were killed in the attack. One man is reported to have made it out by disguising the first name on his voter registration card and convincing the militants that he was a Muslim, which enabled him to leave. The militants used machine guns and grenades on their victims and then fought off government forces for four days by burning materials in the mall and firing on Kenyan security personnel. In the last few hours of the siege, several floors of the mall collapsed, which as the BBC reports on September 27th may have been due to the governments troops using rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) inside of the mall. If true, this action could have killed many hostages, as well as militants, and would demonstrate that the government got impatient and saw the hostages lives as expendable. Reports are also emerging that the al-Shabab militants tortured some of the hostages. The UK Independent on September 26th reports that witnesses are saying that some of the terrorists removed eyes, ears, and noses from their victims with pliers. There are also accusations of rape. However, these charges have not been verified by government officials.
Kenya’s security services have come under fire for not reacting quickly enough to the siege and the government is investigating how the attack eluded its intelligence services. The UK Independent previously cited mentions that the Kenyan National Intelligence Agency (NIS) is arguing that it did warn the necessary political actors about the potential for an attack on Westgate. The UK Telegraph on September 27th reveals that there were twenty-nine separate warnings about an attack on Westgate, which date back to the last year. The incident has undermined some of the existing government’s credibility, which can seldom afford to lose it based on domestic problems (explained below), because during the siege it issued false information. The Economist details this on September 24th when it reveals that officials kept claiming that hostages were freed and then assured the public that the siege would soon end after it began, both of which were false. The Christian Science Monitor on September 25th writes that Kenyan citizens have used social media to demand answers to eighty-five questions about the shooting, which range from why floors in the mall collapsed to how the attackers were able to get a large arsenal of weapons into the mall. Since Kenya is part of the British Commonwealth, the British government is assisting Kenyans in identifying victims and serving in an advisory role during the investigation. Also, the Huffington Post on September 27th explains that agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Canada, Germany, and Israel are assisting in the investigation to assist the Kenyans and also learn more about fighting terrorist attacks on “soft” targets like malls.
It is also notable that al-Shabab is showing no sign of stopping their attacks on Kenyan targets after the Westgate Mall attack. Time explains on September 27th that al-Shabab is suspected of attacking police officers in Wajir and Mandera along the Somali border, which resulted in the death of two police officers and a dozen vehicles being set on fire.
The Future Fight Against al-Shabab
The attack on the Westgate Mall will prompt Kenya to re-evaluate its policy regarding al-Shabab. The attack demonstrates that the group can launch attacks in major Kenyan cities and is a significant threat to Kenyan national security. It is unlikely that the Kenyan government will leave Somalia in the face of the attacks and the attacks might backfire on al-Shabab because they have aroused sympathy for Westerners and more affluent Kenyans. The Atlantic previously cited explains that Kenya’s government has to be careful not to overreact to the Westgate Mall incident. There are 500,000 Somali refugees on its eastern border with Somalia and the Kenyan government estimates that 500,000 more are working in the country illegally. There are also sizeable Somali communities in the Northern half of the country and affluent Somalis in these areas raise the ire of poorer Kenyans. The government has to be careful not to launch a domestic crackdown on these Somalis without cause, since it may radicalize some of them and provide a propaganda victory for al-Shabab. At the same time it must re-evaluate its security procedures to ensure that it channels intelligence in the right areas to ward off future attacks.
The attack may have provided a small boon for Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta and Vice-President William Ruto, who are set to stand trial at the ICC this fall for crimes against humanity that stem from the 2007 Kenyan presidential elections. Both men stand accused of creating ethnic violence that left more than 1,000 people dead and displaced hundreds of thousands of people. The Christian Science Monitor of September 25th explains that both leaders will attend their trials, thereby becoming the first heads of state that are willing to submit themselves to an ICC trial. The ICC has denied relocating the trials to Kenya and requests to do the trial via video. Ruto’s trial is set to begin in the coming weeks and Kenyatta’s will be held in November. Supporters of both men argue that the trial will distract from governing the nation in a time of internal crisis. Supporters have also introduced measures into the Kenyan parliament to withdraw from Kenyan participation in the ICC, but the ICC says that if Kenya does this their actions will not be retroactive and only apply to future cases. A fear of human rights advocates is that Western pressure to accept ICC jurisdiction may wane in the aftermath of the attack and the ICC persecution has already resulted in Kenya orienting its foreign policy more toward China, which unnerves the West.
There is also the question of what the attack on the Westgate Mall means for the United States and its relationship with Kenya. The United States has designated al-Shabab as a terrorist group and banned its activities. However, it has been loath to support previous Kenyan actions against al-Shabab and refused to support its 2011 invasion of the country. The Los Angeles Times of September 25th reveals that the United States has largely tried to avoid being viewed as directly in conflict with al-Shabab so as not to produce direct reprisals against its targets in Africa. The U.S. also sees very little need to take direct action against a group that it believes cannot attack domestic targets, unlike al-Qaeda’s branches in Yemen. The Los Angeles Times explains that twenty Somali Americans are suspected of having joined al-Shabab, but there is no evidence that they are going to bring the ideology home with them. The Economist of September 28th has a great piece on the health of al-Qaeda and terrorism and blasts the Obama administration for its handling of terrorist groups. The piece blames President Obama for running from Iraq and Afghanistan too quickly and relying too much on drone strikes to contain terrorist groups. The article recommends taking on a Cold War mindset and supporting governments that are weak and somewhat corrupt, but willing to resist al-Qaeda in Yemen, Somalia, Iraq, Libya, Mali, Niger, Kenya, and Nigeria. If anything, the Westgate Mall attack may lead to greater Western awareness of Kenya’s struggles with al-Shabab and strengthen U.S.-Kenyan security cooperation. It may also lead to greater interest in al-Shabab’s activities by Western intelligence agencies, even if they will not publicly admit that the U.S. has a vested interest in directly opposing its actions in the Horn of Africa.
What the Westgate Mall attack may demonstrate the most is that al-Qaeda is not declining as a threat. The attack demonstrates that “soft” targets remain attractive to terrorists and the attack is likely to harm some of Nairobi’s shopping centers in the short-term. Al-Shabab is seeking a greater war with the West and its African allies, but for now its activities will likely continue to be centered in the East African region and it will be up to the Kenyan government to figure out how to best ward off future threats.