By Michael Garson
Extempers can famously wax poetic about the problems in the Middle East or the rising Asian powers. Good extempers learn a moderate amount about sub-Saharan Africa to round-out their knowledge. Unfortunately, Latin America is trapped between being heavily reported and known for not being heavily reported. This gap usually results in extempers of all knowledge levels misunderstanding this pivotal area. While there are no nuclear threats and no rising global superpowers, the region does have a lot of mid-level powers that alter international relations. Currently trapped in a seemingly endless struggle, the direction of politics and liberalism hangs in the balance. Since Latin America often gets its own round at major national tournaments, or shares one with Africa, it is vital that extempers learn as much as they can. Since prevailing themes are extremely significant in good speeches and question-writing, this brief hopes to provide the backdrop for Latin America’s current headlines.
The heavily thematic and causal nature of Latin America makes its history especially important. While this brief is certainly not meant to read like a history, it will highlight important historical figures and events. It is the job of every extemper to stay abreast of current events. Speeches that let these events on their own or speeches that heavily distort the historic significance of current events fall short analytically. Those who can explain why one particular view of the present is more accurate will be best able to succeed in extemporaneous speaking, and in critical analysis. For this reason, key themes and the philosophical highlights will be bolded and italicized.
This brief will:
– Provide an in-depth look at:
o Argentina and its history of conflict
o Brazil and its struggle to become a superpower
o Chile and its attempt to re-democratize and moderate
o Mexico and its arrival as a democratic power
o Venezuela and Hugo Chavez’s attempt to change the (inter)national landscape
o Other countries and any particular issues that may arise at tournaments
o The major themes that dominate and dictate international relations in Latin America
o A look at potential conflicts and issues that may arise in the near future
Brief History until 1930
Like most other colonized parts of the world, Latin America historically suffers from a great imbalance. Power, money, and status were all held by the, largely white, elite. Western countries set up outpost companies that would extract natural resources and leave the indigenous people and the country high and dry. This fleecing continued as the culture of Latin America started to evolve. Cities were modeled after Europe and cultures sought out the most refined and expensive of luxuries. Resentment of this system grew throughout the region among the poor and powerless. This history of disenfranchisement continues to play a key role in modern Latin American politics and drove its 20th century history.
Argentina
Peronism 1930-1970/ Rise of ISI
As mentioned, unrest started to build in light of the exploitation of countries for resources and cheap labor. In response, many turned started to unite to take down the prevailing economic structure. The principle of import-substitution industrialization (ISI) started to take hold. This model suggests that countries should limit imports by promoting domestic industry. Instead of shipping out copper and importing wires, a country would be better off if the government subsidized a national company to turn the copper, or any other resource, into a manufactured good. This system virtually guarantees jobs to all workers. Also, the currency could theoretically stay strong since few dollars/pesos/bolivars ever leave the country of origin.
The Radical Party arose as a middle-class party that solidly opposed the oligarchic system. It was mainly comprised of urban, white-collar workers. The party started to build itself as the pre-eminent opposition party in Argentina, keying on the population’s nationalist tendencies. The simple aesthetics of the white minority holding power in a Hispanic country disturbed indigenous and downtrodden citizens. Emphasizing Hispanic roots and attempting to use the military, the Radical Party quickly rose to power. In 1943, a military coup seized power and booted the ruling oligarchs. Cabinet positions were quickly doled out to military and civilian party leaders.
Juan Peron was a military general who supported the Radical Party. When it came to grab governmental power, Peron chose the Secretary of Labor, which was an irrelevant and powerless post. As secretary, Peron unified the previously unorganized working poor. It was the urban middle-class that seized power, but it would be the rural lower-class that would eventually maintain it. Peron used government money to build alliances and a broad coalition with local officials and town leaders. The Peronist alliance launched Peron into power and gave him control over Argentina. Peron is a cult-like, polarizing figure in Argentina who is seen as a savior and a pariah. He introduced the concept of mass politics and using the rural poor for political purposes. The Argentine government would supply money to domestic industry AND rural workers. Limiting imports seemed to be a sustainable answer for Argentina. The rich and poor were both getting a piece of the pie, keeping them all happy.
Ultimately, the economy started to give way under the massive weight of maintaining ISI. Capital goods (machinery, knowledge, investment) were required to build up domestic industry. These goods were purchased with the natural resources that Argentina sought to avoid selling in the first place. Domestic goods were more expensive and of poorer quality than their international counterparts. Argentina was unable to sell its goods, creating the trade imbalance that ISI sought to cure. The situation continued to deteriorate and Peron had to put the brakes on ISI in the 1950s. Since the business and working classes could no longer get the type of economic benefits they were used to, they were pit against each other and the government became authoritarian. Instead of admitting defeat and changing course, Peron set the precedent of simply centralizing power and demanding obedience.
In 1955, the military and the oligarchy united to remove Peron from power. Economic hardship was a key driver in mobilizing the people against the government. The anti-Peronists also failed to unite the country. There was a key cleavage in Argentine politics that lined Peronists against anti-Peronists. The divide increased as each faction attempted to seize power and subjugate the opposition. The military became increasingly anti-Peronist and prevented Peronists from running for office. Argentina went from a centralized pseudo-democracy under Peron to a de facto authoritarian state. The economy continued to fail and the anti-Peronists could not maintain control over Argentina. During the 1970s, Peron returned to power in an attempt to save the country he once ruled. When in trouble, Argentina looked to its past and the people supported a politician that they overglorified and believed could heal the country. Power continued to alternate between factions and within factions. Splinter groups would launch a coup and seize power before falling to another coalition years later. Since 1943, civilian and military groups both failed to control Argentina. Administrations could not hold control for longer than four years without being removed. History has created a legacy of prolonged instability, impatience, and opposition to the government. Despite this great plague, Argentina has remarkably become an industrialized country with a functioning economy and literate population.
Era of Globalization (1980s-2001)
The economy continued to drag along during the 1980s. For reasons beyond bounded rationality, the Radical Party refused to stand up against the Peronist model of ISI. No matter which party was in control, Argentina seemed doomed to stagnation and inflation. In 1989, Carlos Menem, a Peronist, wins with the simple campaign slogan, “Follow Me”. He promises more of the same on the campaign trail and wins the Presidency. Upon entering office, Menem immediately brought conservatives into the government and called for free markets. In short, Menem acknowledged that his campaign was a lie and he sought out the international community and market forces to revive the Argentine economy.
The Currency Board was created by Menem and pegged the Argentine peso to the dollar at a 1:1 ratio (see economics topic brief for the significance and dangers of such an act). Every peso in Argentina would be literally backed by a dollar held by the Argentine Central bank. Therefore, the only way to get out of fiscal hard times was restraint and austerity measures. If pesos left the economy, then the economy was worth less. Only less government spending and increased production would pull the economy back to equilibrium. Credibility issues plagued Argentina and kept out foreign investment. By removing national sovereignty over economics, Argentina became a hotspot for foreign investors and the economy boomed. Argentine economic success became a model for Latin America, and the 3rd world on the whole. The concept of removing national sovereignty and surrendering to international forces became very attractive during the 1990s. The technological boom spurred hedge funds, globalization, and the search for the next big thing. Billions of dollars were made for those who trusted Menem and his Currency Board.
Internationally, Menem endorsed an unconditional alliance with the United States. In fact one of his ministers famously acknowledged, “Carnal relations” with the United States (and yes, that is PHENOMENAL intro material). Argentina joined only Japan and Israel as a “Major non-NATO ally” with the United States. All seemed to be going extraordinarily smoothly. Argentina acknowledged that it was economically incompetent and politically irrelevant. Surrendering to the United States and international community proved to give great benefits and launched Argentina.
However, problems started to surface during the mid-1990s. The Mexican economic crash of 1994 (to be explained later) signaled some concern among investors over the stability of Latin American economies. Crises continued in East Asia, Russia, and Brazil during 1997 and 1998. These three incidents reinforced the fear that developing markets were dangerous. Even the previously unflappable Argentine economy was put under the microscope. Worse yet, the American economy boomed during the Clinton years and the dollar appreciated against virtually every currency in the world. Since the peso was pegged, the peso was forced to appreciate with the dollar. The upward pressure from the dollar and the downward pressure from the international community, tore Argentina apart. The expensiveness of the peso made Argentine exports disproportionately costly. Worse yet, global agricultural advances made the rest of the world far more efficient at producing cheap agricultural products. As global prices dropped, Argentine prices increased and exports plummeted, forcing even more pesos (and dollars) out of the economy. These massive austerity measures nearly bankrupted Argentina. The only thing the government could do was borrow money to maintain a trade balance. With the Currency Board, Argentina had to keep a budgetary balance, so government spending dropped. The drop in government services further abandoned the unemployed and impoverished Argentine people. In 1999, Menem needed to step down and left the Radical Party with an economic catastrophe.
Despite the economic chaos, Menem’s administration was extremely significant. The quality of democracy was low and Menem limited free involvement in politics. He also centralized power on the president, making him the unquestioned leader of Argentina. However, he proved that a military coup was not necessary with his economic reforms.
The turn of the 21st century continued to be a time of crisis for Argentina. The Radicals were forced to maintain the Peronist mantra of government spending cuts to preserve the balance. The international community, enamored with the Argentine currency board, continued to lend money to Argentina to maintain the peg to the dollar. The world believed that a developing country could combine with market forces for economic success so badly that it was blinded to the reality that pegs are short-term solutions. In 2001, riots broke out in Argentina because of the economic crisis. The President was forced to abandon office and flee. Finally, this incident forced a formal dismantling of the Currency Board. The peso was devalued against the dollar, allowing for a trade balance and the government to increase spending to jumpstart the economy.
Moving Forward (2003-present)
Mr. Kirchner
Nestor Kirchner has been the Argentine president since 2003. To say that he is a character would be quite the understatement. Kirchner famously has an extremely bipolar personality. He has been known to glad-hand friends one night and the next night publicly berate them. Kirchner isolates himself as the President and continues to centralize power on himself (hopefully this theme seems awfully familiar). One of Kirchner’s most famous acts was his refusal to pay back some investors that put money into Argentine bonds. Traditionally, shunning investors has been an economic death sentence. While Argentina would save money in the short-term, investors would permanently stay from Argentina for fear of being jobbed by the government. Amazingly, Kirchner’s stubborn approach convinced western governments to not seek repayment and only the most wealthy and influential of private investors saw their money returned. Without the cloud of debt hanging over Argentina, Kirchner has presided over one of the most miraculous economic recoveries in recent history.
As an avowed Peronist, Kirchner hearkens back to the nationalists days of the 1930s. The man (dis)affectionately called the Penguin because of his southern Argentina roots and his less-than-attractive appearance invokes policies that are decidedly populist. Kirchner has publicly discredited Menem’s policy of unconditional support of the United States. He has moved away from America and into the arms of other Latin American populist leaders, namely Hugo Chavez. Argentina under Kirchner has gained economic power, economic independence, and politically moved to the left and away from America’s sphere of influence.
Mrs. Kirchner
Despite approval ratings north of 60%, Nestor decided not to run. Instead, his wife, Cristina ran for President this past month for the Front for Victory party (a Peronist-sympathizing party). Advocating nearly identical policies as her husband, Cristina won a landslide victory with 45%, doubling her nearest rival. This victory was the largest electoral margin since democracy returned to Argentina in the mid-1980s. Mrs. Kirchner won mainly because of strong support in poor, rural areas. Her commitment to helping the poor and using government dollars and pork spending to boost her supporters was the only voting issue in rural Argentina. The practice of patronage (to be explained in greater detail later), would allow Mrs. Kirchner to exchange dollars, goods, and services for votes.
It is important to recognize that Mrs. Kirchner is not simply a patsy for her husband or the party. She was a popular Senator prior to her husband’s presidential victory. One of her most impressive feats was being a moderating, consoling force in Nestor’s life. Cristina famously is the only person that Nestor freely discusses policies with. Therefore, some contend that she has been a de facto President prior to the election. As a strong force known to invoke Eva Peron, Cristina Kirchner hopes to build on her husband’s legacy. Argentina will continue to receive increased income redistribution and a continued distance from the United States. Though Argentina is moving away from its troubled past, the potentially irreparable damage done by the cleavage between Peronists and anti-Peronists may prove that Argentina will again become ungovernable. Unfortunately, most analysis of Argentina under Cristina is little more and than conjecture, since Argentina has a history of rapidly changing courses.
Overview
The main takeaway from Argentina is instability. This is a country that has been rocked by coups, riots, and chaos since the middle of the 20th century. With the exception of very recent history, no administration has been able to maintain control of the country. The division between Peronists and anti-Peronists continues to plague Argentine politics and creates legislative roadblocks that are only overcome by ad hoc alliances and political force. Argentina is at its safest when the military is marginalized as a political actor and when the economy is only moderately regulated by the state. Operating at the extremes has seemed to be a poison for Argentina. Now that Nestor has righted the ship, it will now be up to Cristina to decide if she wants to advance her political agenda or if she wants to start to seek moderate policies and bridge the gap that has seemed to big for decades.
Brazil
Overview
To start, Brazil is a regional monster. It is large geographically and economically. With 180 million people and the 8th largest economy in the world, Brazil should be the regional superpower. The majority of the population and the wealth is in the southeast. As a global breadbasket, Brazil produces many agricultural products, including some that compete with the United States, including oranges. With the division between rich and power, there again is some political instability. An odd intricacy of Brazil is that the wealthy cities often are very close to poor shanty-towns. The result is increased class tension and a high crime rate as the poor seek a better life by robbing the wealthy. With the high incidence of urban, not rural like other Latin American countires, poverty, Brazil is the most unequal country in the region, and the world.
Political History
With different groups requiring very different government services, the Brazilian states have relatively high autonomy. Governors in Brazil have immense amounts of power and take pride in being a state leader, instead of a national leader. With these roadblocks to unity and governing, rag tag coalitions have been required to win national elections. These coalitions often fall apart or are held together by a national policy that is often contradictory or completely erratic.
Until 1995, Brazil has been plagued by completely incompetent presidents. Prior to 1985, the military would select the president, so the following decade was relatively free. Yet, Brazil could not unite under a single leader until Fernando Cardoso. Cardoso is a Marxist sociologist and member of the Brazilian elite through his father and wealthy family. In 1995, Cardoso entered an economic disaster (sound familiar?) and saved it while stalling hyperinflation. As president, Cardoso shunned the traditional ruling elite and acted in what he thought was Brazil’s best interest. By installing democracy and improving the economy, Cardoso raised Brazil’s international profile and turned it into a regional power. Free-market reforms and democracy truly took hold under Cardoso.
Lula
To reiterate, prior to 1995, Brazil was ruled by the aristocracy and the governors. Power was consolidated into a few ruling families and the concept of a true national government seemed impossible. Cardoso laid down the groundwork by being a member of the aristocracy in surname only. Lula da Silva completely changed Brazilian politics through his history and his policies. Lula grew up in a very poor family in Northeast Brazil. His father bounced from job to job and Lula worked in a factory at 14. At the factory, Lula began to become upset with Brazil’s socio-economic system and started to organize labor. He founded the first union in Brazil that was not linked to a corporatist system (better explained in the Mexico section). Unions were linked to a grand, Marxist party called the PT. The PT was, and is, extremely unique in Latin America. The party was national in orientation, a change for the otherwise regionalized Brazil. Instead of having the party give money to the people, the party actually charged dues for membership and demanded strict discipline. The PT was strongly opposed to patronage programs that ultimately were not in the poor’s best interest. Throughout the end of the 20th century, the PT repeatedly lost elections, but it did not matter to Lula. The PT grew very slowly and maintained discipline despite electoral defeats. Lula was committed to his principles and simply waited for the public to agree with him.
His patience paid off in 2003 with a presidential victory with 60% of the vote, a number unusually high for a country that is traditionally fractionalized. Since taking office, Lula has called on socialist principles to reduce poverty with fantastic success. Politically, he has broken the backs of the party machines that controlled the rural poor in the north. One of his most popular and successful programs is Bolsa Familiar which offers families $50/month provided that the children go to school and get routine medical check-ups. This plan has linked societal with familial benefits and has reduced the crime rate and poverty rate. In the longer term, the benefits will grow exponentially with a healthier and a better educated lower class.
Despite his extremist past, Lula has slightly moderated, especially in foreign policy. The United States and Brazil have a friendship as they both see each other as strategic allies, not competitors. President Bush would like nothing more than Lula to tear down Hugo and seize control as the leader of Latin America. However, Brazil has been very slow to do so. While Lula can spend one weekend with President Bush agreeing over the virtues of traditional democracy, he can also visit Hugo and compare socialist ideologies. Brazil has found a way to moderate and become everyone’s friend. With untapped economic and political capital, the future is unclear. Lula has run into some problems since his base of ardent socialists have fled in favor of a more extremist candidate. However, all else seems to be fine in Brazil. The key issue that surrounds Brazil is its potential. In the ideal situation for Brazil, it gains a UN security council seat (to be discussed in the UN topic brief), continues to build up its economy, maintains democratic values, and potentially replaces Hugo as the leader of South America. The possibilities are there for the taking, leaving experts to conclude that the obstacle to Brazil is its own unwillingness to leave its murky past and accept its destiny as regional superpower.
Chile
Overview
Chile, unlike the rest of the region, has a strong history of democracy and political competition. Prior to the 1950s, there was a parliamentary republic. Political parties from across the ideological spectrum would run and succeed in elections. However, they could never gain an electoral majority because of the variety in parties. Therefore, alliances were always needed to pass policies. The reliance on the political center stabilized Chilean politics in the early 20th century. This system worked well until 1964, when Eduardo Frei led the Christian Democratic Party. This party offered the functionality of conservative policies with the morality and Christianity with liberalism. As the first party to actively attack the center and try to build its own majority, the Christian Democrats did very well and Frei became President. By not building a coalition, Frei forced parties to reach to their extremes to compete. This extremism destabilized politics and pigeon-holed the options of voters. Socialist Salvador Allende became President in 1970 and linked himself to Castro. The majority of Chileans and the international community were terrified of Allende’s leftist extremism. He immediately nationalized industries, executed land takeovers, and presided over economic growth. The United States responded by blockading Chile and demanding regime change. Seeking protection, Allende brought in military general Agosto Pinochet to defend the administration.
Months later, supposed ally Pinochet launched a coup that bombed the presidential palace and killed Allende. Under Pinochet, Chile became an authoritarian, militaristic state. Political opponents were kicked out or killed. Pinochet built a program to completely dominate Chilean politics. He first sought to destroy the left by removing traditional party elites. Economically, Pinochet wanted to reform the economy by eliminating all remnants of Allende’s socialism. The government almost completely removed itself from the business of helping the poor. Politically, he declared that he would remain in office until 1997 and introduce the military into politics.
Pinochet’s free-market policies failed him in 1982 and caused a recession. With the economy in trouble, political exiles saw their opportunity to return to Chile. In a move that redefines stupidity, Pinochet allowed the opposition to return as long as they acknowledging Pinochet as the legitimate leader. While Pinochet was the “legitimate” leader, he fell asleep at the wheel as opponents from across the political spectrum united in a “Campaign of No” against Pinochet. Pinochet’s new constitution called for a referendum on his administration in 1989, which he lost 53-43% to a Christian Democrat who received support from all opposition parties.
Bachelet
Since Pinochet, Chile has done a fantastic job returning to early 20th century principles. Slowly, Pinochet’s constitution has been dismantled and political power has been decentralized. In 2006, Michelle Bachelet was elected President. She was taken prisoner while her father was tortured as political dissident under Pinochet. With this terrifying past, Bachelet is constantly aware of the threats and dangers of instability and of tyranny. An avowed atheist, Bachelet brings strong socialist credentials to the table. Despite her strong liberal views, she has maintained political freedom and maintained rule of law. Without any crises, Chile has proven to be a success story. Since the fall of Pinochet, Chile has grown more (by percentage) than any other Latin American country. Poverty has been halved during this same time period. Perhaps most importantly, corruption has been greatly decreased in favor of transparency and purer democracy.
Chile is one of the most boring countries in the region. With the exception of 1970-1989, it has dragged along as a stable, peaceful country with a strong economy. As such a success, extempers would be wise to see if Chile can be emulated. Unfortunately, the key advantage that Chile has is its history of democracy. Without the history of a ruling oligarchy as a template for governance, Chilean leaders are expected to be fair and even-handed. While Chile seems to be destined for democracy and prosperity, it may serve as a beacon of hope for other countries. If the government and the people work together for democratic principles, then success is not out of reach.
Mexico
History
Feel free to skip over if this seems like a recurring theme, but an elite oligarchy held a near-monopoly of power over Mexico during the 19th and early 20th centuries. An export-driven economy ran relatively smoothly as the poor laborers and natural resources were exploited for the benefit of the white minority. During the 1910s, there was a massive uprising throughout the north and south. The Mexican Revolution was spearheaded by ad hoc alliances among the poor and the discontented. Fearing a complete overthrow of government, \ landlords/warlords/overlords/medieval lords worked together to restore stability. The previous oligarchy was overturned in favor of a national party that united regional bosses. Led by Plutarco Calles, the PRI (Institutional Revolution Party…a contradiction in terms) became wildly popular. The party incorporated nearly all segments of society in a system vaguely reminiscent of fascism…without the violence and brutality.
Rise of PRI/Corporatism
By segmenting society and addressing each group individually, the PRI engaged in corporatism.
Most governments of the world divide the public based on location. Federalism delegates powers between national and local governments. The PRI added the layer of functional federalism. While geographic boundaries determined elections, professions and socio-economic statuses determined policies. All labor unions were nationalized and membership was mandatory. Mexican workers were forced to join their occupational union and that union would receive government handouts and bonuses. Elections were held and the system was strictly regulated. While there may have been some electoral fraud, the PRI would have legitimately won elections anyway. The system of patronage and corporatism endeared the people to the government. Every six years there was a new president that was essentially handpicked by his predecessor. The focus was strictly on the president, who set the national agenda for the party.
While the system was extraordinarily corrupt, it also provided a great amount of stability for Mexico. During the 20th century, Mexico was a haven for political dissidents fearing persecution from Chile, Argentina, and other unstable countries. Internal Mexican opposition to the PRI was not killed or silenced, they were co-opted. If a local leader started to mount a political uprising, he would be offered a cushy job with the government or a lucrative contract to quiet him. The PRI did not like violence and was far better at negotiation and bribery than destruction and eradication. Indeed, the PRI’s non-violent rule, coupled with the peaceful transitions between presidents set a precedent of stability. In a region dominated by coups, economic shocks, and political upheaval, Mexico stood out as a success story, despite its lack of democracy.
Fall of PRI:
Division
During the 1980s, the Mexican economy ran into problems with low economic growth, partially due to low oil prices. The PRI instituted austerity measures to weather the storm and pull out of the recession. Markets were opened up to foreign investors and the party looked to economists to solve the crisis. This influx of economists changed the culture of the PRI. These “tecnicos” were economic technocrats that usually were educated at prestigious American and European universities in business and economics. This upper-class flair started to sweep through the party’s rulers. Shifting away from the “politicos”, the rural native-Mexicans who know how to work the voting base and dole out money, created a rift in the PRI.
Over time, the tecnicos and politicos started to jockey for power and the decision over the presidency became increasingly contentious. There was a cultural clash between modernizing and maintaining the status quo. Since the president could (de facto) determine his successor, tecnicos kept control over the party. However, they did not have the political wherewithal to work the political machinery and its corporatist/patronage aspects. While the policies may have been sound, the politicos were the ones who rallied the vote and kept the PRI in power.
In 1988, many disgruntled politicos in the PRI felt that the party had moved to the right. They banded together and formed the PRD. The PRI’s monopoly over politics had ended. During the 1988 elections, early polling suggested that the PRI did not have a majority and would be forced to have a coalition government to keep control. Unfortunately, the computers that ran the system “mysteriously” crashed. To this day, there is little doubt that the tecnicos that ran the PRI had found a way to trip the voting tabulation system. “Miraculously” the PRI was declared the victor after the computers were restarted and votes were retabulated. Though the PRI had won by the narrowest of margins in 1988, it became clear that it was the beginning of the end for the party that once ruled Mexico without any opposition.
President Carlos Salinas vowed to modernize Mexico and the PRI during his administration. A proud tecnico, he worked with President Clinton to create the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The deal opened up Mexican markets and seemed promising for all parties. However, the rural Mexicans that have stuck with the PRI out of nationalism and clientelism became very angry and scared that they nation they once knew had sold itself out to the international community. On New Year’s Day 1994, Mexican rebels that called themselves the Zapatistas (a reference to the 1910 Mexican Revolution) seized control of government buildings throughout the country. The government was able to suppress the revolt, but since then the Zapatistas have continued to periodically cause havoc on the Mexican government that they think has robbed them. Tecnicos continued to shift the PRI as the clientelist and patronage systems were shifted to the top of government. Instead of using local leaders, who were usually politicos, the party would dole out money from the Presidency. Therefore, the tecnicos had complete control over the politics and the money of the PRI.
In 1994, the PRI scored another presidential victory with Ernesto Zedillo, who ran a campaign supporting democracy. He promised not to use his post as President for political means or to enhance the PRI. Public funds would be distributed based on need and merit, not on political affiliation. Hailed as the father of modern democracy, Zedillo presided over the Mexican economic collapse, which showed that the PRI’s tecnicos were not all-knowing and were not perfect. At the same time, the PRD continued to grow in prominence and gained support of the farmers that used to receive government handouts. The PRI attempted to maintain patronage to keep support in rural areas, but it became increasingly expensive to buy voters away from the more lucrative politics of the PRD and the policies of the PAN (National Action Party).
Defeat
While the PRD and PRI were fighting over the same voting base that controlled Mexico for nearly a century, the PAN quietly gained support among disgruntled voters. The PAN is a center-right party that promised true democracy and pro-business principles. Working on the true modernization of Mexico without the political arm-twisting of the PRI, the PAN became an obvious choice for Mexico’s growing middle class. As the Mexican economy grew in the late 1990s, people moved to the cities and worked as skilled laborers. With an urban, increasingly cosmopolitan population, there was no need for the dirty politics that the PRD or PRI were offering. The PAN offered a fresh perspective and a new Mexico.
Vicente Fox
In 2000, Vicente Fox was elected President from the PAN. Fox was a former executive from Coca-Cola and represented the corporate, modern Mexico that the young, urban Mexicans wanted to achieve. Politically, Fox achieved virtually nothing. He could not pass any of his reform bills because the PAN lacked a majority in congress. An alliance between the PRI and PRD blocked almost all of Fox’s initiatives and attempted to portray the PAN as impotent.
Yet, symbolically, Fox meant everything to Mexico. After 70 years under the PRI, the fact that there were no coups, upheavals, or economic catastrophes showed that other parties can also be in control. For so long there was a fear in Mexico that if the PRI did not maintain control, all hell would break loose, as it did in so many other Latin American countries. By simply presiding over government, Fox showed Mexico an alternative future.
Obrador v. Calderon
In 2006, the elections were again a three-way race. The PRI continued to slip in the polls and had little chance of winning. However, it hoped to gain enough congressional seats to stay relevant and build an alliance with the party that most needed the majority. Representing the PAN was Felipe Calderon, a young, wealthy candidate who offered increased modernization. Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador ran for the PRD as a vanguard of the poor, indigenous, and disenfranchised. The race became very close as the urban middle class were pitted against the poor. The race was also split down geographic lines, with the wealthy north against the rural, poor south. After the votes were tallied, Calderon won by a fraction of a percent. The race was so close that Obrador asked the Mexican courts for a review of the legitimacy of the election. Despite the blessings of the Mexican courts and the United Nations, Obrador insisted that he was the rightful president of Mexico. As mayor of Mexico City, he used his power to organize a massive protest that shut down the city. For days, thousands of supporters sat out in tents as Obrador organized his own inauguration and demanded that Calderon admit to cheating and defer to Obrador. This event sent shockwaves throughout the country and threatened the rule of law and democracy. For decades the PRI avoided this exact type of situation that so typically sent other Latin American countries into civil war. Thankfully, Obrador finally caved in and Calderon was allowed to take over. The ability of the Mexican people to allow democracy to take its course and acknowledge the rightful victor ultimately saved it from chaos. Certainly other countries in similar situations would have been torn apart.
Mexico at Present
Mexico is moving out of the crossroads of the 90s and into a successful future, at least by American standards. In the early part of his administration, Calderon appears to be doing an admirable job cleaning up some of the corruption and institutional flaws of Mexico. He has worked with the tecnicos of the PRI to build a coalition that can override the populist will of the PRD. Calderon has a working alliance with the United States and has instituted tougher anti-drug laws. In a country of great economic inequality, Calderon has won over some of the poorer citizens by eliminating tax loopholes frequented by the countries many billionaires that have been ducking taxes for years.
To America’s chagrin, Calderon is “working on the immigration issue” at a snail’s pace. While Calderon certainly cannot mind that some of his poor citizens are leaving the country and sending checks back to Mexico, he recognizes that it is a political sore point with President Bush. Since the United States desperately needs allies and presidential candidates are boosting their campaigns by insisting that they have the only answers, there is less pressure on Mexico than there should be.
Politically, Calderon has institutionalized democracy at nearly every level of government. Unfortunately, he had to make a Faustian bargain with the PRI to preserve his congressional majority. A great amount of independence and sovereignty has been rendered to the states, allowing some of the remnants of the PRI’s clientelist system to remain. It will be Calderon’s ability to eventually move past all of Mexico’s tainted history that may finally make Mexico stable, successful, and democratic.
Venezuela
Overview
One of the most fascinating and widely-covered Latin American countries is Venezuela. With Hugo Chavez making wildly polarizing remarks on a weekly basis, it is easy to see why journalists and extempers flock to Venezuelan articles. As a country with one of the largest oil reserves in the world, Venezuela has been endowed with a lot of power. This power has been put to use for good, evil, and the morally ambiguous. Since Hugo works on a far more theoretically and regional level than his counterparts, the history of Venezuela is far less important. Instead, the philosophical and political underpinnings of Chavismo are of the most significance to extempers.
Fall of Punto Fijo system
From 1958 until 1998, Venezuela operated under the Punto Fijo system. This arrangement between a variety of parties yielded the same government for almost half of a century. Parties were often bought by wealthy Venezuelans to run campaigns and put the elite in office. A particular ideology or policy-stance could not be pinned to any given party. This “party-archy” was dominated by the upper-middle class and the aristocracy. Though oil prices fluctuated greatly, revenues were almost universally given to the upper class to sustain their style of living. Meanwhile, poor Venezuelans were routinely left out of the political and economic system.
Hugo
In 1992, a military general by the name of Hugo Chavez attempts a coup to overthrow the Punto Fijo system. He believed that all Venezuelans should benefit and be a part of the political process. The coup fails and he is jailed. Despite being jailed, Hugo gains a cult following among the lower classes and protests break out in support of him. Chavez is let out of jail and the wealthy elite try to co-opt him and use money and power to quiet him. However, Chavez is a man of principle and ideology. Therefore, he shunned the offer and vowed to end Punto Fijo.
In the election of 1998, Hugo promises the Movement of the Fifth Republic. The trick about this promise is that the Punto Fijo system called itself Venezuela’s Fourth Republic. Indeed, Hugo’s campaign was predicated on a complete overthrow of the government as Venezuelans knew it. This broad claim showed a lot of confidence and vision. He wins in 1998 and immediately starts to change Venezuela. Tax reform and income redistribution programs begin and eat away at the powerful Venezuelan elite. The opposition organizes itself and vows revenge on Hugo and his Bolivarian revolution.
In 2002, the military brass makes an alliance with the Punto Fijo system to take down Hugo. The plan works and Hugo is taken prisoner and kept on an island. Over the next 24 hours, the elite start to “undo the damage” of Chavismo. Nearly every country condemned the coup as a supremely undemocratic act that threatened the stability of Latin America. However, the United States defended the opposition’s coup as an act against the tyrant, Hugo. Forced into hiding, Hugo’s cabinet were supported by mass riots and protests among the poor demanding Hugo’s return. Thousands and thousands of poor Venezuelans were shaking the constitution insisting that the coup was unconstitutional. Ultimately, the military changed allegiance, booted the opposition, and returned Hugo to power.
This coup was extremely significant in many ways. First, it showed that the opposition was not going to go away quietly. Throughout Hugo’s administration, the opposition has used its economic might to force oil strikes that nearly crippled Venezuela’s economy. However, the people want Hugo Chavez as their president. Additionally, the symbolism of poor people flaunting the constitution and demanding rule of law certainly is as desirable a situation as any. Those who are not even literate have at least a loose understanding of the government’s operations. For any and all of Hugo’s faults, proliferation of political interest is not one of them. Another important facet is the American support of the coup. If there was any hope of salvaging an American-Venezuelan relationship, it ended when the Bush administration supported the illegal forced removal of a democratically elected president.
Opposition
As the 2002 coup so brilliant points out, the opposition is not blameless in the Venezuelan situation. Despite standing in the face of a highly polarizing figure, the opposition has completely failed to mount a legitimate political check to Hugo. Worse, the wealthy do have a large amount of economic power. The nationalization of various industries has made it hard to coordinate lasting strikes or embargos. In light of increasing taxes, many wealthy Venezuelans and investors have pulled out. Only by the power of oil has Hugo sustained the capital flight. With ideological opposition decreasing, Hugo has been free to operate seemingly unchecked.
Oil wealth
Venezuelan oil is unique in that it is unusually heavy and difficult to extract, unlike Middle Eastern or Russian oil. Therefore, extraction is only profitable when oil is at high prices. If oil prices were to drop, investment and oil revenues would plummet as Venezuela would be unable to compete at lower prices. Since oil prices are high and appear to remain so, oil appears to be a key export for a while. Oil offers Venezuela two important benefits: money and protection. With high revenues, oil has funded Hugo’s aggressive plans for socialism. Moreover, oil money has been used to buy support from other Latin American countries. Aside from revenues, Hugo benefits from oil by isolating himself. The international community is unwilling and unable to put embargos or sanctions on Venezuela because of oil. Depsite the rocky relationship, the United States is still sucking at the Venezuelan spigot. In fact, Hugo has cut exports to the United States as a means of punishment as he has sought out other customers globally that are more tolerant of his ideology. The power of oil ultimately runs the show in Hugo. To his credit, Chavez has used oil money to build both economic and political capital.
Political Power
Domestic
At home, Hugo has firmly centered power on himself. Invoking South American liberator Simon Bolivar with his Bolivarian revolution, Hugo wants to power to the people. For too long the wealthy elite have stolen power and money from the laborers. With a socialist agenda and oil money, Hugo has created a super welfare state. Some of the main programs from the Bolivarian Revolution are:
– Creation of Mercal, a supermarket chain that sells food at a 40% discount to poor people, representing a frontal assault on the private sector
– Creation of worker cooperatives that provide microloans to poor people in need of money
– Addition of 1.5 million reservist soldiers
– Creation of Missions that provide free education, health care, and food for the poor
– Nationalization of oil
– Nationalization of the largest telecommunications company, creating a state-run television channel
After reforming the constitution in 1999, Hugo Chavez’s next project is a series of 69 amendments to the constitutions. Insisting that power rest with the people, Venezuelan voters will have a referendum on the amendments on December 2nd. As a sign of political openness, or arrogance, Chavez offered to have a referendum on his presidency if the opposition could garner 3 million signatures. This declaration is but of an example of the hubris and confidence that Hugo had prior to drawing up these amendments. Some of the more significant and controversial of them include:
– An amendment that will allow Hugo to violate Venezuela’s term limits and remain as president until a referendum declares otherwise
– Having vice-presidents look over the states (a page out of Putin’s playbook that allows Hugo to marginalize the power of the governors)
– Increasing rights to women and preventing discrimination against homosexuals
– Lowering the vote age from 18 to 16
If these reforms are accepted, then Hugo will become unstoppable. With virtually unchecked power, Hugo will continue to build his socialist paradise and be free to antagonize whoever he wants. This affirmation from the people will undoubtedly fuel Venezuela to become more similar to Cuba than ever before. Additionally, Hugo has offered to bring in different political ideologies and encourage dialogue within his party. If he is as politically philosophical as he claims, then this statement will be true. Yet, if his power is only limited by a referendum, then there is no reason to give the opposition a voice in government. The main fear with Venezuela is that Hugo wants enough power so that he can only be stopped by himself, in the name of Caesarist democracy. However, there might be another solution to the Hugo problem. With the Bolivarian revolution giving way to the centrism of Chavismo, some members in Hugo’s cabinet are becoming dissatisfied. Those truly committed to socialist principles would rather have Chavismo without Chavez. If indeed the political movement in Venezuela is driven by the people, and not Chavez, then it logically follows that a member in the government will stand out as a critic not of policies, but of methods. It is in this scenario that a true democratic socialist state can exist.
International
Perceiving injustices across the continent, Hugo has decided to take his socialist agenda abroad. The mantra of nationalism and booting out the elite that have long made money off of the labor of the poor plays well in many countries. Supplying money to these countries also seems to help.
Hugo’s Ideology
While Hugo is certainly reacting on a national level to injustices, he is also doing so on an international level. It is essential for extempers and policymakers alike to recognize that Hugo Chavez is one of the most well-read politicians there is. Chavez will stand in front of the United Nations and cite Noam Chomsky with more fluency and understanding than even the most polished of extempers. His policies are the synthesis of previously articulated political philosophies and his own political situation. While other nationalist politicians come from humble roots and act instinctively, Hugo appears to be crazy like a fox. All moves and policies are extremely calculated. Therefore, extempers would be unwise to depict Hugo as “another crazy pseudo-dictator”. Indeed, Hugo also does not see himself as a dictator. He truly believes that he is acting in a democratic fashion. Centralizing power on the president is completely acceptable as long as the people support it. His emphasis on referenda a cult-like leader is more commonly known as “Caesarism”, a reference to the Roman emperor.
At the risk of defending Hugo, Venezuela is a form of democracy. It is hardly a western form, or even a pure form, but democracy nevertheless. If we define democracy and popular sovereignty as the ability for the people to choose their leaders, then Venezuela is a democracy. However, there are serious concerns over Hugo’s growing power. Especially in light of his constitutional reforms, the people of Venezuela are starting to realize that Hugo may have an insatiable desire for power. On the whole, Hugo’s power appears to stop where the people say it does. We can only hope that when the people finally choose to limit Hugo it will be neither ignored nor too late.
Other Countries of Interest
Bolivia
A new force in Latin American politics has arisen from the most unlikely of places: a coca farm. A decade ago, Evo Morales was a poor coca farmer who was a member of agricultural coalitions. As of 2006, he is the president of Bolivia. By standing up for the rights of indigenous people in a country that long has had income-distribution issues, Evo became the ultimate symbol of the everyman. He won 54% of the vote by promising real change and real solutions to the poor and disenfranchised. Morales became the country’s first president of indigenous origin, a fact that is not insignificant. Wihtout any economic power, the poor wielded the power of the ballot to institute change and Evo has not disappointed.
One of his first acts as President was to boot out foreign oil companies. In Evo’s defense, the contracts were largely exploitative and kept most oil royalties away from Bolivia and in the hands of wealthy CEOs. Yet, unilaterally restructuring contracts is neither democratic nor appealing to foreign investors. Evo has engaged in aggressive land reform and income redistribution, benefitting the nation’s poorest citizens.
Ideologically, Evo has great similarities and differences with Hugo Chavez, the leader he is most frequently compared to. First, Bolivia lacks the oil and power that Venezuela wields. Therefore, Morales’ international influence is little more than symbolic and rhetorical. Another key difference is in education. Morales is the Bolivian equivalent of Jimmy Carter (forgive the political potshot on Carter) in terms of background, but even more extreme. Morales is not as well versed in philosophy as Chavez. He simply comes from poverty and wants to lift everyone out of it, a noble goal. He looks at the circumstances of his country and seeks to find causes of poverty and inequality. Morales settled on capitalism, and has attacked it mercilessly. While Hugo and Evo advocate similar policies and share a distaste for globalization and the United States, they get to that conclusion at very different intellectual paces. To his credit, Evo is very personable and has a flair for the dramatic. He has called America the world’s greatest threat and has repeatedly condemned “neo-liberalism” (a general term for globalization).
Though he has been in power for a while, question-writers still find Morales’ influence and importance worthy of analysis. Evo is a stereotypical poor leader who is on a crusade to those in similar circumstances. His policies are clear and his motives are self-evident, making analysis very easy. Therefore, it may be hard to get to a deeper analytical level with such a caricature of a President. Probing the international ramifications of having an indigenous leader attempt to “save the poor” may yield some interesting nuggets of wisdom. Perhaps the most important thing for extempers to check is the success of these programs. If Bolivia, albeit with the help of Hugo’s foreign aid, can be a fully-functioning democracy and economy, then the rest of Latin America should take notice. Evo has a chance to show that an assault on neo-liberalism need not result in a democracy deficit. Countries can be anti-American, but still be free. Pure capitalism can be shunned and economic growth can still exist. While these objectives ideally would be Evo’s goals, it appears that the goal of income redistribution and social equality may trump all other priorities.
Colombia
The overwhelming issue with Colombia is the drug war. With rebel groups like FARC routinely challenging the government, there is a need for a strong president. Alvaro Uribe serves this role admirably as a democratic strongman. He has been tougher on rebels and the drug trade than his predecessors. Therefore, he is an ally of the United States. In terms of international relations and extemp, Colombia is rarely included in any issue other than the drug trade. One important aspect of Uribe’s presidency is that he walks the line between authoritarian and strongly enforcing rule of law. Therefore, he is polarizing in the international community as some are afraid that he is overstepping his bounds. However, he is popular in Colombia as he attempts to bring calm and stability to the country.
Cuba
For those extempers that have forgotten, Fidel is still Fidel. He is currently in failing health and he has handed over temporary control to his brother, Raul. Assuming that Fidel passes away in the near-future, question-writers will feast on Cuba as a source for questions. Analysis of Cuba rests on how the speaker feels that the Castro years represented Cuba. While the country certainly is corrupt and lacks any semblance of democracy, there is a remote possibility that the people want communism. If so, then Cuba will again be under control of a Castro, or one of his cronies. I find this possibility unlikely since the people are so oppressed. If we accept that the Cuban revolution accidentally led to tyranny, then democracy is Cuba’s future. The people were so intent on eliminating a bad government that they installed a worse one. Intent on not making the same mistake, democratic groups will use Fidel’s death as a rallying cry to call for free elections. Eagerly seizing on the moment, the United States will gladly support democracy and build Cuba up as the democratic, capitalist paradise and vacation spot that it was in the early 20th century. Finally, one could argue that Castro has institutionalized tyranny in Cuba. By building up the military and creating a culture that does not expect democracy, the transition of power will smoothly go to Raul. Under this scenario, Cuba will receive more of the same. Frankly, all three of these possibilities are possible. There is ample research and philosophical backing to argue for any of them. Nearly any speech that has enough sources AND provides a PHILOSOPHICAL OR POLITICAL reason for why the analysis is correct will likely be fine.
The other main issue is American-Cuban relations. The embargo on Cuban goods exists as a political stand against Castro’s Cuba. To answer any questions on the issue: it is extremely unlikely that the embargo will be lifted. All things considered, the embargo probably should be lifted. Opening up the Cuban market may expose it to western ideals, including democracy and capitalism. Also, breaking up Castro’s monopoly on economic power in Cuba would serve to undermine his rule. Finally, Cuba has products that we want: sugar, crops, and tobacco. Yet, the embargo won’t be lifted for three reasons (funny how there always seem to be three reasons…):
1. Allowing Cuban agricultural products to enter the American market would upset the exceedingly powerful agricultural lobby into further increasing tariffs
2. The symbolism of acknowledging and legitimizing a leader that has been condemned would be too much. A country has proud and powerful as America would never be able to swallow its pride and reverse such a profound policy without regime change.
3. Many Cuban defects live in southern Florida and operate as an extremely powerful voting bloc, largely leaning Republican. Since Florida is a swing-state, any president or party would commit political suicide to infuriate these voters by lifting the embargo.
Thematic Overview
Patronage
One of the most unique facets of Latin American politics, especially in Argentina and Mexico, is patronage. The concept of “buying” votes is not uncommon in the United States. After all, pork spending and pet projects are congressmen’s way of building support among constituencies. However, literally giving money to people from a certain district is a completely foreign concept. For decades the PRI and Peronists would go into small, rural towns and offer money to people. In fact, a recent report by al-Jazeera (yes, al-Jazeera) showed an in-depth report of local officials giving money to poor Argentines, with the understanding that they will vote for Cristina Kirchner. This video was immediately condemned by Mrs. Kirchner and was taken off the air. Occasionally, this shocking expose surfaces on youtube. In any event, the very legitimacy of governance is questioned when votes are bought and sold. Elections are not rigged, but the voters are manipulated.
Perhaps the most unfortunate part of this system is that, on the whole, the poor lose out on their agreement with the party. A few dollars, dried food, and toiletries pale in comparison to the amount of corrupt money that is kept away from the poor. Like in every other part of the world, governments act to maintain control and secure reelections. Rarely do the parties actually care about the poor and benefits only spike prior to contentious elections. Instead of actually investing in infrastructure and fixing the great imbalances that plague these particular countries, parties treat voters like cattle and herd them as necessary.
While condemning patronage as a damning aspect of Mexican and Argentine politics and making it a key argument in every speech on these countries is easy, it is not entirely fair. The feasibility of overhauling the system may be easier said than done. Mexico has shown that a modern, refreshing, and democratic candidate can overcome traditional party politics and patronage votes. However, this is due to the modernization of Mexico. As people move out of rural areas and into the cities, patronage becomes a less appealing option. While anecdotal, the answer to patronage may be national success. Indeed, the PRI’s undoing was its own success in improving Mexico. Extending this theory, if Cristina Kirchner can continue to modernize Argentina, citizens may move into the cities, where Mrs. Kirchner is wildly unpopular. Simply, a growing middle class neither wants nor needs government handouts. Instead, transparent economic and political programs become the desired governmental outputs. Further complicating this solution is the possibility that Mrs. Kirchner looked north and now fears the urban middle class. I will stop well short of suggesting that Mrs. Kirchner should sabotage her country, but the rich-poor divide certainly favors her political party and chances of reelection. There are myriad possibilities for deep analysis that center around the issue of patronage and I urge all readers to take advantage and show that their understanding transcends geographic (national) and chronological (the present) boundaries.
Clientelism
Patronage is the general concept that rules the day in many countries in Latin America. However, clientelism is the slightly narrower definition that more accurately depicts Argentine and Mexican politics. In case it has not been clear before, presidential candidates would find it impossible to personally hand out government goodies to each member of the party. Therefore, local leaders are used as proxies for candidates and parties. Often these leaders are not necessarily mayors, but can be community leaders in the more social sense. While traditional gifts can be given prior to elections, these clients also offer to help citizens with any help they may need. Small loans can be given out to fix leaky roofs, support a small business, or provide food to the jobless.
With this view, patronage and clientelism suddenly do not seem to be so bad. Despite the immense power of political parties and politicization of government funds, Mexico and Argentina do seem to have a certain amount of devolution and strong local government. Though not in the most equitable of fashions, the clientelist system gets immediate help to those who need it. Yet, this shift of power to smaller regions drastically alters politics in these countries. Governors, mayors, and leaders became supremely powerful. For the average subsistence farmer who receives 50 pesos for voting for the PRI, the allegiance not goes not to the party but to the person who is actually supplying the money. Therefore, the onus is on the presidents and national parties to keep regional leaders in line. This dichotomy and battle over party machinery and party dollars is an extremely important theme to look at. Any articles that focus on the federalism of clientelist countries should be given special attention. This issue is one of those that are often ignored by extempers but can prove tremendous depth and understanding to the very nature of Latin American politics.
Marxist roots v. Nationalist roots
The most palpable division in Latin America is based on the roots of a particular country’s ideology. With the lone exception of Mexico, Latin America is a liberal paradise. The spectrum ranges from Bachelet’s moderate democracy to Evo’s populism to Fidel’s communism. Yet, history plays a critical role in lining up alliances against each other. Those that draw on Marxist roots for liberalism (Brazil, Chile) tend to be freer. Communist and socialist principles do not inherently threaten democracy, regardless of America’s Cold War foreign policy declared. There is a safety in knowing that the government is acting to help the people as a unit, not as a dictate from the president.
Those countries that saw nationalism rise before liberalism (Argentina, Venezuela, Bolivia ) are facing a democracy deficit. When politics are a knee-jerk reaction from the people, there is a greater susceptibility to corruption. The rush to remove the ruling class often blinds the public to focusing on implementing a better government. Moreover, the foreign policy of nationalist countries tends to be more obstinate and hostile. For the rural poor, the wealth and power of the United States seems eerily reminiscent of the wealthy elite that used to rule their country. This fear that the United States wishes to recolonize Latin America drives mass anti-Americanism. When blasting the global superpower garners as much as applause as it does in Latin America, it becomes no wonder that it is such a popular platform in nationalist circles.
This cleavage is pulling Latin America apart and forcing all countries to choose sides. As Hugo continues to lean on smaller countries with money and oil, the region is quickly losing its moderates. To see the area as a microcosm of its own politics, the push away from the center ultimately causes chaos. Hopefully, student of history Hugo Chavez recognizes this difference and stops the brewing civil war. Unfortunately, student of history Hugo Chavez may recognize this difference and spur the civil war in hopes of winning over the region.
Final thought from Northwestern University professor of Latin American politics (and contributing source in this topic brief) Edward Gibson, “the legacy of poverty and demand for rapid social change prevent democracy from taking root quickly and following a Chilean model”
Cards:
“All This and Oil Too.” The Economist 15 Nov. 2007. <http://www.economist.com/world/la/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10134215>.
This article has sent theoretical shockwaves throughout Latin America. The Brazilian discovery of billions of barrels of oil would greatly change international relations and economics. As a leader of alternative energy sources with ethanol, Brazilian power would greatly increase if it became an oil-exporter, as well. Using oil and ethanol money would grant Brazil the chance to, like Hugo, buy allies. If indeed Brazil uses its new found economic power for political purposes, that would certainly be a theme worth watching.
“Are They Beginning to Lose the Faith?” The Economist 29 Nov. 2007. <http://www.economist.com/world/la/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10214956>.
The traditionally conservative Economist again comes in with another scathing review of Hugo Chavez. This article documents Hugo’s attempt to institute 69 constitutional amendments, and the subsequent public reaction. Many Venezuelans are beginning to recognize that socialism is giving way to a dictatorship, to put the situation in terms as stark as possible. With rising inflation, there may be some chinks in the armor of Hugo Chavez’s Bolivarian revolution.
“A Warning for Reformers.” The Economist 15 Nov. 2007. <http://www.economist.com/world/la/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10136464>.
This poll provides enough information to make it relevant to a discussion on multiple aspects of national and international politics. Simply asking two questions about the importance and effectiveness of democracy for all Latin American countries, numerous conclusions can be drawn. I suggest using the trends of voters in each country as a barometer for the perceived effectiveness and future of democracy.
“Brazil‘s Ethanol Diplomacy.” 9 July 2007. Council on Foreign Relations. <http://www.cfr.org/publication/13721/brazils_ethanol_diplomacy.html?breadcrumb=%2Fregion%2F243%2Fsouth_america>.
While Hugo Chavez uses oil money to buy friends, Brazil may be doing the same. Enviornmentalists and economists alike are flocking to ethanol and declaring it a savior. Therefore, Brazil’s ability to give ethanol to potential allies is rapidly building its political capital.
Castaneda, Jorge G. “Latin America’s Left Turn.” Foreign Affairs May-June 2006. <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060501faessay85302/jorge-g-castaneda/latin-america-s-left-turn.html>.
If you read one article (and hopefully you read more than one), then I urge you to read this one. Though slightly old, Castaneda’s analysis is brilliant and serves a basis for deeper and more critical thought. His article is credited as being one of the first to delineate between Hugo’s nationalist left and Bachelet’s Marxist left. This article is a must-read and offers great perspective on Latin American politics.
“Chile‘s Bachelet, Chavez Exchange Public Attacks.” The Santiago Times 27 Nov. 2007. <http://www.tcgnews.com/santiagotimes/index.php?nav=story&story_id=15369&topic_id=15>.
Admittedly of little substance, this article provides a peek at how divided Latin American politics truly are. It documents a disagreement between Bachlet and Chavez. These two presidents are the leaders of their respective movements and will continue to fight to advance their continental ambitions.
Friedman, Thomas L. “The First Law of Petropolitics.” Foreign Policy May-June 2006. <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3426>.
This article, much like Castaneda’s, is of great and timeless value. The incomparable Thomas L Friedman again provides analysis that provides a backdrop for international relations. This article in particular focuses on Friedman’s contention that oil prices and political freedom are inversely related. Though well suited for nearly any article on democratization OR oil OR on oil-exporting countries, it does have an interesting relation to Venezuela. Hugo has changed political freedoms, for better or worse, and oil prices have skyrocketed. While the main cause of this is Middle Eastern oil shocks and increasing demand, Venezuela could serve as either an example or a counter-example to this argument, depending on the extemper’s analysis.
Hanson, Stephanie. “Argentina‘s Democratic Dynasty.” 29 Oct. 2007. Council on Foreign Relations. <http://www.cfr.org/publication/14608/argentinas_democratic_dynasty.html?breadcrumb=%2Fregion%2F243%2Fsouth_america>.
Hanson provides a brief look at how power has been handed from Nestor to Cristina Kirchner. In typical CFR style, multiple other sources are cited. These sources provide varying looks at what Argentina may become under a new Kirchner.
“Mrs. Kirchner-Lula: More of the Same But with Pragmatism.” MercoPress 19 Nov. 2007. <http://www.mercopress.com/vernoticia.do?id=11928&formato=HTML>.
One of Mrs. Kirchner’s first acts as president-elect was to meet with Brazilian President Lula. This meeting is of great symbolic and political significance. As a country that heavily relies on nationalism, attempts to centralize power, and patronage, Argentina’s logical allies are Mexico and Venezuela. However, Kirchner’s meeting and positive feelings towards Lula may suggest that she is ready to move Argentina into the 21st century and reinvent the country’s guiding political philosophy.
Romero, Simon. “Chavez’s Vision Shares Wealth and Centers Power.” New York Times 17 Nov. 2007. <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/17/world/americas/17venez.html>.
Romero provides limited depth, but a good deal of facts in his assessment of Chavez’s constitutional reforms. This article is a good source to introduce the contents of the amendments. Also, it introduces Raul Baduel, the former member of Chavez’s cabinet who has broken ranks. Baduel is not the classically anti-democratic, elitist opposition member. Instead, he believes in the power of Chavismo, but wants to decentralize the government’s power.
“Strike Shuts Cities in Most of Bolivia.” New York Times 29 Nov. 2007. <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/29/world/americas/29bolivia.html?_r=1&ref=americas&oref=slogin>.
This article shows the problems with social revolutions. Evo Morales’ revolution has built growing resentment among the aristocracy that once ruled over Bolivia. Maintaining economic and political capital, these elite have decided to pour their efforts into bringing Bolivia to a grinding halt. Remember that this is exactly how the 2002 Venezuelan coup attempt played out. In this case, the opposition took control, was praised by only the Untied States, and then removed by an angry Venezuelan public. This issue should be in extemp tournaments and a comparison to Venezuela and a greater understanding of Latin America’s deep inequality should serve speakers well.
“The Penguins’ Awkward March.” The Economist 1 Nov. 2007. <http://www.economist.com/world/la/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10063738>.
As control moves from one Kirchner to another, analysts are struggling to predict Argentina’s future. Since there was almost no credible opposition to Mrs. Kirchner, she never was tested. She has been relatively quiet on her policy ambitions. The main speculation of The Economist is that she may try to mend the brutal relations that her husband created with the international community.