Last Friday, President Barack Obama opened a new chapter in U.S.-Russian relations by decided to adjust plans to place missile interceptors in Poland and an advanced radar system in the Czech Republic. Obama’s policy was likely fuelled by advice from the Defense Department, who had argued that such a system was not capable of meeting the defense needs of America or its allies in the region, and a belief that cooperation with Russia was needed to resolve pressing world problems, notably nuclear proliferation.
Despite this backing and these strategic calculations, proponents of a missile defense system have argued that President Obama has greatly weakened the security of U.S. interests in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. They also argue that the President sold out countries in Eastern Europe who have been very loyal to the United States to Russia, for whom they wish to receive protection from.
Since extempers will be faced with answering questions pertaining to this issue in the weeks ahead, it is timely to have a topic brief lay out the history of missile defense, the new defense plans the Obama administration is adopting in Eastern Europe, and what major changes in American foreign policy may be realized by this defensive shift.
History
Extempers would be wise to look at the Council on Foreign Relations website (http://www.cfr.org) to look at interviews and briefings about America’s new missile defense policy. The Council on Foreign Relations is an excellent source for global issues that will impact American foreign policy and its backgrounders are great in understanding the historical forces at work in many global conflicts.
Last week, the Council on Foreign Relations pointed out that America has a long history of working with missile defense systems. Since the end of World War II, the United States has experimented with ways to intercept missiles from other countries. The first extension of this defensive idea was to shoot down nuclear missiles with other nuclear missiles. Tests were conducted in the 1950s to test this idea, but in 1963 when the U.S. became a signatory to the Partial Test Ban Treaty such tests were banned. The U.S. still toyed with the idea of using other ballistic missiles to shoot down other missiles, but the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty with Russia limited the deployment of U.S. missile defenses. Despite this, the Reagan administration played with the idea of a Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), then known as “Star Wars” that could give the U.S. a reliable missile defense program. The U.S. would further experiment with missile defense technology in the use of Patriot missile batteries during the Gulf War, when they were used to protect Israel from Iraq’s Scud missiles. Despite later evidence that these batteries were grossly ineffective, the press still held them up as a great piece of technological innovation. With such beliefs, one of President Bush’s first controversial foreign policy decisions was informing Russia that the U.S. was withdrawing from its commitments to the ABM treaty in 2002 and as The Washington Post noted on September 21st, spending on missile defense questions quickly increased from $3.7 billion to $9 billion in 2007.
For historical purposes, it is also important to note that when the U.S. was attempting to create a missile defense system its initial goal was to protect the country from other major nuclear powers such as China and Russia. However, as the Council on Foreign Relations points out the focus of the missile defense shield in the 1990s began to shift away from these powers and towards rogue states such as North Korea and Iran. In fact, after North Korea’s missile tests in the late 1990s, the Republican Congress was able to compel President Clinton to take a much firmer line in favor of missile defense systems. The missile defense system in Europe that President Obama is reconfiguring was meant to protect Eastern Europe from missiles sent from Iran, although defense experts point out that it would have served countering Russian missiles better.
Although missile defense systems have experienced a good deal of success in testing situations over the last decade, it is worth noting that not all of these tests are what they appear to be. Critics of missile defense point out that when confronted with a warhead that has “dummies” attached to it, meant to fool a missile launched to intercept it, missile defense systems have failed. Another criticism that the Council on Foreign Relations alludes to is that contractors have a lot to lose if their inventions fail in test conditions. Therefore, they rig the tests to maximize the chances of success. This leads to the U.S. procuring missile defense equipment that is expensive and not properly tested under proper battle conditions. Faced with these facts it is no wonder that according to The Washington Post on September 21st, when the Defense Department earlier this year recommended cuts in some defense programs one that was slated for a 15% cut was the missile defense infrastructure.
As a final point, it is necessary to point out that the U.S. currently has two missile defense systems operating within its borders. These two missile defense systems are located in Alaska and in California.
Strategic Readjustment
Although some in the media are portraying Obama’s decision as a complete drawdown of U.S. defense capabilities in Eastern Europe, they are completely off base. As Defense Secretary Robert Gates wrote in The New York Times on September 19th, the U.S. is merely relocating missile defenses based on intelligence gathering about Iran’s missile capabilities. Current intelligence estimates that have been disclosed to the public reveal that the U.S. believes Iran is increasing its capacities in short and medium range ballistic missiles. To counter this, the U.S. military has decided to go with sea based SM-3 interceptor missiles. The sea based aspect is important because that allows the U.S. to move these interceptors around more freely and closer to areas that they feel they can best be served by having the system in place. Gates wrote in his piece that the SM-3 missiles have a greater reliability than other interceptors, with eight successful tests being completed since 2007.
Extempers should also make sure that they know moving the interceptors out to sea is only temporary. By 2015, the interceptors are supposed to be located on land. Thus, as the astute reader will know, Russia’s anxieties about these interceptors has only been relieved temporarily. This may be why the Russian defense establishment has been vacillating about whether or not it plans to cancel a program to pull short range missiles out of Kaliningrad, an exclave along the Baltics that Russia controls.
Before moving on, is must be said that Russia is angry about these interceptors not only because they complicate its ambitions over Eastern Europe, but mostly because their nuclear arsenal is degrading. After the Cold War, Russia’s economy experienced a collapse and when the world meets at Copenhagen this December to discuss the issue of climate change, Russia has been talked about as a developing nation, in the same tones as India and China. While these two nations are on their way up, Russia appears to be stuck, not necessarily moving up or down in status. Therefore, Russia knows that it cannot effectively pay for a new, more robust nuclear arsenal and this paranoia about the U.S. building up defenses that can take out outdated Russian weapons helps fuel much of Russia’s response to U.S. aims for missile defense.
Changes in U.S. Foreign Policy
While critics, especially on the right, continue to attack the President for this decision, there are some dividends it may pay for U.S. foreign policy. Liberals have to hope that a reduction of this missile defense system may open Russia’s mind on cooperating with the U.S. against Iran. However, The Christian Science Monitor last Friday put this idea to rest when it explained that Russia’s foreign offices have expected the U.S. to withdraw this missile defense system after July’s summit between the two nations. In fact, rumors are now circulating that Russia is demanding new economic benefits (such as membership in the World Trade Organization) or a U.S. promise not to push for NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine. If these are true, it would be damaging for Obama because it adds fuel to the fire that the U.S. gave up too much in missile defense for little in return.
However, it is highly likely that a withdrawal of these missile systems, while temporary, may increase the likelihood of a new U.S.-Russia arms control agreement to replace the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). This agreement expires in early December and the U.S. and Russia are fighting each other over the details, such as how inspections are to be carried out, how missiles are to be counted for each side, and which weapons systems will be included. The Washington Post on September 21st said that while all of these disputes may not be resolved by the December deadline, Obama’s decision to withdraw the missile defense system may get Russia to back off some of its hardline stances in the talks. After all, Russia may be willing to reduce weapons systems it may have not have considered negotiable before because those systems may not be needed to overwhelm a missile shield in their backyard. These START negotiations are also not a minor affair. Their success is arguably what global efforts to curb nuclear proliferation depend on, so they are very symbolic while also serving as a possible cost cutting defense measure for both countries.
The negative feeling of Eastern Europeans is something the Obama administration will have to deal with. Eastern Europe stood by the United States when other members of the European Union (EU), notably France and Germany, condemned the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. These countries felt that they were being rewarded by the U.S. when missile defenses were installed because it gave the U.S. a significant strategic interest in the region. Anxieties have been heightened over Russia’s willingness to use natural gas and oil as a weapon of national policy and Russia’s war with Georgia last year. Therefore, the major foreign policy challenge for Obama will be in assuaging the governments of these countries that they are not being sold out to Russia and that the U.S. will continue to support them and their political, economic, and security needs.
Therefore, the adjustment of the U.S. missile defense shield poses significant benefits and also potential drawbacks for the Obama administration moving forward. If nothing else, this new policy is a stern test of Obama’s willingness to make bold moves to engage America’s enemies and if he succeeds, it would aid the U.S. internationally on a myriad of concerns (North Korea, Iran, Darfur, etc.) while also assisting in Obama’s re-election effort in 2012 by disregarding the stereotype that he is a foreign policy novice and weakling.