Background
With the seizure two weeks ago of the MV Faina, a Ukrainian freighter, by Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden, the world and its press have suddenly rediscovered the problems that exist in Somalia. Piracy off of Somalia’s waters is hardly a new phenomenon and is increasing on a yearly basis, with the international community too divided or apathetic to achieve a joint solution to the problem. What makes the seizure of the MV Faina important was that according to The Economist on October 4, 2008, the Faina had been equipped with anti-aircraft guns, grenade launchers, light weaponry, and 33 T-72 Russian tanks. Analysts fear that the pirates may have been able to ship much of the lighter weaponry to their allies in Somalia, although the chances of them being able to use the bigger weapons on board are slim. The seizure also has geopolitical implications in Africa, as the tanks on board were supposedly bound for southern Sudan, which is watching the clock and waiting for an opportunity to declare independence from Muslim-dominated northern Sudan in 2011.
Over the last two decades, Somali has had a very turbulent history, racked by civil wars and clan violence. Experienced extempers might note that they have had to focus on Somali before, when Ethiopia invaded the country to crush Islamic rebels in 2006. Today, extempers will need to focus on Somalia because the worsening political situation in the country has ramifications for the east Africa region as well as for the war on terrorism in the United States. Furthermore, the topic of Somali piracy is sure to emerge in question sets over the next month due to the fact that the world is trying to clamp down on surging pirate attacks, which threaten commerce in the Gulf of Aden, which has ten percent of the world’s shipping.
This brief will seek to provide extempers with some historical background about Somalia as well as briefly discuss several of the problems the country faces in the near future.
History of Somalia (Colonial Period to Present)
In the 1880s, European powers focused on one of the last theatres of colonial expansion, Africa. In the so-called “scramble for Africa” in this time period, Italy, Great Britain, and France arrived in Somalia looking to use the country as a basis of trade routes for goods. When the smoke cleared from this scramble, Somalia was divided in half between British Somaliland, which was located in the north, and Italian Somaliland, which was located in the south. During World War II, Italy would briefly take over British Somaliland in 1940, only to be driven out a year later by British forces based in Kenya.
Following World War II, the Italians briefly returned, but independence would be fully granted to both parts of Somaliland in 1960. Both lands were eventually unified into a country called Somalia, but as with most African countries created during the colonial period, boundaries did not take into effect clan allegiances. As a result, clans who were distrustful of each other carried that distrust into the political arena and the chaos paved the way for a military government, led by General Siad Barre to seize power in 1969. The military government would eventually name itself the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party and codify its rule in a constitution in July 1976.
One piece of history that is relevant for extempers about Somalia is that the country has long had tensions with its neighbor Ethiopia. Many Somalis believe that Ethiopia was unfairly granted territory that belonged to Somalia by the European colonial powers and argue that there are ethnic Somalis living in these lands that need to be brought into a Somali-led country. Wary of these territorial claims, Ethiopia’s government has long been hostile to the idea of working with any Somali government. These territorial questions fueled the Ogaden War, which lasted from 1977-1978, where the objective of the Barre government was to capture the disputed lands from Ethiopia. Although Somali forces enjoyed success in the early part of the war, the Soviet Union eventually got involved to protect Ethiopia’s communist government. This support eventually drove Somali forces out of Ethiopia, when the United States decided not to lend military aid to the Barre regime.
The chaos that Somalia has come to be known for began to emerge in January 1991, when Barre was overthrown by Ethiopian-backed Somali clans operating in the northern and central part of the country. Barre’s successor, Ali Mahdi Muhammad, a warlord for the Hawiye clan who had sparked much of the anti-Barre violence, was very ineffective and eventually his allies ended up fighting the United Somali Congress (USC), led by fellow warlord Mohammed Farrah Aidid. Soon, this violence between warlords escalated, with Barre’s supporters in the south becoming involved until mid-1992.
During the civil war, anarchy engulfed Somalia and the warlords began using international food aid as a weapon, sparking a massive famine in the country. Recognizing the need for international aid, the United States helped to launch the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) and Operation Restore Hope to assist in the delivery of food aid. When U.S. forces were withdrawn in May 1993, the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) took over for UNITAF but soon came under attack by Aidid, who felt the UN mission threatened his power. Taking advantage of the UN’s weak mandate, Aidid’s forces attacked UN forces and the U.S. troops who remained in the country. Following years of violence, the UN eventually withdrew in March of 1995.
By 2000, Somalia’s civil war had ended, but the country was a shell of its former self. After the violence, the Harti clan created the state of Puntland in northeast Somalia, which has declared autonomy from the Somali government. Also, the Isaaq clan established the autonomous state of Somaliland in northwest Somalia and refuses to be a part of any Somali government. However, it has not been recognized by anyone in the international community.
Trying to piece together what was left of the country, Somalia’s clans came together and formed a Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The TFG tried to extend its authority across southern Somalia, but clan tensions continued to disturb government operations. In 2006, fighting between the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), an alliance of Islamic scholars and militants, and an alliance of Mogadishu warlords called the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT) in conjunction with Puntland forces, engulfed the country. The ICU had the support of much of the Somali populace, who believed that although the ICU’s belief in sharia law would lead to a strict living environment, it provided stability, and used that support to win the early stages of the conflict. However, the United States became alarmed at the prospect of radical Islamists overthrowing the TFG and setting up an Islamist Somali state. Also, Ethiopia and Kenya became worried about refugees spilling over their borders and about the territorial aims of the ICU.
As ICU troops gained control of much of the territory occupied by the TFG, Ethiopia issued a security guarantee to the TFG and warned the ICU about threatening the TFG’s main capital at Baidoa in southern Somalia. Backed with U.S. support, Ethiopia sent its troops into Somalia on July 20, 2006. In direct encounters, Ethiopian troops overwhelmed the ICU and secured Mogadishu on December 28, 2006. Following this, the ICU retreated towards the border with Kenya and has re-emerged as a guerilla fighting force, employing many of the same tactics insurgents are using in Iraq against Ethiopian troops. In many ways, Ethiopian troops remain as protectors of the TFG as well as de facto peacekeepers, but have become bogged down in this guerilla conflict without receiving much support from the Somali people. Therefore, one can argue that Ethiopia is facing its own Vietnam and Iraq currently in Somalia.
Issues Confronting Somalia
When extempers decide to speak on Somalia, the most extensive background knowledge of the country they have and are able to weave into speeches the more coherent their speech will be. One major concept extempers need to acquire quickly about Somalia is that much of the country is in a perpetual state of anarchy, where there is very little government involvement in everyday life and people are struggling to get by. Experts believe that over half of Somalia’s population has been born since the fall of the Barre government in 1991, leaving a large pool of uneducated and jobless youths for warlords and Islamists to recruit. Emphasizing the chaos in Somalia should be the number one goal of an extemper talking about the country and it should be clarified in the introduction so the judge understands the backdrop of all of these events and why they are so chaotic.
The United States worries that the fight in Somalia is a larger, if neglected, theatre in the war on terrorism that is just as important as Iraq and Afghanistan. With the TFG being weak, divided, and under siege it cannot stage an effective counter-terrorism policy. In the midst of a political vacuum, Somalia’s people are desperate to get a government who can provide peace and stability, even if brutal means are required to do so. This mindset is what allowed the Taliban to set up a government in Afghanistan in the 1990s. The worry among U.S. policymakers is that if Ethiopian troops remain in Somalia, anger against the TFG will rise, ushering in more support for the ICU from which an Islamic state could emerge in Somalia. An Islamist base in the Horn of Africa could prove to be a base for al-Qaeda, which intelligence analysts believe has militants operating in the country. Also, this could threaten U.S. interests in Kenya and Ethiopia and spread conflict beyond Somalia’s borders.
Also, extempers should take not that Ethiopia’s standing in eastern Africa is also at stake in this conflict. At home, Ethiopian prime minister Meles Zenawi has been clamping down on political opposition and has also clamped down on foreign aid groups in the country. The U.S. has turned the other way due to Ethiopian actions in Somalia, but a loss there would not put Ethiopia on the U.S.’s good side. Also, the Ethiopian people are very much against their troops being in Somalia, an action they see was motivated more by choice than necessity. If Ethiopian troops are marred in this conflict much longer look for the political situation in Ethiopia to deteriorate. Finally, Ethiopia’s enemy, Eritrea, has been providing aid and support to the militants who are fighting Ethiopian troops in Somalia. Eritrea and Ethiopia have a long-standing dispute over the town of Badme, which currently belongs to Ethiopia, but Eritrea argues belongs to it. Both countries fought a war over this dispute from 1998-2000, and it is also important to note that Eritrea achieved its independence from Ethiopia in 1991 after a long independence struggle that lasted thirty years. A scenario extempers should consider is that Ethiopia could get angry over Eritrea’s assistance to Somali militants and attack Eritrea or, a more likely scenario, Eritrea could feel empowered by Ethiopia being weakened in Somalia and reconstitute the border war.
A final area extempers need to be aware of is that the chances of political reconciliation in Somalia are slim. A UN peacekeeping force is not likely to be dispatched to replace Ethiopian troops, which is essential for any peace deal between the rebels and the TFG. This is due to the fact that the UN is stretched thin and is still struggling to raise an effective force to police the Darfur region. Also, extempers need to take into consideration that there is very little national political character in Somalia. After decades of civil war, people are more loyal to their clans or warlords who own their territory than to a national government. Having so many warlords fighting for power is not a good ingredient to create a government of national reconciliation. Emphasizing this point home to the audience would be good in any extemp speech about Somalia so that the audience can get a clear picture as to why political changes are so tough to push through. Overall, although the UN is presiding over peace talks in Djibouti, there is little chance of an agreement emerging between moderate Islamist forces and the TFG.