By Michael Garson
During the “Asia” round at most major tournaments, extempers will be eagerly preparing their analysis of China’s rural poor or how the United States can limit Chinese economic power. Fifteen minutes the prepared extempers will have to do nothing but chuckle as they hear, “Who the hell is Yasuo Fukuda?” Contrary to popular belief, East Asia extends beyond Chinese borders. Indeed, the world’s second biggest economy and the world’s second biggest surreptitious nuclear program provide more than enough fodder for question writers. It is very important to maintain focus on the Korean peninsula and Japan throughout the year. North Korea and Japan occasionally hit the headlines with the latest news of a missile attack or bank collapse. However, these countries never fully disappear. Filing these countries regularly may be difficult, but not impossible. As “second-tier” issues, many IXers will ignore them. However, those who want to be well-rounded extempers that can handle any question on any topic already have at least a basic analysis of the region. Therefore, this brief hopefully will provide the foundation to a deeper understanding of Japan and the Korean peninsula. Specifically, Japan’s near future under Mr. Fukuda and North Korea’s short-term and long-term destiny with itself and the world are of particular interest.
Japan
Politics
Being controlled by one political party for half a century is typical in under-developed countries that are led by dictators. Yet, Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party has maintained a near-monopoly on political power since the 1950s. After enduring financial scandals during the early 1990s, the party was removed from power for a two-year period. However, the failures of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), allowed the LDP to return. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi decided to revamp the party’s goals in the beginning of this decade. Intent on cracking on down corruption and jumpstarting the economy, Koizumi’s main plan was to privatize the Japan Post (more on this later). His opposition to the traditional ruling classes made him a polarizing leader. Despite lacking a standing military, Koizumi also worked on strengthening Japanese foreign policy and forged a closer bond to the President Bush. A famous visit, and extemp AGD, had President Bush and Koizumi meeting at Graceland, home of Koizumi’s idol, Elvis.
Koizumi’s successor, Shinzo Abe (pronounced ah-bay), barely lasted twelve months. He attempted to improve Sino-Japanese relations while maintaining opposition to North Korea. However, his foreign policy was undermined by domestic issues. Suicides, resignations, and scandals crippled the Abe administration. Seemingly cursed and facing approval ratings in the mid-thirties, Abe resigned. Extempers should be more concerned with the Abe administration as a context than as an actual area of analysis. Moving on after such a doomed and catastrophic period of governance poses great challenges and great opportunities.
Yasuo Fukuda has been asked to take over for Shinzo Abe. Fukuda holds not one, but two, mildly significant Japanese records. He is the first 2nd generation prime minister and also was the longest serving Chief Cabinet Secretary. These two facts alone suggest that Fukuda is seen as projecting competence and stability. Fukuda was a contender for the LDP’s nomination following Kozuimi’s departure, but chose not to run. Many believe that a 2004 pension scandal may have kept Fukuda from running. This scandal should be of great concern to Japanese voters, but the theme of corruption almost seems to be far too widespread to be noteworthy.
One of the most important policies that Fukuda’s advocates is a halt on visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. Both physically and metaphorically, Japan’s imperial past is hurting its foreign policy. This shrine is a Shinto graveyard and memorial for all soldiers who have died fighting for the Japanese Emperor. When an American president visits Arlington Cemetery, it is seen as an act of respect. When a Japanese Prime Minister visits Yasukuni, it causes headlines and alarm. The reason for this difference is that Yasukuni is home to war criminals. Much to the chagrin of Japanese history textbooks, Japan engaged in many war crimes in the midst of conflict. Enslavement, unfair treatment of POWs, and attacks launched on civilians remain at the forefront on the minds of Japan’s neighbors. Having the official head of state honor brutal murderers and ruthless military leaders revives and legitimizes a dark spot on Japanese history. Therefore, Fukuda’s refusal to visit could greatly improve Japan’s image. The drawback to this plan is that it reverses precedent. For years, Prime Ministers honored the fallen. Fukuda is willing to not visit the brave, honest soldiers in exchange for avoiding any connection with the less than moral leaders. On a larger scale, the Japanese people will now be forced to revisit the fundamental issue of Yasukuni because of Fukuda: is it worth it? Publicly acknowledging Japans’ past military mistakes will bring a great deal of humility to Japan and possibly lead to a new maturity in self-image
Economics
As an island nation with few natural resources, Japan was forced to resort to trade from infancy. Establishing trade routes with the west and Southeast Asia were essential to keep Japan afloat. One of the key reasons why Japan found it necessary to bomb Pearl Harbor was because the United States was limiting the trade of natural resources in and out of Japan. The devastation of World War II certainly took its toll in the years following the conflict. It wasn’t until the 1970s and 1980s,
Japan started to turn around its economic futures. Heavily invested in technology, Japan became the dominant force in producing high quality goods at low price. Instead of using the culture of pride and righteousness for war, Japan struck the right economic chord. Billions of dollars, or yen, in trade surplus accrued in the following years. This meteoric economic rise pushed Japan back onto the world stage. Indeed, many American pundits were terrified of the Japanese rise. Eerily reminiscent of Chinese alarmists, politicians and scholars alike showed concern over the possibility that Japan could use its economic might to bully the United States. This fear proved itself to be overblown as an economic downturn gripped Japan. Fast growth, increasing economic density, and corruption kept economic growth from propelling the country forward.
At present, Japan is looking to creep out of its economic slumber. One of the cornerstones of Koizuimi’s administration was the privatization of the Japanese Post. This behemoth of a government business controls all banking, and the ever-important postal service. Following the adage that absolute power corrupts absolutely, the Post was exploited. Family members and business partners would provide loans below market levels and then not repay them. Transparency gave way to the cloud of corruption. Worse than the rich getting richer, the poor got poorer. To pay for slanted business deals, middle and lower class Japanese had to pay high rates, if offered a loan at all. As basic economics teach us, if potential businesses are not created because of high interest rates, the economy suffers. Such has been the case for the past decade. The privatization plans gives Japan a chance to get out of the muck and slime that it has entrenched itself in. While other issues such as trade imbalances and other corruption scandals, most notably Livedoor, also have hurt Japan, the Post is clearly the pink elephant in the room if for no other reason that its sheer size.
Military
One of Japan’s most distinctive characteristics is that it does not have a standing army, or at least not in the traditional sense. In the aftermath of World War II, Japan was left devastated. National pride was ruined after the noble soldier/warriors were defeated by the allies. In response, Japan decided to completely gut the military that convinced politicians that war was a wise move. With a strong American military presence throughout the country, Japan drafted a new constitution. While the government structure is fairly standard, the military was abolished. Article 9 of the Japanese constitution forbids the creation of an active military. Force can only be used in a defensive, domestic role. The Japanese hoped that the lack of a military would protect Japan from enemies and from itself. By not engaging in arms races or agitating potential enemies, not having a standing military should put neighbors at ease. Also, without overzealous military generals infiltrating all ranks of government, Japan would be free to choose policies without coercion.
During the second half of the 20th century, Japan was relatively successful in reaching these goals. No major conflicts occurred during this time period and Japan did not fall to military juntas. Viewing the world as a non-zero sum game, Japan has taken steps back by not taking steps forward. With nuclear proliferation, the United Nations, and military buildups allowing other countries to amass power, Japan has been idly watching from the sidelines. Since the military is such a weakness in Japan’s bid for regional hegemony, some have wondered if it would be wise to repeal Article 9.
One of the more intriguing subplots of the Afghanistan War has been Japan’s involvement. Junichiro Koziumi’s strong alliance and friendship with George W Bush proved to be stronger than the paper the Japanese constitution is printed on. Koiziumi sent Japanese soldiers to Afghanistan in non-combative roles. The imagery of Japanese men in uniform going abroad to help a war effort that does not directly serve Japanese interests scared many voters. This attempt to restore Japan to the days of supremacy also restored the sense of fear and uncertainty prevalent in the same era. The general disapproval of the military intervention likely shows that the Japanese are still unwilling to open up the military. However, public opinion is not always right.
Reasons why Japan should repeal Article 9:
1. Not having offensive capabilities shows weakness to potentially hostile neighbors, such as China
2. Building up a military will better round out Japan’s power base
3. Japan could use its military (in the symbolic, not the physical sense) to improve relations with Southeast Asia
Reasons why Japan should not repeal Article 9:
1. The public is still apprehensive
2. Doing so would be perceived as a threat to China and North Korea
3. Unless Japan goes nuclear, having a conventional military would prove futile in a war against China and North Korea anyway
Foreign Relations
With significant economic power and no military strength, Japan is caught in limbo. Making the leap onto global politics would require significant amounts of effort. There are many things working against Japan:
Without a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, Japanese opinion is usually irrelevant to big ticket international items. If countries don’t need a Japanese “yes” vote, they are less likely to care. It should come as no surprise that Japan is jockeying for a permanent seat, without veto power, on the UNSC . I’ll table the UNSC’s expansion program for now. Suffice it to say that enlargement is unlikely, but could serve to greatly enhance Japanese power.
Along with the UNSC, there is another elite club that Japan is not a part of. Not surprisingly, the spread of nuclear proliferation skipped over the only country that has ever experienced a nuclear attack. While the logical causes of a lack of Japanese nuclear weapons program is self-evident, Japan still suffers by not having one. One would hope that nuclear weapons are symbolic, not physical, measures of national power. Yet, losing that singular symbol of potential for domination and supremacy weakens Japan. A great deal of power is based on perception. Since Japan is not perceived as capable of wholesale destruction, its absence in the nuclear conversation is harmful.
In the same vein, Japan’s lack of a military limits the potential for power. Though few large-scale wars are likely in the near-future, having a standing army allows a country to back up any threats. Though equally effective, dollars and yen do not seem to cause the same fear that bullets and bombs do. The physical safety of Japan’s enemies is never in question, providing a false of sense security. Japan’s inability to have the pomp and circumstance of large-scale military operations again keeps it from reaching superpower status. In light of China’s rise in military strength, Japan is now only falling further and further behind.
While Japanese actions are noteworthy to extempers and to the world, they pale in comparison to those of China. Japan’s neighbor seems to making headlines on a weekly basis. China’s rise is a far sexier topic than visiting the shrines of war criminals. Since Japan lacks the ability to compete rhetorically with China, it again falls out of conversation. International officials repeatedly discuss how China can be stabilized. Since Japan already is an industrialized power that has a generally positive international reputation, it does not draw attention. While I will never suggest that being an adjusted, successful democracy is bad, it certainly keeps you from being interesting.
Korea
History
The concept of a “North” Korea is, in some senses, a misnomer. The division between North Korea and South Korea along the 38th parallel is largely a result of Soviet and American intervention. Following the Korean War, both sides agreed to divide the Korean peninsula. This division resulted in a communist-turned-dictatorial North and a democratic South. The first president of North Korea, Kim Il Sung led North Korea with an iron fist. Power was consolidated within the upper classes. After Kim Il Sung died, power was passed on to his son, Kim Jong Il. Interestingly, Il Sung was declared to be the president of North Korea of all eternity. Therefore, Kim Jong Il cannot be president. Instead he has been endowed with the AGD-friendly title of Dear Leader.
Domestic Policy
North Korean human rights abuses are undoubtedly one of the world’s worst kept secrets. Kim Jong Il represses his people in both direct and indirect ways. Directly, television and most forms of mass communication are severely limited to ensure that the population stays loyal. Additionally, food and other goods are doled out rarely and in low quantities. Those outside of Il’s inner circle suffer from chronic malnutrition and excessive governmental intervention. However, there are also indirect means of oppression. Il’s foreign policy causes increased pressure on his people. Building a nuclear program and opposing international intervention keeps the populace from entering the international community. Trapped by their own government, many have chosen to flee out of the country and/or smuggle precious luxuries into the country.
Military parades and parties that proclaim Kim Jong Il’s greatness appear almost sarcastic from the international point of view. After a recent round of golf, the North Korean government proudly proclaimed that Dear Leader made 13 of 18 hole-in-ones (for those non-golf fans, that statistic would have set a world record at least 4 times over). The chubby little man has an incredible amount of self-confidence. Il thinks of himself as leader, idol, and playboy. This charisma has further strengthened the regime, but also allowed mistakes to be made. Similar to most dictatorships, most North Koreans would love nothing better than to get rid of Kim Jong Il. Fear and a lack of resources keep any substantial uprising from forming. In a country as small as North Korea, the population is controlled far more easily. When looking at how Kim Jong Il can be contained, it appears that, at the very least, he is going to control everything within his borders.
Arms Race
For those who insist that Iraq is one of America’s first foray into mishandling WMDs, allow me to submit Exhibit A: North Korea. During the 1990s, Kim Jong Il was actively pursuing a nuclear program. As a small, weak country, nuclear weapons would prove to be the ultimate deterrent against foreign involvement. Inevitably, Il got his hand caught in the cookie jar and was called out by the United States. In 1994, Clinton and Il struck a deal to satiate both sides. This pact allowed the United States to build two light-water nuclear reactors in North Korea, which are far less prone to creating weapons-grade nuclear material. Once these buildings were functional, North Korea would publicly destroy its nuclear program and allow the United Nations weapons inspectors to enter the country. In a move that has been more spun by Clintonites than Hillary Clinton’s public image, America never delivered on the reactors. After intentionally backing out of the deal, the United States then found it easy to continue to condemn North Korea as the nuclear program continued unabated. Recent missile tests and limited evidence suggest that North Korea is nuclear. Most estimates suggest that North Korea has nuclear capabilities and could reach most targets in East Asia.
Endgame
So here we are, thirteen years after what America squandered our last best chance. Suggesting that North Korea would have completely dismantled its nuclear program had all gone to plan in 1994 is probably foolish, but at least the United States would have been left eating anything other than crow while licking the egg off of its face. A deal has been struck that appears to be stronger and vaguer than ever. North Korea has offered to stop its nuclear program and the light-water reactor issue will be “revisited”. The addition of Japan, China, and South Korea to the deal also adds weight and legitimacy. So far, North Korea has stopped its main nuclear processes and has in the process of receiving fuel and food aid.
North Korean Desires
As suggested in previous topic briefs, governments only want two things: power and security. Governments want to be in control of as much as possible for as long as possible. The only exceptions to these rules are people who are literally insane. And not insane in the “Big Bob is having a BLOWOUT sale! 50% off!” or the “Osama bin Laden is insane for launching a war in the name of Allah” senses. Insanity, defined as a complete lack of rationality and reality, is the only obstacle to a government making self-interested choices. Therefore, the first question that must be raised is whether or not Kim Jong Il is sane. Despite his overinflated sense of self, it appears that he does know what he is doing. Most of his ridiculous proclamations appear to serve as advertisements for his regime, not the blathering of an idiot. Accepting the probability that Il is sane, it is then possible to move on to the question regarding what actions keep Il in power. While dominating a small country with ruthlessness and corruption may seem to be fun, it also angers more powerful neighbors. Though Japan, South Korea, America, and China appear to be unlikely to launch an invasion, universal and absolute economic sanctions could bring North Korea to its knees. North Korea is simply too poor to afford provocations and proclamations.
Food and fuel aid could keep North Korea just wealthy enough to keep North Koreans alive and Il’s inner circle overindulged. Considering that Il has shown the world what he might be capable of, it appears that the world is willing to let North Korea be an oppressive regime, as logn as no one else is threatened. If and when this epiphany dawns on Kim Jong Il, relatively safety and stability may descend on the Korean peninsula.
International Desires
The recent success brokered by the six-party (both Koreas, Russia, Japan, China, and America) should lead extempers to analyze the perceived benefits to any and all parties. With North Korea and the United States getting their own sections due to significance, the other four are often ignored. To begin, the safety of not being near a semi-stable nuclear power is certainly enough to interest all involved parties. Though it seems obvious, any speeches involving the staying power of the six-party talks should mention why ALL PARTIES would want to move forward. Additional benefits to a stable North Korea are provided to China and South Korea.
For the past few decades, China and North Korea have an awkward alliance. After the fall of the Soviet Union, North Korea was forced to turn to China as its main source of international support and aid. Looking to widen its sphere of influence, China obliged. While neither country is a democracy, they are ideologically opposed. Kim Jong Il wants to protect himself; China wants to protect the party. This difference prevents North Korea and China from being best of friends. Regardless of occasionally frigid relations, North Korea still needs China. A tacit linchpin to the most recent pact was that China would prevent Il from being removed from power. Without nuclear weapons, North Korea lacks the physical defense mechanisms to withstand an invasion from a regional or global power. Therefore, formal recognition of security by China would go a long way to making Il feel stable.
The awkwardness between China and North Korea is only topped by the rhetorical games that North and South Korea decide to play. Since the Korean Wars, many on both sides of the border have called for a reunification. South Koreans live in a highly modernized, successful country. Those lucky enough to be south of the border sympathize with their northern neighbors. Ergo, many South Koreans would send aid to North Korea. While very generous, these acts would sabotage peace talks. Private donations often undermined American threats of economic sanctions. Similarly, North Korea used the kindness of South Koreans to feed the scientists that planned the destruction of Seoul. Whether or not Il has ever actually contemplated nuclear war is less significant than the perception that he has. A disarmed North Korea would open up relations with South Korea and remove a great deal of tension. No matter how the nuclear story ends, Il may still seek to reunify Korea and rule over it. South Koreans strongly oppose giving power to a leader with such a horrible political track record. On the other side, if Il built a nuclear weapon to stay in power, diplomacy and sociology are unlikely to knock him out. If the nuclear program is dismantled, extempers would be wise to maintain focus on the politics and relations within the Korean peninsula.
American Desires
Looking at the underpinnings of neoconservative thought and its emphasis on liberty and freedom, many would deduce that the Bush administration would call for regime change. However, those many would likely be the same people who wonder why the United States refuses to get involved in Darfur. For better or worse, politics have again trumped ideology inside the White House. President Bush seems to accept Kim Jong Il, but not his weapons program. Perhaps realizing that invasions are far harder in real life than they are in Risk, Bush has focused his energies on using carrots and sticks to stop nuclear proliferation. If 9/11, civil liberties limitations, Iraq, and corruption were not going to define the Bush administration, North Korea could have stood as a potential long-term success. Alleviating the worries of the citizens of Tokyo, Seoul, and even Los Angeles would go a long way to improving Pacific-American relations. Again, this deal is not completely in motion and there are no guarantees. However, the United States’ willingness to use multilateralism, carrots, and sticks appears to have helped achieve the national goal of separating rogue states from nuclear programs.
Cards
“Don’t drop guard against North Korea.” The Daily Yomiuri. 8 September 2007.
The United States and North Korea likely thought it necessary to improve Japan-North Korea relations in a bid to set the stage for removing North Korea from the list. However, we cannot condone any move to drop the North from this list until the abduction issue has been fundamentally resolved.
“Denuclearisation North Korea.” The Economist. 8 September 2007.
Beyond such fundamental doubts, there remains the tactical question of sequencing. In return for dismantlement, North Korea has been promised aid and other goodies, starting with 950,000 tonnes of fuel oil. The problem, says a diplomat from Japan, which is expecting to pay for a good chunk of the aid, is working out a way to ensure that North Korea sticks to a timetable of dismantlement even as it gets regular deliveries of aid. This is something that will presumably be debated at the plenary sessions of the six-party talks in Beijing later this month.
“The US and North Korea near diplomatic thaw.” Christian Science Monitor. 4 September 2007.
North Korea says it suffers because of the US trade embargo, and if the US lifts the sanctions, North Korea will get out of its suffering.
“Insights into the world; Japan-U.S. alliance vital for Asia.” The Daily Yomiuri. 2 September 2007.
Should the goal of completely abolishing North Korea’s nuclear arms program be considered unattainable, its act of clearing up the suspicions over its uranium enrichment could give rise to an adverse, concomitant effect of enabling Pyongyang to make a de facto declaration of its status as a nuclear power.
“Fukuda enters race, vows to avoid Yasukuni.” The Japan Times. 16 September 2007.
“Would you do something your friend doesn’t want you to do? I don’t think so,” Fukuda said at a news conference Saturday morning to declare his candidacy.
“That goes for relationships between countries too. I don’t think it is necessary to do something that another (country) doesn’t want you to do,” he said.
“Time Japanese leaders woke up.” The Korea Herald. 20 September 2007.
Tackling Japan’s debt challenge won’t be easy. The issue is particularly pressing given Japan’s worsening demographics. Twenty-one percent of the country’s 127 million people are older than 65. That compares with a world average of 7.5 percent. The percentage of Japanese younger than 15 is 14 percent, well below the world average of 27 percent.
Japan’s ability to pay off its debt in the long run is complicated by a low birthrate. It was 1.31 per woman in 2006, well below the 2.07 percent the government says is needed to stop the population from shrinking.
“Conservative Fukuda expected to bring stability to Japan.” The Business Times. 24 September 2007.
Mr Fukuda’s appointment is likely to be welcomed in Pyongyang and in Beijing, as he is expected to pursue a less hard line on North Korea than Mr Abe, who left Japan in an isolated position on this issue.
The change of prime minister might not be quite so welcome in Washington, however, as Mr Fukuda is known to be less America-centric than either Mr Abe or Mr Koizumi.
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