By Michael Garson
Common political theory suggests that countries only act to enhance national power. Economic revitalization, political mobilization, and diplomatic posturing all move towards improving a state, domestically and internationally. However, the advent of the nuclear weapon has completely changed the concept of power. Power was distributed among cavemen based on strength and aggression. During early civilization, power was distributed based purely on numbers of men in an army. The past few centuries evolved power to encompass economics, politics, technology, and knowledge. Though different, all of these systems are egalitarian in nature. They all offer equal footing. However, nuclear weapons allow disproportionate amounts of power. Economic powerhouses like Germany or Japan would not stand a chance against Israel or Pakistan in a full-scale military exchange. The ability to accelerate one’s place in the global pecking order has proven extremely attractive. It is because of the immense power of nuclear weapons to obliterate life as we know it AND to change the distribution of global power, nuclear armament certainly has deserved its own brief.
This issue arises within Iran, Iraq, North Korea, all nuclear-capable countries, and general foreign policy theory. While nuclear proliferation questions are rare, they are often mishandled by unprepared extempers. This brief will:
– Provide a history of nuclearizations
– Explain what nuclearization means
– Show how nuclear and non-nuclear interactions are relevant to other global issues
– Examine modern nuclearization
– Look at foreign policy theories that can be applied to nuclear and non-nuclear situations
History of Nuclear Weapons
The concept of a nuclear weapon was developed during World War II. Under Albert Einstein and Robert Oppenheimer, the United States was developing a nuclear program. This program was secret and endorsed by Presidents Roosevelt and Truman. Known as the Manhattan Project, the quest to build a nuclear bomb culminated with the test at Los Alamos in July 1945. One of the reasons the project was pushed so quickly was because the Americans believed that the Germans were progressing quickly with their own nuclear ambitions. The arms race was on and America was farther ahead than it could have possibly imagined.
How and why President Truman dropped nuclear bombs on Nagasaki and Hiroshima during August 1945 remains a great mystery. Optimists hold that the United States was not willing to fight for every square inch of Japanese territory. The Japanese warrior code of bushido prevented a surrender before the very last minute. A nuclear attack would force the Japanese into a premature formal recognition of defeat. Others believe that Truman wanted to test out his new toy and see how much damage it could do. Also, the bomb would serve as a sign to the Soviet Union. Critics insist that Truman wanted Moscow to be aware what the United States was capable of. In any event, the thousands of casualties and tragedies that occurred in Nagasaki and Hiroshima have forever changed politics.
First Domino Effect of Proliferation
Soviet Union:
– Feared a monopoly of nuclearization by sworn enemy, United States
– 1949
England:
– Grew tired of relying on America for defense and backup against the Soviet Union
– 1952
France:
– Also did not want to rely on the United States and England for national defense
– 1960
China:
– Did not want to rely on the Soviet Union, and feared the western powers
– 1964
Precedents/Justifications
The concept of nuclear proliferation first started with this domino effect. The Soviet Union established that if an adversary has a nuclear weapon, nuclearization is required to maintain balance. After all, a non-nuclear Soviet Union would have faced the daily threat of annihilation, making communist governance nearly impossible. England, France, and China all showed that when stronger allies have nuclear weapons, power inequality increases. Being beholden to the “nuclear savior” strains an alliance and building an independent nuclear program helps to create independence and self-sufficiency.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
Why?:
In 1968, the nuclear states decided that proliferation needed to stop. Nuclear weapons were far too powerful to be entrusted with anyone but themselves (how convenient). Therefore, they all created and signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
What?:
The NPT is comprised of three pillars:
1. Signers will not proliferate nuclear weapons
2. All states that sign up to not have nuclear weapons will dismantle their nuclear program
3. All states can use nuclear technology for peaceful means. Nuclear power can be incredibly
efficient and cheap
Does it Work?:
India, Israel, Pakistan, and North Korea all are not signed on to the NPT. It should therefore come as quite the shock that those are the only four states to have successfully developed nuclear weapons since the ratification of the NPT. The main issue is that membership is mandatory, as it has to be. Perhaps embargos could be placed on non-signers, but ultimately, the agreement is non-binding. Countries can pull out whenever they feel like it. Additionally, some countries clearly have broken their vow. Israel and North Korea certainly did not develop nuclear technologies without “assistance”. Ultimately, the NPT is a good document but is simply too weak. It now stands as a chance for countries to reaffirm the goal of non-proliferation, and little else.
Second Domino Effect
India:
– Feared nuclear enemy, China
– 1974 (the first nuclear test was called “smiling Buddha”….thought that was noteworthy)
Israel:
– Needed a deterrent to stop the persistent invasions by Arab neighbors
– The program was kept a secret, though it is believed to have been largely supported by French technology
– Believed to be 1979, although the Israeli government is hesitant to admit there is a nuclear program
Pakistan:
– Feared nuclear enemy, India
– The origins of the program are unclear
– First successful test was as late as 1998
Precedents/Justifications:
India and Pakistan both followed in the footsteps of the previous nuclear powers. The main difference is that neither of these countries were previously considered to be world powers. The addition of “second-tier” powers certainly changed the global power balance. More intriguing was the Israeli nuclear program. After fighting off multiple invasions, Israel realized that it could not continue to defend itself without a nuclear deterrent. This was the first example of nuclear proliferation that defended against non-nuclear powers. Israel set an extremely dangerous precedent and its relative peace since the program shows that countries can achieve safety through nuclear means. Despite being able to eliminate its hostile neighbors, Israel has not used its nuclear arsenal, a sign that nuclear weapons can be stabilizing.
Third Domino Effect
Iraq:
– Saddam pursued WMDs to become a regional superpower…and to use on his own people
– Iraq is included on this list because it is common knowledge that it had them during the Iran-Iraq War
o Whether or not Iraq had/pursued/thought of a nuclear program and subsequent policy decisions is irrelevant for the sake of this brief
Iran:
– Iran started looking into alternatives after the Iran-Iraq war
– A nuclear Israel scares Iran
– A nuclear weapon could create regional supremacy
– It could also allow Iran to go on the offensive and put pressure on Israel and western enemies
North Korea:
– North Korea has relied on China for support since the Korean war
– A nuclear program would protect the regime from invasion by the United States, Japan, or South Korea
– It has been used as a bargaining chip in exchange for aid from western powers
– The details and progress of the program is kept secret, except for periodic “tests” that the North Korean military will conduct
Russia:
During the Cold War, the Soviets were very sloppy with their control of their nuclear weapons. American senator Sam Nunn famously toured the Soviet Union and was appalled at how easy it would be to smuggle out nuclear material. To this day, there still is a cleanup effort to repatriate nuclear weapons back to Russia from eastern European countries. Occasionally, stories will pop up about active uranium being found in a Latvian cave, or somewhere equally esoteric. Aside from the safety of eastern Europeans, nuclear material on the loose is a serious security issue. If nuclear weapons are out on the black market, then they are not out of the reach of terrorist groups with cruel intentions. This issue will be more fully examined in the upcoming Russia/eastern bloc topic brief.
Precedents/Justifications:
North Korea has used a new justification: political defense. The nuclear program exists not to protect the country, but to protect the government. Since Kim Jong-Il knows that his government is unpopular, he needs to find ways to stay in power. Certainly holding his country hostage is a powerful move. Iran is using the argument employed by the Soviet Union and India that an enemy has nuclear power. While Israel has shown no signs of potential nuclear aggression, Iran certainly has a point. However, Ahmadinejad’s overly bellicose rhetoric is a cause for concern and shows a desire for regional supremacy and the potential obliteration of Israel.
Nuclear Theories
Waltz
The father of realist theory, Kenneth Waltz is one of the most significant figures in nuclear proliferation. His belief that nuclear proliferation stabilizes the world is controversial to say the least. Though extempers should not blindly follow an argument because it is unique or eye-catching, his is certainly worth examination. Waltz holds that if every state had nuclear weapons, then invasions would never occur, for fear of a nuclear exchange. No one state could reign over the others since all states are equally powerful, dangerous, and afraid.
The best analogy would be to compare nuclear proliferation to concealed guns laws, and their advocates. Potential criminals are less likely to rob someone if there is the potential that the victim has a gun. Likewise, invasions would not occur if the attacked could respond with the ultimate offensive.
The main criticism of Waltz is that he does not recognize the variability within states’ philosophies. If the War on Terror has taught anything it is that an enemy that values the opposition’s death over its own life is extremely difficult to defeat. Likewise, expecting Iranian zealots to not attack Israel because it wants to survive is extremely naive. Also, some states are susceptible to corruption and revolution. If Osama bin Laden knew that the Saudi government was in control of a nuclear arsenal, all of al-Qaeda and allied groups’ efforts would go into toppling the royal family. In the same vein, the more nuclear weapons there are, the more likely an accident is to occur. A power outage, computer error, or hitting the wrong button could set off a nuclear warhead. Despite the perception of nuclear weapons as highly volatile, dangerous objects, Waltz still wants one in every pot.
Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD)
Perhaps the most popular of all nuclear theories is that of Mutually Assured Destruction. MAD is the belief that governed over the Cold War and allowed civilization to survive it. The idea is that two countries would never engage in a nuclear exchange because they both would die. Destroying Moscow is of no value to John F. Kennedy if it comes at the cost of New York City and Los Angeles. To involve modern politics: a Chinese nuclear strike on Los Angeles would result in the immediate demolition of every Chinese town with a population higher than 1,000. MAD is regarded as one of the most user-friendly, simple theories in modern international relations. However, it rests on two important factors.
First, MAD only works for entities that value their own survival. As referenced in the description of Waltz’s theory, those who do not care about their own life must be treated differently. Mutually Assured Destruction certainly exists, but it does not matter to martyrs. Blowing up every hideout from Baghdad to Islamabad is a price that terrorist groups are willing to pay in exchange for millions of western casualties. Therefore, MAD can only apply to states that are rationally self-interested and value survival over ideology.
Additionally, MAD is supposed to reference two actors of relatively equal strength. MAD would not apply to the conflict between the United States and Iraq. An American nuclear assault would not result in equivalent damage on the home front. When a nuclear actor faces a non-nuclear actor, the nuclear state can choose to use its full arsenal. Since MAD could apply to interactions between two non-nuclear actors, MAD suggests that a nuclear adversary should use a nuclear weapon to prevent non-nuclear MAD from taking place. If a nuclear weapon could destroy Baghdad with no casualties, but a full-scale invasion would cost thousands of American lives, the choice is clear. While MAD comes across as simple and “correct”, its flaws are only explained by extempers with a true grasp of political theory and modern international relations.
Robert Jervis’ Security Dilemma
Originally used to describe pre-World War I Europe, the security dilemma does an excellent job pointing out a counterintuitive phenomenon. As countries increase defense, other countries respond with increased offense. This idea can be best described in its original environment: early 20th century Europe. Without giving a history lesson, all European powers started to mobilize troops and place them at national borders in rapid succession. If Germany mobilized out of fear of Russia, then France would mobilize out of fear of Germany. The reason this theory holds is because a strong defense is invariably confused with a strong offense. At present, there is no way to improve defense without giving the strategic advantage. Building forts along national borders could be a common practice to secure national boundaries. Yet, it can easily be perceived as a forward movement of military might in preparation of an invasion. The implementation of any change to military allocation or implementation will threaten potential adversaries, further destabilizing the system. In short, creating stability through defense breeds instability and offense.
First-Strike Capability
During the Cold War, there was great emphasis on what would happen if America and the Soviets went to war. The concept of first-strike capability became the ultimate goal for both parties. FSC is the ability to prevent a nuclear response. If the United States was able to destroy all nuclear plants and missile storage facilities before the Soviet Union could respond, it would have fsc. This ability would completely eliminate the concept of MAD, since there would no physical response to a nuclear strike. Gaining fsc is both an offensive and defensive objective. The ability for one country to dominate the other would overwhelmingly shift the balance of power. It would be hard to argue against a nuclear attack on an enemy if there would be no repercussions. Additionally, fsc can be defensive. Enemies will have to tread lightly around a country with fsc. The power to absolutely destroy would keep adversaries from being too vocal in dissent of the fsc country. An important fact to remember about fsc is that two countries can have it. This situation is exceptionally dangerous because it creates a prisoner’s dilemma, where states fear being attacked first. Choosing to not attack would yield peace or untold damage. Anytime not attacking involves some risk, the system clearly has destabilized.
Second-Strike Capability
If the opponent lacks fsc, then an entity has second-strike capability. SSC can be defined as the ability to retaliate with a nuclear strike after receiving one. By spreading out nuclear weapons across the country and keeping nuclear warheads on ships on the seas and planes in the sky, a country can keep ssc. Being able to respond will keep nuclear adversaries at bay. Again, more than one entity can have ssc. In this case, mutual ssc would prevent a nuclear exchange since MAD comes into play for both actors.
Non-Nuclear Routes
If we are to accept the reality that a nuclear exchange may never occur, then nuclear weapons do not matter anymore. Perhaps the easiest example of military force not relying on WMDs is the War in Iraq. The United States invaded Iraq because of a supposed illegal program to create a nuclear bomb. Using a nuclear bomb to obliterate Iraq would have made the “war” incredibly easy. Millions of casualties would have been inflicted, Sunnis, Shi’ias, and Kurds would be terrified and form a rag-tag alliance to get America out of Iraq as soon as possible. Iran would have seen what America is capable of and stopped its nuclear program for fear of being next. While this story only exists in the most ardent of war hawks and delirious of Bush bashers, it did not play out because of morality. Using a nuclear weapon to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons seems to be, at the very least, hypocritical.
The United States has the most aggressive foreign policy of nuclear states and yet is the least likely to employ one. As the only country to use the ultimate weapon, America carries the moral burden of being alone. No other country will ever deal with the guilt of ruining the lives of thousands of people through radiation. Thankfully, there are other routes countries can take to enhance military strength without building or using a nuclear weapon.
Conventional methods:
Building a standard military with a lot of soldiers and a lot of guns still seems to be effective. Even without nuclear capabilities, when Kim Jong Il parades his million man army, it is quite impressive. Conscription in South Korea and Israel has proven effective in maintaining a strong national defense in the face of aggressive enemies. Aside from having a large military, new technologies also are a solution to the non-nuclear. Advanced fighter jets, missile-carrying ships, and IED-resistant tanks are not the type of fighting force that the average low-level dictator with international ambitions wants to face. Indeed, Slobodan Milosevic would have thought twice if Albanians were organized with bombers, machine guns, and master tacticians.
A good example of non-nuclear technology is China’s usage of missiles to shoot a satellite out of the sky. Not the act was good for international relations, let alone legal, but it put the world on notice. President Bush has talked about restarting “Star Wars”, which would allow the United States to be able to shoot a nuclear weapon out of the sky, making it invincible to an aerial assault. Decades of history suggest that the program is not economically or technologically feasible, but a strong missile defense goes a long way to preventing an attack.
Legend holds that Ronald Reagan famously took naps and would rarely pay attention during cabinet meetings. When the idea of Star Wars first arose, it became clear that the Soviets would become paranoid if they knew that the United States was immune to a nuclear strike. In his dazed state, Reagan had a flash of brilliance, “Give them the technology, too”. Gaining a defense advantage would have destabilized Soviet-American relations. Giving the USSR Star Wars out of good faith would have made both parties safer. Again, Jervis’s security dilemma comes into play. States can choose to improve defense as an aggressive measure or do so as a means to show stability and calm.
Economic power:
Even without a strong military, countries can still have influence on foreign policy issues. The fastest route to power is to have money. Presently, there are two important examples of money trumping military: Germany and Japan. Germany maintains a strong voice in the European Union and Chancellor Angela Merkel is widely respected by the world’s powers. As the world’s third largest economy, Germany has quite a deal of clout. While it does not appear likely that the German military will be invading anyone any time soon, Merkel still feels free to speak out in favor a given foreign policy initiative.
As explained in a prior topic brief, Japan still tries to influence international opinion on military issues. With an economy second only to the United States, threats of trade restrictions still loom on those who openly defy Japan. The Japanese constitution prohibits aggressive military action, but a national defense force still exists to ward off threats of invasion. While some countries use military strength to threaten, or attack, smaller countries, Japanese loans often tend to serve the same goals with far less bloodshed.
Conclusions
Does Nuclearization matter?
In the end, it would be easy to argue that nuclearization does not matter, except in rare cases. Surely Ahmadinejad might be just crazy enough to attempt his life-long dream of eliminating Israel. Saddam Hussein was seen as just volatile enough to merit a full-scale invasion and regime change. Kim Jong Il is egotistical enough to terrify his neighbors and force thousands of American soldiers to remain at the DeMilitarized Zone. However, in most cases nuclear capability is a sign of status. Only in the direst of circumstances would France launch a nuclear weapon. It is simply having the trump card, not using it, that provides extra self-confidence in foreign policy. So in terms of understanding international relations, nuclear weapons matter, but not in terms of military advantages. With regards to utilization, having many weapons is far less important than the likelihood of using one. It is the facts that Ahmadinejad and Jong Il would use nuclear weapons that everyone finds scary. If Switzerland pursued a nuclear program, then the publicity and focus would be far less intense.
Is Nuclearization inevitable?
As time progresses, rudimentary statistics teaches that eventually nuclear proliferation will go global. Whether or not the earth is destroyed by a comet, climate change, or a return of the dinosaurs remains to be unseen. The position that all states will have nuclear weapons is uncomfortable in that it almost necessary is linked to the idea that all states should have nuclear weapons. If the nuclear powers do not want to proliferate nuclear technology, they won’t. History has shown that very few, if any, states have independently developed a weapon of mass destruction. The process is difficult, time-intensive, expensive, and not easily hidden. Thus, nuclearization is inevitable to the extent that America, Russia, China, France, England, Israel, India, and Pakistan want it to be inevitable.
With the rise of dangerous nuclear states in Iran and North Korea, states will likely focus on defensive measures. A squeamish South Korea would be well-served if it investigated new forms of national defense. Surely no states will stand in the way in widespread safety. If the international community trusts the nuclear states to not attack, then the shift to a defensive mindset should be gradual and stabilizing. If the international community becomes concerned for its own well-being, then states may choose to mobilize forces in a potential effort to attack before being attacked. In any event, the psychological and emotions of the international community, nuclear and otherwise, will set international relations far more significantly than which countries actually have nuclear weapons.
Cards:
Jervis, Robert. “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma.” World Politics (1978).
The date of this article alone shows its significance. This is one of the first articles that clearly articulated the security dilemma. It is tough to find and would be lucky to find a hard copy. Referencing an article from three decades ago that references a war fought nearly a century ago certainly takes guts. The analysis and “cool factor” of the article is well worth the risk
Jervis, Robert. “Mutually Assured Destruction.” Foreign Policy Nov.-Dec. 2002. <http://www.jstor.org/view/00157228/sp040012/04x0427k/0>.
This article provides an important update to Jervis’ theories and his feeling on how MAD has changed in the post 9-11 world. It’s three pages long, but comes from a good magazine and a better scholar.
Kimball, Daryl G. “Of Missiles and Missile Defenses.” Arms Control Today. <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_10/focus.asp>.
Arms Control Today stands as the preeminent source of nuclear proliferation analysis. This article seems particularly fitting since it focuses on the usage of defensive, instead of offensive, missiles.
Sagan, Scott, and Kenneth N. Waltz. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: a Debate Renewed. W.W. Norton, 2002.
I have not read this book, but it is written by two authors with diametrically opposed ideas. Waltz, as stated earlier, is pro-proliferation. Sagan believes that the more states with nuclear weapons increases the likelihood of a nuclear conflict or accident.
“U.S. Breaching NPT by Building New Nuclear Weapons: Top Lawmaker.” 29 Oct. 2007. Tehran Times. <http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_View.asp?code=155977>.
It certainly is noteworthy that this article comes from the Tehran Times. Yet, it still shows a very important, underreported perspective on the nuclear question. If the United States is violating the NPT, then the legitimacy of America’s call for non-proliferation greatly diminishes.